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correctional facility to provide a sample for DNA analysis to determine the identification characteristics specific to the person.” Imprisoned on a felony drug charge, Quarterman’s DNA sample was used to link him to an outstanding rape case. 1. No equal protection violation ; State’s statutory scheme requiring DNA samples from incarcerated felons bears a rational relationship to a legitimate State interest, which here is “creating for law enforcement purposes a permanent identification record of convicted felons.” “[T]he Legislature acted reasonably and not arbitrarily when it focused on those convicted felons who are housed in a correctional facility where DNA samples can be efficiently and economically obtained. See Farley v. State, 272 Ga. 432, 434 (531 S.E.2d 100) (2000) (legislature may address problem ‘“one step at a time” or even “select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others”’).” 2. No search and seizure violation : “The privilege against self-incrimination in the United States Constitution does not protect an individual from government compulsion to provide blood or other biological samples. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757(II) (86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908) (1966) (neither extraction of blood nor its chemical analysis is inadmissible on self-incrimination grounds). Although the right against self-incrimination in the Georgia Constitution ‘has been construed liberally to limit the State from forcing an individual to affirmatively produce any “evidence, oral or real,” regardless of whether or not it is testimonial, [cit.]’ Muhammad v. State, 282 Ga. 247, 250 n. 1 (647 S.E.2d 560) (2007), OCGA § 24-4-60 does not force a convicted felon to remove incriminating evidence but only to submit his or her body for the purpose of having the evidence removed. Thus, OCGA § 24-4-60 does not violate Quarterman’s right under the Georgia Constitution to not incriminate himself. See Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 518(3) (192 S.E.2d 350) (1972).” Accord, Leftwich v. State , 299 Ga.App. 392, 682 S.E.2d 614 (July 7, 2009); Stinski v. State , 286 Ga. 839, 691 S.E.2d 854 (March 1, 2010). 3. No cruel and unusual punishment: “The court finds the statute is not penal and that means used to enforce the statute have not been shown to be malicious or grossly disproportionate to the refusal to comply with the statutory mandate.” U. DRUG COURT Fleming v. State, 297 Ga. 606, 774 S.E.2d 594 (June 29, 2015). Affirming unpublished Court of Appeals decision; trial court properly did not credit time spent in drug court program toward sentence in these circumstances. Defendant pled guilty to identity fraud and related offenses; her negotiated plea “allowed for deferred sentencing and participation in a drug court program. Her negotiated plea agreement specified that she would be sentenced to eight years of probation if she completed the drug court program, but she would be sentenced to ten years, with the first four to be served in prison and the remaining six to be served on probation, including residential substance abuse treatment, if she failed to complete the program.” When defendant violated the program, she was sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement, with no credit for the time spent in the program. “We hold that credit towards Fleming's sentence for her time spent in the drug court program is not warranted because such credit was not part of her plea agreement, the relevant statutes do not provide for credit in this case, and allowing credit would discourage defendants from successfully completing the drug court program.” 1. “T he agreement did not specify that her eventual sentence would be adjusted in any manner to give her credit for the time that she would spend in the drug court program prior to sentencing. Instead, it stated simply and clearly what her sentence would be based solely on her eventual success or failure in the program.” 2. “OCGA § 17– 10–11(a), which governs how credit is to be allotted, does not provide credit for Fleming in this case. This statute provides that full credit is to be given ‘for each day spent in confinement awaiting trial and for each day spent in confinement, in connection with and resulting from a court order entered in the criminal proceedings for which sentence was imposed, in any institution or facility for treatment or examination of a physical or mental disability.’ Because the trial court deferred sentencing, Fleming was neither under a sentence nor in confinement while she participated in a drug court program. ” 3. “Finally, the drug court was designed ‘to provide an alternative to the traditional judicial system.’ See OCGA § 15–1–15(a)(1). The drug court statute provides trial courts with wide discretion in crafting a plan for a defendant's rehabilitation and potential punishment. A defendant enrolled in a drug court program gains a valuable benefit because he or she receives treatment and an opportunity to possibly receive a lesser sentence or the dismissal of his or her case upon successful completion of the drug program. See id. at § 15–1–15(b)(2),(3). If sentence credit were given for time served in a drug court program, there might be less incentive for a defendant to successfully complete the program, for the drug court team in charge of treatment to work with a defendant when he or she broke program rules, and for the State to agree to a drug court program in lieu of a sentence of confinement.” 4. Restitution payments made by defendant while in the drug court program weren’t required before sentencing. She was properly credited with those payments at sentencing, but wasn’t entitled to credit for time served based on those payments. 5. “ We note, as did the trial court, that the time Fleming spent in jail, both before the suspension of her criminal proceedings to allow her participation in the drug court and during the times that she was placed in jail because of her lack of compliance with the drug court program, should be reported by the jail custodian to the Department of Corrections so that she will be given appropriate credit for that pretrial detention. See OCGA § 17– 10–11(a); Maldonado v. State, 260 Ga.App. 580, 580, 580 S.E.2d 330 (2003) (‘[T]he amount of credit given for time