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to be served. “[A]lthough OCGA § 17–10–7(c) ‘prohibits parole, it does not dispense with the trial court's discretion to probate or suspend part of a sentence under OCGA § 17–10–7(a).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hill v. State, 272 Ga.App. 280, 282 (612 S.E.2d 92) (2005).” Overruled on other grounds , Maddox v. State, 322 Ga.App. 811, 815(1), 746 S.E.2d 280 (2013). Lester v. State, 309 Ga.App. 1, 710 S.E.2d 161 (March 30, 2011). Whole court opinion; upon his convictions for kidnapping and related offenses, trial court properly sentenced defendant to life in prison as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7(a) and (c). OCGA § 17-10-7(a) requires longest possible sentence for a second felony, with discretion in the judge to probate or suspend part of the sentence; OCGA § 17-10-7(c) requires service of the maximum sentence for a third or greater felony, without parole. See also Jones (February 11, 2002), below, and cases collected thereunder. Accord, Jefferson v. State , 309 Ga.App. 861, 711 S.E.2d 412 (June 13, 2011); Allen v. State , 325 Ga.App. 752, 754 S.E.2d 795 (February 18, 2014). Krepps v. State, 301 Ga.App. 328, 687 S.E.2d 608 (November 24, 2009). Recidivist sentencing under OCGA § 16-5- 90(c) applies where first conviction was for aggravated stalking. “Krepps asserts that he could not be sentenced pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-90(c) because his prior conviction was for aggravated stalking, not ‘stalking.’ … While we acknowledge that the language of OCGA § 16-5-90(c) does not explicitly mention ‘aggravated stalking’ in addition to ‘stalking,’ it would be an absurd and contradictory result for this Court to hold that a prior misdemeanor stalking conviction could trigger the applicability of recidivist stalker sentencing pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-90(c) while an aggravated stalking conviction could not.” Raymond v. State, 298 Ga.App. 549, 680 S.E.2d 598 (June 25, 2009). Where defendant was found not guilty of possession of firearm by convicted felon, State was free to use same prior felony convictions to support recidivist sentencing, citing Walker v. Hale (February 11, 2008), below. Howard v. State, 297 Ga.App. 316, 677 S.E.2d 375 (April 3, 2009). No ineffectiveness of counsel shown for failure to investigate defendant’s prior criminal record, used for recidivist sentencing, where defendant’s prior record actually did support recidivist sentencing. Although one conviction tendered had been reversed on appeal, the other three were valid. This aggravated assault conviction was thus defendant’s fourth felony, justifying his maximum 20-year sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7(c). Battise v. State, 295 Ga.App. 833, 673 S.E.2d 262 (January 15, 2009). Where defendant was acquitted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, underlying felonies remained available for aggravation of sentence on burglary conviction. Citing Walker v. Hale (February 11, 2008), below. Hooks v. State, 284 Ga. 531, 668 S.E.2d 718 (October 27, 2008). “Because ‘murder is a capital felony and OCGA § 17- 10-7(c) expressly excepts from its purview capital felonies, it follows that a sentence under that Code section is a punishment which the law does not allow to be imposed for murder.’ Funderburk v. State, 276 Ga. 554, 555(2) (580 S.E.2d 234) (2003). See also Miller v. State, 283 Ga. 412, 417(5) (658 S.E.2d 765) (2008).” Accord, New case!Hyde v. State , S16A0698, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2946475 (May 23, 2016). Legislatively superseded, Ga. L. 2010, p. 563, § 1. Singleton v. State, 293 Ga.App. 755, 667 S.E.2d 711 (September 30, 2008). Trial court properly sentenced recidivist defendant to life without probation or suspension for armed robbery conviction. “ OCGA § 17-10-7(a) generally provides that any person convicted of a felony who shall afterwards commit another felony ‘shall be sentenced to undergo the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the subsequent offense of which he or she stands convicted, provided that, unless otherwise provided by law, the trial judge may, in his or her discretion, probate or suspend the maximum sentence prescribed for the offense.’ The longest period of time prescribed by Georgia law for the punishment of armed robbery is life imprisonment. OCGA § 16-8-41(b); see Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 252(1), 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995) (rejecting argument that person convicted of armed robbery must be given sentence for a determinate number of years rather than a life sentence unless he is sentenced to life as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7). And as recognized in State v. Baldwin, 167 Ga.App. 737, 307 S.E.2d 679 (1983), OCGA § 17-10-1 ‘expressly abrogates the trial court's discretionary power to grant probation in cases in which life imprisonment or capital punishment is imposed.’ Id. at 740(4), 307 S.E.2d 679 (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, as held in Baldwin, it is ‘otherwise provided by law’ that the trial court has no discretion to probate or suspend a portion of a life sentence imposed as recidivist punishment under OCGA § 17-10-7(a). Supra; see Stone v. State, 218 Ga.App. 350,