☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 161, 164(3) (554 S.E.2d 190) (2001). See also Roebuck v. State, 261 Ga.App. 679, 684(4) (583 S.E.2d 523) (2003). In this instance, the prosecutor was comparing the actions of [victim’s boyfriend] Kempf to Glidewell at the time when the victim became missing, and the prosecutor was not commenting on Glidewell’s silence after he became the target of a police investigation. As an objection would have been meritless, his attorneys were not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s statement.” Johnson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 182, 630 S.E.2d 778 (April 21, 2006). 1. “Tracy [Johnson]’s trial counsel made strategic decisions (a) to cross-examine the police officer on the subject of the lineup after the fact that the victim had identified Tracy had already come out, and (b) not to object to testimony concerning that identification so as not to draw attention to this same subject. There was no deficient performance here. See Sneed v. State, 267 Ga.App. 640, 641- 642(2)(b), (c) (600 S.E.2d 720) (2004) (affirming trial court’s finding that presumably strategic decisions concerning cross-examination and objection did not amount to ineffective assistance).” Accord, Stillwell v. State , 294 Ga.App. 805, 670 S.E.2d 452 (November 6, 2008); Durham v. State , 292 Ga. 239, 734 S.E.2d 377 (November 19, 2012) (counsel’s “decision not to object to the officer's hearsay testimony was a legitimate trial strategy.”). Accord, Johnson v. State , 294 Ga. 86, 750 S.E.2d 347 (October 21, 2013) (decision to cross-examine rather than object was strategic, not deficient); Bragg v. State , 295 Ga. 676, 763 S.E.2d 476 (September 22, 2014). 2. “Tracy … asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to testimony concerning the guilty plea of Lawrence Franklin arising from the same incident as well as a reference to that plea by the prosecution in the course of closing argument. … ‘It is true that evidence of a co-defendant’s guilty plea is not admissible into evidence, since it has no probative value as to the guilt of the defendant himself.’ Zachery v. State, 276 Ga.App. 688, 689-690(1) (624 S.E.2d 265); OCGA § 24-3-52 (confession of co-defendant made ‘after the enterprise is ended shall be admissible only against himself’). However, trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that an objection to either the testimony or the reference in closing argument would have led the jurors to ‘think more about what has transpired during the objection.’ Again, we refuse to second-guess this strategic choice. See Bogan v. State, 255 Ga.App. 413, 415(3)(b) (565 S.E.2d 599) (2002); Cunningham v. State, 244 Ga.App. 231, 234(3) (535 S.E.2d 262) (2000).” Stancil v. State, 278 Ga.App. 843, 630 S.E.2d 130 (April 13, 2006). Counsel was not “ineffective for failing to object to the re-assembled rifle being used as an exhibit at trial, because the rifle that Stancil pointed at the police officer did not include the stock of the weapon. ... The record reveals that there was no need for trial counsel to object to the rifle being presented to the jury as a complete weapon, because the officer’s testimony on direct and cross-examination made clear that Stancil pointed an incomplete weapon at him, even though the officer did not know at the time that the rifle’s stock had been removed and instead believed that Stancil could have shot him. Presenting the disassembled rifle to the jury would merely have been cumulative of this evidence.” Bunkley v. State, 278 Ga.App. 450, 629 S.E.2d 112 (March 24, 2006). Defense counsel’s decision not to raise Bruton objection to admission of co-defendant’s out-of-court statement, because it fit his trial strategy of pointing blame at third defendant, was an unassailable strategic decision. “‘Trial counsel’s decision not to seek ... exclusion under Bruton was clearly a matter of trial strategy. Such a strategic choice, made after thoughtful consideration, cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’ (Citation omitted.) Smith v. State, 269 Ga.App. 133, 143(4)(d) (603 S.E.2d 445) (2004).” Accord, Browder v. State , 294 Ga. 188, 751 S.E.2d 354 (November 18, 2013) (“A decision not to raise a Bruton objection to the admission of a co-defendant's out of court statement can, depending upon the circumstances, be the result of reasonable trial strategy.”). Hines v. State, 277 Ga.App. 404, 626 S.E.2d 601 (January 27, 2006). Police officer’s testimony on defendant’s failure to respond to certain questions during his interrogation, though he had consented to be questioned, violated defendant’s right to remain silent, and counsel’s failure to object thereto constituted deficient performance ; no reversal, however, because there is “no reasonable probability that the comments had any effect on the jury’s verdict,” as it was brief, elicited on cross, and state made no further reference or attempt to take advantage. “‘It is fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination of a defendant as to post-arrest silence where the defendant has been informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), or to permit comment thereon, since the giving of the Miranda warnings might induce silence by implicitly assuring a defendant that his silence will not be used against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); Clark v. State, 237 Ga. 901, 230 S.E.2d 277 (1976). See also Bennett v. State, 254 Ga. 162(4), 326 S.E.2d 438 (1985).’ Chapman v. State, 263 Ga. 393, 393-394(1), 435 S.E.2d 202 (1993). Furthermore, in Durden v. State, 250 Ga. 325, 327-328(3), 297 S.E.2d 237 (1982), the Court held that a police officer’s testimony that the defendant answered certain questions asked of him by the police during a post-arrest interview, but gave no response to other critical