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§§ 24-5-2 (‘In order to admit secondary evidence, it shall appear that the primary evidence for some sufficient cause is not accessible to the diligence of the party.’); 24-5-4(a) (‘The best evidence which exists of a writing sought to be proved shall be produced, unless its absence shall be satisfactorily accounted for.’).” Here, however, “the state failed to present any competent evidence that the original record of the prior conviction had been destroyed and that a certified copy of it could not be obtained despite the due diligence of the state. Compare Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 553(11) (651 S.E.2d 689) (2007); Summerour, 211 Ga.App. at 66(1). The trial court therefore erred in ruling that the state could use secondary documentary evidence to prove the prior conviction in lieu of a certified copy of the original record.” Accord, Owens v. State , 324 Ga.App. 198, 749 S.E.2d 783 (October 9, 2013). Fraser v. State, 283 Ga.App. 477, 642 S.E.2d 129 (February 6, 2007). Despite prosecutor’s specific reference to illegal evidence in his argument for sentencing, no evidence that trial court relied thereon. “‘[T]here is a presumption, in the absence of a strong showing to the contrary, that the trial judge sifts the wheat from the chaff, ignoring illegal evidence and considering only legal evidence.’ (Emphasis supplied; punctuation omitted.) Tutton v. State, 179 Ga.App. 462, 463(2) (346 S.E.2d 898) (1986). Given that the court’s admonishment cited by Fraser makes no specific reference to the improper evidence in aggravation, Fraser has not made a strong showing that the trial court considered this improper evidence in imposing sentence. Thus, his claim that the trial court erred is without merit.” Accord, Williams v. State , 293 Ga.App. 193, 666 S.E.2d 703 (July 18, 2008) (sentence affirmed; trial court expressly stated it didn’t consider hearsay in sentencing). Cf. Brinkley (December 31, 2009) (trial court expressly stated that it considered prior conviction for which there was no competent evidence). Johnson v. State, 281 Ga.App. 7, 635 S.E.2d 278 (August 4, 2006). “We have previously held that the State has the burden of introducing evidence to show that a foreign conviction was for conduct that would be considered felonious in Georgia. Woodson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 67, 70(4) (530 S.E.2d 2) (2000). Here, the State introduced copies of the applicable Oklahoma statutes, which were signed by an Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma. After hearing argument by both the State and Johnson, the trial court concluded that Johnson’s conduct in violating the Oklahoma statutes would be considered felonious in Georgia. We find no basis for concluding that the trial judge was required to review certified copies of the Oklahoma statutes in order to reach its conclusions, and the trial court did not err in sentencing Johnson pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7(a).” Morse v. State, 277 Ga.App. 67, 625 S.E.2d 489 (December 16, 2005). Sentencing was not improper where defendant’s 20 prior arrests were mentioned by prosecutor, but only his three prior, properly-proven convictions were specifically relied upon by the court in imposing sentence. “ ‘A presumption exists ... that a trial judge did not consider improper matters in imposing sentence.’ Jenkins [ v. State , 235 Ga.App. 547, 550 (3)(c), 510 S.E.2d 87 (1998)].” Schaff v. State, 275 Ga.App. 642, 621 S.E.2d 595 (September 28, 2005). On sentencing, trial court may take judicial notice of prior convictions of defendant within same court. Based on Petkas v. Grizzard , 252 Ga. 104, 312 S.E.2d 107 (1984). Railey v. State, 273 Ga.App. 520, 615 S.E.2d 609 (June 6, 2005). “Following Railey’s motion for new trial, the trial court granted a new trial as to Railey’s sentence because ‘the State failed to introduce any admissible evidence regarding [Railey’s] prior convictions, and as such, the Court erred in sentencing [him] as a recidivist.’ At his resentencing, the State introduced certified copies of prior convictions, and Railey was sentenced as a recidivist. Railey then raised the additional ground for new trial that the court erred by giving the State a second chance to introduce proper evidence of his prior convictions. That motion was denied, and Railey appeals that decision. Railey’s argument is essentially one of double jeopardy, but that argument fails because a retrial to establish a prior conviction for the purpose of enhancing a sentence is not prohibited: ‘Whether double jeopardy precludes a retrial to establish a prior conviction depends upon whether the purpose of the conviction is to enhance the sentence or to prove an actual element of the offense. State v. Atwood, 16 S.W.3d 192, 194 (Tex.Ct.App. 2000). See also Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 734(II) (118 S.Ct. 2246, 141 L.Ed.2d 615) (1998) (double jeopardy does not preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in noncapital sentencing proceedings); Holcomb v. Peachtree City, 187 Ga.App. 258, 259(1) (370 S.E.2d 23) (1988).’ Brantley v. State, 272 Ga. 892, 893 (536 S.E.2d 509) (2000).” (Emphasis added.) Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 604 S.E.2d 488 (October 25, 2004). Conviction and sentence for malice murder and arson affirmed. 1. Trial court did not err in excluding expert testimony about false confessions in penalty phase, where the testimony was not supported by adequate showing of reliability and general scientific acceptance. “[A]lthough evidentiary rules are relaxed in the penalty phase, the trial court may exclude evidence that is unreliable,” citing