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V. EVIDENCE See also subheadings AGGRAVATED SENTENCE – PRIOR CONVICTIONS, above; PRE-SENTENCE HEARING , below; and VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT, below Taylor v. State, 331 Ga.App. 577, 771 S.E.2d 224 (March 26, 2015). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly considered defendant’s juvenile record in imposing sentence, citing Burrell v. State, 258 Ga. 841, 844(7) (376 S.E.2d 184) (1989) and OCGA § 15-11-79.1 (now 15-11-703), which “provided that juvenile court dispositions could be used, inter alia, in ‘sentencing in felony offenses,’ and the ‘records of dispositions and evidence shall be available to district attorneys and superior court judges and the accused and may be used in the same manner as adult records.’ Ga. L.2000, p. 91–92, § 1. This statute was in effect at the time of Taylor's sentencing, and thus the trial court properly considered his juvenile court records in sentencing him. See also former OCGA § 17–10–1(e) (‘In any case involving a felony in which the defendant previously appeared before a juvenile court, the records of the dispositions of the defendant as well as any evidence used in any juvenile court hearing shall be available to the district attorney, the defendant, and the superior court judge in determining sentencing as provided in Code Section 15–11–79.1.’)” Bun v. State, 296 Ga. 549, 769 S.E.2d 381 (February 16, 2015). Following 17-year old defendant’s conviction for malice murder and related offenses, no ineffective assistance at sentencing based on failure to object to testimony of former juvenile judge about defendant’s juvenile record and her opinion of defendant’s likelihood of rehabilitiation. “Bun claims counsel should have objected to Lawson's testimony because it was prohibited under Canon 2 of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct which states that judges ‘shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities’ and ‘should not testify voluntarily as [ ] character witnesses.’ Canon 2(A) and 2(B), Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. Bun's reliance on the Code of Judicial Conduct as the ground for exclusion of Lawson's testimony is misplaced. The Code of Judicial Conduct, which is intended ‘to provide a structure for regulating [judicial] conduct through disciplinary agencies,’ is limited in its application to officers ‘of a judicial system performing judicial functions’ and, in some circumstances, to judicial candidates. See The Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble, and Application of the Code of Judicial Conduct (‘Anyone ... who is an officer of a judicial system performing judicial functions ... is a judge for the purposes of this Code.’). Thus, even assuming the Code of Judicial Conduct could be asserted in a criminal proceeding as a basis for the exclusion of evidence, the Code did not apply to Lawson because she was not a judge or judicial candidate at the time her testimony was given. Counsel's failure to raise a meritless objection did not amount to ineffective assistance.” Benham, joined by Hunstein, dissents: “[w]e do not allow former prosecutors, former defense attorneys, and former judges involved in the prior case to testify about a defendant's character for sentencing purposes or otherwise.” Andrews v. State, 307 Ga.App. 557, 705 S.E.2d 319 (January 19, 2011). Felony obstruction and related convictions and sentences affirmed; no error in sentencing based on failure to prove prior conviction, especially given trial court’s express statement that it didn’t consider the prior conviction in sentencing. “‘There is a presumption, in the absence of a strong showing to the contrary, that the trial judge, when sitting without a jury, separates the legal evidence from facts not properly in evidence in reaching his decision,’” quoting Ingram v. State, 262 Ga.App. 304, 308(4)(c) (585 S.E.2d 211) (2003) (“no error where hearsay evidence was introduced at pre-sentencing hearing, absent strong showing that trial court relied on it in determining sentence”). Accord, Knight v. State , 311 Ga.App. 367, 715 S.E.2d 771 (August 4, 2011) (“there is a presumption that [a] sentence was correctly imposed, and the burden of showing that a sentence was not correctly imposed is with the party who asserts its impropriety,” quoting State v. Freeman, 198 Ga.App. 553, 557(3) (402 S.E.2d 529) (1991). Brinkley v. State, 301 Ga.App. 827, 689 S.E.2d 116 (December 31, 2009). Trial court erred in considering secondary evidence of defendant’s prior conviction in aggravation of sentence, absent showing of unavailability of certified copy of original under best evidence rule. State here sought to prove defendant’s prior guilty plea to second degree murder in Maryland through the testimony of the ADA who handled the prosecution and through “three exhibits allegedly relating to the Maryland case: an uncertified copy of the indictment; a document entitled ‘State's Version of Offense that had been prepared by the Maryland district attorney's office ‘primarily for parole purposes so that ... the parole authority would have information concerning the offense rather than just the title of the offense’; and a computer print-out of the purported case procedural history.” The Georgia prosecutor explained that no certified copy of the Maryland conviction was available because “the actual records were destroyed by a private records retention company;” but no evidence was presented to substantiate that contention. “[T]he state can introduce secondary documentary evidence or parol testimony to prove the prior conviction, if the state shows that the original record of the conviction was lost, destroyed, or inaccessible and cannot be produced despite the state's exercise of due diligence. See, e. g., Lumley v. State, 280 Ga.App. 82, 82-83 (633 S.E.2d 413) (2006); Summerour v. State, 211 Ga.App. 65, 66(1) (438 S.E.2d 176) (1993). See also OCGA