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served is computed by the pre-sentence custodian, and it is awarded by the post-sentence custodian. Therefore, the trial court is not involved in this process.’ (footnotes omitted)).” Evans v. State, 293 Ga.App. 371, 667 S.E.2d 183 (August 22, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s double jeopardy claim when defendant was removed from drug court program and given option to withdraw his guilty plea. 1 Trial court involuntarily withdrew defendant from drug court program “because he had a mental illness, was under a doctor's supervision, and was taking four prescription medications.” “Evans argues that being sentenced to anything but drug court would constitute a second sentence on the same crime and thus constitute double jeopardy. But agreeing to attend drug court is not a “sentence.” It is a pre-trial intervention contract in which the defendant agrees to attend drug court in exchange for the opportunity to avoid having a conviction on his record. Further, the terms of the drug contract are not absolute. Successful completion of the contract depends upon Evans completing a drug court program. If ‘we will not interfere with a trial court's termination of a drug contract absent [the trial court's] manifest abuse of discretion,’ Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 213(1) (641 S.E.2d 189) (2006), we must grant the drug court similar discretion in deciding how to administer the program and who to admit.” 2. “Evans also argues that the State is contractually bound to adhere to the terms of his plea bargain. While a plea bargain is a binding contract between the State and the defendant, Thomas v. State, 285 Ga.App. 792, 794 (648 S.E.2d 111) (2007), we have not analyzed pre-trial intervention programs under contract law. If we held that the drug court had to admit any defendant recommended to its program regardless of any variables in the defendant's life, we would strip the drug court of its discretion in administering the program, which we decline to do.” 3. No equal protection violation where defendant not allowed to participate in drug court program due to his medical condition, including HIV and depression. “Evans was not excluded from participating in the program because of his HIV status, but because the relatively new program was ill-equipped to deal with his complicated medical status and multiple medications. The State's interest in preserving Evans' health is rationally related to its decision to exclude him from the drug court program, and we find no equal protection violation.” 4. No violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). “The Towaliga Circuit Drug Court is a public entity to which the Act applies. See Pa. Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (118 S.Ct. 1952; 141 L.Ed.2d 215) (1998) (state prison is public entity to which ADA applies.) But while both HIV positive status and mental illness are cognizable disabilities under the ADA, “[t]he statute is not operative ... unless the impairment affects a major life activity.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637 (118 S.Ct. 2196; 141 L.Ed.2d 540) (1998) (HIV-positive patient had action against dentist refusing to treat her because major life activity of reproduction was affected); see also Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, (119 S.Ct. 2176; 144 L.Ed.2d 540) (1999) (no issue whether institutionalized mentally ill petitioners were disabled). In this case, however, Evans has neither argued nor demonstrated that either impairment affects a major life activity. In fact, Evans argues that he requires no accommodation to attend the drug court program and that his health issues are being adequately treated by his doctors. In the absence of a major life activity impairment, the trial court did not err in concluding that the ADA does not apply to this case.” Wilkinson v. State, 283 Ga.App. 213, 641 S.E.2d 189 (December 20, 2006). Preponderance of evidence standard applies in proceeding to terminate defendant’s drug court contract. “Although OCGA § 16-13-2, which sets forth the trial court’s authority to institute an alternative to traditional sentencing in drug possession cases, does not establish the State’s burden in terminating such situation, we find it analogous to revocation of probation or of first offender status. Indeed, this Court has already analogized a drug court contract to first offender status. See Andrews v. State, 276 Ga.App. 428, 430-431(1) (623 S.E.2d 247) (2005) (like first offenders, defendants alleged to have violated a drug court contract must file an application for discretionary appeal). And ‘[f]irst offender status may be revoked based on alleged violations of probation if evidence produced at the revocation hearing establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the violation or violations alleged.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Young v. State, 265 Ga.App. 425, 426 (594 S.E.2d 667) (2004). We find the preponderance of the evidence test equally applicable in cases involving an alleged violation of a drug court contract. Moreover, we will not interfere with a trial court’s termination of a drug contract absent manifest abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. See Dugger v. State, 260 Ga.App. 843 (581 S.E.2d 655) (2003) (appellate court will not interfere with trial court’s ruling on probation revocation absent manifest abuse of discretion).” Stinson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 107, 630 S.E.2d 553 (April 7, 2006). “On this issue of first impression, we hold that a defendant who elects to plead guilty and undergo alternative treatment in a Drug Court program offered under OCGA § 16-13-2(a) is not entitled to credit for time spent in treatment if he is subsequently terminated from the program and sentenced on his original crime.” Based on State v. Stinson , 278 Ga. 377, 602 S.E.2d 654 (September 13, 2004) (previous appeal of same case on different issue) (“A defendant, like Stinson who has pled guilty and utilized the benefits of a rehabilitative option in order to avoid an adjudication of guilt may not withdraw the plea as a matter of right under OCGA § 17-7-93(b).”).