☢ test - Í

325, 528 S.E.2d 788.” Miller, joined by Phipps, dissents. Hoosline v. State, 328 Ga.App. 175, 761 S.E.2d 576 (July 10, 2014). Physical precedent only. Following defendant’s guilty plea to cocaine possession with conditional discharge under OCGA § 16-13-2(a), “the trial court erred by resentencing her to a term longer than her initial five-year sentence” because sentence form actually adjudicated defendant guilty at initial sentencing. “We note that the trial court used a standard sentencing form and added a handwritten note indicating that the plea was entered under OCGA § 16–13–2. Because a plea entered and accepted under OCGA § 16–13– 2 is not an adjudication of guilt, this form incorrectly reflected an adjudication of guilt and sentence. Instead, in addition to orally explaining the provisions of OCGA § 16–13–2 when a plea is entered, a trial court should enter a document accepting a plea under OCGA § 16–13–2, deferring adjudication, and explicitly stating that successful completion of the terms of probation would result in a complete discharge and dismissal, while a violation of the terms of probation would result in an adjudication of guilt and sentencing on the underlying charge up to the maximum permitted by law.” Miller concurs specially, disagreeing on this point, but arguing instead that “once a defendant begins serving a sentence under OCGA § 16–13–2 the sentence may not be increased. See Perdue v. State, 155 Ga.App. 802, 803, 272 S.E.2d 766 (1980) (reversing judgment in which trial court sentenced defendant to serve five years consecutive to any other sentence he was presently serving after the trial court revoked the defendant's three-year probationary sentence under Georgia Code Ann., § 79A–9917, the predecessor to OCGA § 16–13–2).” Dillard concurs in judgment only. Smith v. State, 322 Ga.App. 549, 745 S.E.2d 771 (July 1, 2013). Following guilty plea to cocaine possession, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw plea. Sentence was entered with conditional discharge pursuant to OCGA § 16-13-2 based on defendant’s claim that he was a first offender. In fact, defendant had a prior drug conviction in another state. “[A]s Smith knowingly defrauded the trial court by assenting to his eligibility for sentencing under OCGA § 16–13–2, he cannot request relief from error that his misconduct caused,” citing “ McFadden v. State, 243 Ga.App. 896, 898(2) (534 S.E.2d 566) (2000) (evidence of a prior out-of-state felony conviction for a drug offense established that defendant had defrauded the court in testifying that he had no such conviction, and thus defendant waived any right to complain on appeal of error resulting from his own misconduct); Cunningham v. State, 239 Ga.App. 889, 890–891(1) (522 S.E.2d 480) (2000); Johns v. State, 223 Ga.App. 553, 554(2) (479 S.E.2d 388) (1996).” Tew v. State, 320 Ga.App. 127, 739 S.E.2d 423 (March 6, 2013). Statutory rape conviction affirmed; trial court properly ruled that defendant wasn’t eligible for first offender sentencing. Defendant was 22, victim was 14, when offense occurred. Trial court ruled that plain language of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(b) prohibits first offender sentencing for anyone “convicted of a sexual offense.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, language of OCGA § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) doesn’t allow it, either. Subsection (c)(1) allows the court to “deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence as set forth in subsection (b) of this Code section, or any portion thereof,” if certain conditions are met. “ The wording and grammatical structure of the two subsections make it clear that (c)(1) was only intended to refer to the part of (b) relating to minimum sentences, not the last sentence relating to first offender sentencing. Accord, Harris v. State , 325 Ga.App. 568, 754 S.E.2d 148 (January 16, 2014) (defendant was ineligible for first offender sentencing on guilty pleas to child molesting and enticing a child). Higdon v. State, 291 Ga. 821, 733 S.E.2d 750 (October 29, 2012). Affirming 311 Ga.App. 387, 715 S.E.2d 741 (July 27, 2011); 1. trial court properly held that it couldn’t enter first offender sentencing under OCGA § 42-8-60 on charges contained in four separate charging instruments. Defendant here was charged with burglary, theft by taking, and six counts of deposit account fraud. Defendant pled guilty to all charges in a single hearing. “The trial court ruled that it had no authority to treat Appellant as a first offender on all eight crimes, because he was pleading to different offenses separated by time and place and charged in separate indictments and accusations. Although the court offered Appellant first offender status on the crime or crimes alleged in any one of the charging instruments, he declined the offer as providing him no benefit.” Held, OCGA § 42-8-60(b), providing that “[n]o person may avail himself or herself of this article on more than one occasion, ” in context, limits the treatment to the charges contained in a single accusation or indictment, generally. “[W]e hold that once ‘a verdict or plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere’ has been entered on a charging instrument, and the trial court grants a defendant first offender status for the offense or offenses alleged in that instrument, the defendant has availed himself of the first offender article on ‘one occasion’ and may not benefit from it as to a sentence entered on another indictment or accusation. The fact that the court's sentencing decisions on multiple charging instruments may be orally announced during the same hearing (as happened here), or may be formally entered close in time (as happened with Appellant's three accusations, although the judgment on his indictment was entered a week later), does not change the fact that, when the first judgment is entered, the defendant has benefitted from first offender treatment on a verdict or plea and may not do so again.” 2. Not resolved: whether first offender treatment may extend to charges in multiple charging instruments consolidated or joined for trial. “If such a joinder results in