☢ test - Í

Griffin v. State, 282 Ga. 215, 647 S.E.2d 36 (June 25, 2007). Sixth Amendment provides no “right to a speedy indictment.” Following United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752) (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468) (1971); Moore v. State, 278 Ga. 473, 474 (604 S.E.2d 139) (2004); State v. Madden, 242 Ga. 637 (250 S.E.2d 484) (1978). Manley v. State, 281 Ga. 466, 640 S.E.2d 9 (January 8, 2007). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar; 18- year delay between victim’s death and defendant’s indictment did not deprive defendant of due pocess. “In order for Manley to prevail on his claim that his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated by the delay between the time of the crime and the time of his arrest, Manley must prove (1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to his defense, and (2) that the delay was the result of deliberate prosecutorial action to give the State a tactical advantage. Jackson v. State, 279 Ga. 449(2) (614 S.E.2d 781) (2005).” “‘ The offense in this case is murder, for which there is no applicable statute of limitation. Hence, any prejudice which results merely from the passage of time cannot create the requisite prejudice. The possibilities that memories will dim, witnesses become inaccessible, and evidence be lost are inherent in any extended delay, and, these possibilities are not in themselves enough to demonstrate that [the defendant] cannot receive a fair trial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted) Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 880(3) (426 S.E.2d 852) (1993). Thus, Manley has failed to show that the delay between the time of the crime and the time of his arrest prejudiced his defense. Nor is Manley able to show that the delay here was the result of deliberate action by the State to gain a tactical advantage. Delay caused by an ongoing investigation does not result in a violation of due process, Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200(4) (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003), and Manley has produced no evidence that the State acted deliberately to gain a tactical advantage in this regard.” Accord, Bunn v. State , 284 Ga. 410, 667 S.E.2d 605 (October 6, 2008) (three-year delay in murder prosecution; quotes language above); Curry v. State , 291 Ga. 446, 729 S.E.2d 370 (July 9, 2012) (almost 24 year delay between murders and indictment). See also Holton (June 26, 2006), below. Holton v. State, 280 Ga. 843, 632 S.E.2d 90 (June 26, 2006). No due process violation where defendant’s murder prosecution was delayed 20 years, although she was immediately arrested at the time of the killing. First grand jury declined to indict; DA’s office re-opened case 20 years later and obtained indictment. “Defendant claims she was denied her due process rights because the State delayed the prosecution for 20 years. In order to prevail on this claim, defendant must show (1) that the delay actually prejudiced the defense and (2) that the prosecution deliberately delayed the case in order to gain a tactical advantage. Jackson v. State, 279 Ga. 449, 450(2) (614 S.E.2d 781) (2005); Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 878(2) (426 S.E.2d 852) (1993). Defendant has not made either showing. True, several witnesses died in the intervening years [Cit.] and some pieces of evidence were missing. [Cit.] But this hindered the prosecution as much as defendant; it is the type of prejudice inherent in any extended delay. See Jackson v. State, supra; Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 205 (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003). And even if defendant could show actual prejudice as a result of the delay, it cannot be said that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the State.” See also Manley (January 8, 2007), above. Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 586 S.E.2d 651 (September 22, 2003). “‘Where the delay occurs in the investigative stage before either arrest or indictment, due process, not sixth amendment, standards apply. [Cit.]’ Haisman v. State, 242 Ga. 896, 898(2) (252 S.E.2d 397) (1979). A due process violation requires a finding ‘1) that the delay caused actual prejudice to the defense, and 2) that the delay was the product of deliberate action by the prosecution designed to gain a tactical advantage.’ [Cits.; emphasis in original.] After conducting a hearing, the trial court concluded that defendant failed to prove either element. He contends that the evidence demands a finding of actual prejudice because some witnesses are now inaccessible and certain evidence has been lost. However, ‘any prejudice which results merely from the passage of time cannot create the requisite prejudice.’ [Cit.]. As for the second prong, defendant showed, at most, that the delay … was the result of the State’s decision to conduct further investigation and to obtain additional evidence. Delay occasioned by the ongoing investigation of a case does not rise to the level of a due process violation.” Henderson v. State, 272 Ga. 621, 532 S.E.2d 398 (July 5, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no due process violation in State’s four-year delay in indicting and arresting defendant. “[Co-defendant] Benjamin did not show that the delay caused actual prejudice to the defense [fn: Benjamin has not demonstrated any prejudice which would not be expected due to the passage of time. After all, the possibility that memories will fade, witnesses will disappear and evidence will be lost are inherent in any extended delay. State v. Madden, 242 Ga. 637, 638, 250 S.E.2d 484 (1978). Moreover, the trial court specifically found that Benjamin's alibi defense was not prejudiced by the delay. ] and that it was the product of a deliberate action which was designed by the prosecution to gain a tactical advantage. Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876, 878(2), 426 S.E.2d 852 (1993).”