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record, and in the presence of counsel about the offense to which the defendant has pleaded.’ Rule 11(c)(5). We do not question the authority of a district court to make whatever inquiry it deems necessary in its sound discretion to assure itself the defendant is not being pressured to offer a plea for which there is no factual basis. A defendant who withholds information by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination at a plea colloquy runs the risk the district court will find the factual basis inadequate. At least once the plea has been accepted, statements or admissions made during the preceding plea colloquy are later admissible against the defendant, as is the plea itself. A statement admissible against a defendant, however, is not necessarily a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Rule 11 does not prevent the defendant from relying upon the privilege at sentencing.” “We reject the position that either petitioner's guilty plea or her statements at the plea colloquy functioned as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing.” 2. Contrary to Third Circuit, incrimination isn’t complete at plea entry, but continues through sentencing. “It is true, as a general rule, that where there can be no further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege. We conclude that principle applies to cases in which the sentence has been fixed and the judgment of conviction has become final. See, e.g., Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 513, 81 S.Ct. 260, 5 L.Ed.2d 249 (1960). If no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared. Where the sentence has not yet been imposed a defendant may have a legitimate fear of adverse consequences from further testimony.” Based on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), a death penalty case: “Any effort by the State to compel [the defendant] to testify against his will at the sentencing hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.” 451 U.S., at 463, 101 S.Ct. 1866. “The Fifth Amendment by its terms prevents a person from being ‘compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. To maintain that sentencing proceedings are not part of ‘any criminal case’ is contrary to the law and to common sense.” 3. Sentencing court couldn’t draw negative inferences from defendant’s silence at sentencing. “The normal rule in a criminal case is that no negative inference from the defendant's failure to testify is permitted. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). We decline to adopt an exception for the sentencing phase of a criminal case with regard to factual determinations respecting the circumstances and details of the crime.” “The Government retains the burden of proving facts relevant to the crime at the sentencing phase and cannot enlist the defendant in this process at the expense of the self-incrimination privilege. Whether silence bears upon the determination of a lack of remorse, or upon acceptance of responsibility for purposes of the downward adjustment provided in § 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (1998), is a separate question. It is not before us, and we express no view on it.” Scalia, writing for Roberts, O’Connor and Thomas, dissents. W. EXCESSIVE SENTENCE See CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT/EXCESSIVE FINES, above X. FINE See also CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT/EXCESSIVE FINES, above Jones v. State, 308 Ga.App. 99, 706 S.E.2d 593 (February 24, 2011). Conviction and sentence for speeding and related offenses affirmed, but community service imposed exceeded that statutorily authorized “Jones argues … that the enactment of legislation setting lower limits on speeding fines set forth in OCGA § 40-6-1(b), which became effective on July 1, 2001, [cit.] rendered the general misdemeanor punishment statute (OCGA § 17-10-3) inapplicable to speeding convictions. We disagree. OCGA § 40-6-1(b) simply sets limits on fines that may be imposed as punishment for a first offense of speeding. It does not restrict the available punishment for speeding to a fine. See Caputo v. State, 276 Ga.App. 477 (623 S.E.2d 687) (2005) (recognizing that speeding ‘is a misdemeanor and subjects [the defendant] to potential punishment as a misdemeanant,’ including possible imprisonment); Gregg [ v. State, 253 Ga.App. 243, 245(7) (558 S.E.2d 729) (2001)]. Compare Chastain v. State, 231 Ga.App. 225, 228(4) (498 S.E.2d 792) (1998) (holding that violations of OCGA § 40-6-253, which ‘criminalizes the act of operating a vehicle while in possession of an open container of alcohol and also prescribes its own punishment for such an act (i.e., a fine not to exceed $200),’ are punishable ‘by the specific statute, OCGA § 40-6-253(c), and not by the general misdemeanor statute’). Therefore, Jones's sentence to serve 12 months for the speeding charge was within authorized limits. See Caputo, 276 Ga.App. at 477; Gregg, 253 Ga.App. at 245(7).” Crane v. State, 302 Ga.App. 422, 691 S.E.2d 559 (February 18, 2010). Trial court erred by ordering defendant to begin paying fine while still incarcerated. Marshall v. State, 291 Ga.App. 284, 661 S.E.2d 662 (April 24, 2008). Trial court properly imposed $5,000.00 fine for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. “Marshall … contends that the trial court erred in imposing a $5,000 fine as a condition of his probation, because the statute under which he was sentenced, OCGA § 16-13-30(d), mandates