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controlled; (2) The earnings and other income of the offender or person ordered to pay restitution; (3) Any financial obligations of the offender or person ordered to pay restitution, including obligations to dependents; (4) The amount of damages; (5) The goal of restitution to the victim and the goal of rehabilitation of the offender; (6) Any restitution previously made; (7) The period of time during which the restitution order will be in effect; and (8) Other factors which the ordering authority deems to be appropriate.’ Here, Tindol received a restitution hearing, the trial court considered all of the required factors, and the court made findings based on the evidence presented. ‘[I]t is well established that review of evidence by this Court is limited to questions of sufficiency.’ Anderson v. State, 226 Ga.App. 286, 288 (486 S.E.2d 410) (1997). The evidence showed that Tindol currently makes approximately $500 a month working through a temporary job service as a day laborer; however, before his arrest he made $1,400 a month at BMC. While, Tindol testified about his monthly expenses, including his rent, food, utilities, and child support, he did not bring check stubs or income tax returns showing how much he had earned in the previous years. The trial court found that based on the evidence presented at the hearing, ‘[Tindol] is making at least six thousand dollars per year. He’s got over six years left on probation. So he’s got the ability ... to pay any restitution found within the evidence presented.’” In re: C.S., 280 Ga.App. 781, 635 S.E.2d 176 (July 11, 2006). Juvenile court’s restitution order vacated and remanded for failure to make written findings regarding the appropriateness of restitution and the juvenile’s ability to pay. “‘Before ordering restitution, a trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether restitution is appropriate and, if so, the amount that should be paid. OCGA § 17-14-10 requires that the trial court consider several factors in making this determination, including the offender’s present financial status, the offender’s probable future earning capacity, the goals of the restitution order, and the amount of damages suffered by the victim. Following the restitution hearing, the court must make written findings of fact relating to each of the factors set forth in OCGA § 17-14- 10. Failure to make such written findings renders the restitution order deficient. Lummus v. State, 274 Ga.App. 636, 638- 639(3) (618 S.E.2d 692) (2005) (citation and punctuation omitted); OCGA § 17-14-10 (2004); see Garrett v. State, 175 Ga.App. 400, 403(1) (333 S.E.2d 432) (1985) (holding that restitution orders must contain written findings of fact related to the factors in OCGA § 17-14-10); see also Revis v. State, 223 Ga.App. 470(1) (477 S.E.2d 880) (1996). After the June 2005 extension order was entered in this case, OCGA § 17-14-10 was amended to modify and add factors. Ga. L.2005, p. 88; see Register v. State, 279 Ga.App. 61, 630 S.E.2d 593 (April 21, 2006).” Accord, Newton v. State , 281 Ga.App. 549, 636 S.E.2d 728 (September 13, 2006). In re: C.S. and Newton both disapproved “to the extent they require written findings when ordering an offender to make restitution,” McCart (February 29, 2008), above . Lummus v. State, 274 Ga.App. 636, 618 S.E.2d 692 (July 27, 2005). Restitution order following burglary conviction reversed; “the trial court neither held a required hearing nor made the proper written findings. Under these circumstances, we must vacate the trial court’s sentence to the extent that it imposed restitution and remand this case for a hearing and entry of a new order and sentence that includes the required written findings.” Disapproved “to the extent [it requires] written findings when ordering an offender to make restitution,” McCart (February 29, 2008), above . Wiggins v. State, 272 Ga.App. 414, 612 S.E.2d 598 (March 23, 2005), reversed in part on other grounds, 280 Ga. 268, 626 S.E.2d 118 (January 30, 2006). Following conviction for child cruelty and related offenses, restitution award reversed and remanded for failure to hold hearing. “Before ordering restitution, a trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether restitution is appropriate and, if so, the amount that should be paid. See Nobles v. State, 253 Ga.App. 814 (560 S.E.2d 724) (2002). OCGA § 17-14-10 requires that the trial court consider several factors in making this determination, including the offender’s present financial status, the offender’s probable future earning capacity, the goals of the restitution order, and the amount of damages suffered by the victim. Following the restitution hearing, ‘the court must make written findings of fact relating to each of the factors set forth in OCGA § 17-14-10.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 814-815. Failure to make such written findings renders the restitution order deficient. See id . at 815.” Accord, Gray v. State , 273 Ga.App. 747, 615 S.E.2d 834 (June 17, 2005) (deficient restitution order must be vacated and remanded for proceedings in compliance with OCGA § 17-14-10); Turner v. State , 312 Ga.App. 799, 720 S.E.2d 264 (November 22, 2011) (same). Nobles v. State, 253 Ga.App. 814, 560 S.E.2d 724 (February 19, 2002). Following guilty plea to theft by taking, trial court’s restitution judgment vacated and remanded because the trial court failed, as required, to include written findings of fact, in its order, pertaining to various factors set forth in OCGA § 17-14-10. However, a new restitution hearing may be required only if the required factors were not considered in making the order. Accord, Steele v. State , 270 Ga.App. 488, 606 S.E.2d 664 (November 16, 2004). Written findings of fact no longer required, see McCart (February 29, 2008), above.