☢ test - Í

against State, citing “ Layman v. State, 284 Ga. 83, 85, 663 S.E.2d 169 (2008) (State's inability to draft perfect indictment relatively benign though negatively weighed).” 3. Defendant’s “testimony that he lost two jobs because he had to travel to court on multiple occasions is evidence of anxiety and concern. But Lambert ‘chose not to alleviate his anxiety and concern by filing a speedy trial demand’ for five years following the mistrial on the kidnapping charge. Green v. State, 295 Ga.App. 468, 471(6), 672 S.E.2d 414 (2008).” Accord, Richardson (October 23, 2012) (physical precedent only on this point; defendant’s testimony that his career was derailed by pending child molestation charges “is at least some evidence of anxiety and concern”). Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 690 S.E.2d 507 (February 3, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s constitutional speedy trial demand on his state court DUI prosecution. 1. ‘[T]he trial court erred in holding that an overcrowded docket was not a delay caused by the government for which the State was not at fault.” “The issue is not whether the delay could be attributed to the defendant, the State, or the trial court, however, but whether it could be attributed to the defendant or the government. The ‘responsibility of bringing a defendant promptly to trial rests with the government.’ Williams v. State, 300 Ga.App. 797, 686 S.E.2d 407 (November 6, 2009). A delay due to crowded dockets resulting from ‘the government's failure to provide for sufficient numbers of judges, prosecutors, or indigent defense counsel,’ is a delay caused by the government, albeit unintentional, and must be weighed against the State. Ruffin v. State, [284 Ga. 52, 60(2)(b)(ii) (663 S.E.2d 189) (2008)]; Oni v. State, 285 Ga.App. 342, 343-344(2)(b) (646 S.E.2d 312) (2007).” Accord, Jakupovic v. State , 287 Ga. 205, 695 S.E.2d 247 (May 17, 2010) (delay from crowded docket and changing judge assignments “weighs minimally against the State.”); Ward v. State , 311 Ga.App. 425, 715 S.E.2d 818 (August 16, 2011) (delays in appointment of counsel attributable to government); Dillard (October 5, 2015), above (delay “occasioned by a lack of judicial resources and budgetary shortfalls” should have been weighed “lightly” against the State). 2. Trial court properly found that defendant’s jury trial demands were not demands for speedy trial though “he cited that portion of the Georgia Constitution providing that ‘the defendant shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury,’ Art. 1, Sec. 1, Par. 6(a). Those jury trial demands themselves, however, included no explicit speedy trial demands, and our Supreme Court has held that a demand for jury trial does not invoke a constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 513(3) (555 S.E.2d 710) (2001). The accused bears the responsibility for putting the government on notice he does not want a delay, and failure to do so weighs strongly against him” in constitutional speedy trial analysis, citing Frazier v. State, 277 Ga.App. 881, 882(c) (627 S.E.2d 894) (2006). 3. Trial court could find no prejudice where defendant had, at most, lost one of four witnesses due to passage of time, and that one was cumulative of the other three. Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446, 689 S.E.2d 283 (February 1, 2010). No violation of defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights where his trials for felony murder, child molestation and armed robbery were delayed between two and five years. “The primary reason for the delay in this case was Marshall's cooperation with the prosecution in the Brian Nichols case. Because both Marshall and the State agreed to the delay to explore whether Marshall would be able to help prosecute Nichols, it cannot be said that the delay can be attributed to the State.” Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 387, 688 S.E.2d 344 (January 25, 2010). No constitutional speedy trial violation where 12- month, 10-day delay between defendant’s indictment for murder and filing of motion to dismiss. “The ‘peculiar circumstances’ of this case include the process of obtaining a requisition warrant from the Mississippi governor, which process was initiated within a month of [defendant's] indictment and took three months before the warrant was issued.” The delay was thus not “presumptively prejudicial.” Grizzard v. State, 301 Ga.App. 613, 688 S.E.2d 402 (December 14, 2009). 1. Trial court erred in denying defendant’s plea in bar to prosecution of child molestation charges; presumption of prejudice after unjustified eight-year delay in prosecution should have been weighed “heavily against the State , not merely benignly.” This is true even if one year is attributed to defendant’s interlocutory appeal, successfully challenging trial court’s failure to dismiss four of six counts on statute of limitation grounds. “The State concedes that it did not diligently prosecute the case, that the case had fallen ‘off the radar’ screen, and that even though the State was aware of the case and was responsible for calendaring cases, the case disappeared off the calendar and ‘just did not get prosecuted’ until it began to appear on court calendars in late 2008.” But see Franklin v. State , 305 Ga.App. 354, 699 S.E.2d 575 (July 8, 2010) (presumption of prejudice after 17-year dead-docket delay “was outweighed by the State’s proof that Frankin suffered no actual prejudice,” given that “he admitted under oath that he has no defense to the crime, that he does not have a defense and has never intended to mount a defense, and that no witnesses have been lost as a result of the delay.”). 2. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, his appearance for trial in 2001 did not constitute “an assertion of his right to a speedy trial.” “[W]e hold that appearing for trial does not invoke either a constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial.” Accord, Miller v. State , 313 Ga.App.