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not rendered ineffective because it was filed “together with ten other pleadings and motions upon a single form certificate of service.” “Notwithstanding the absence of a separate certificate of service attached directly to Hudson's speedy trial demand filing, see generally OCGA § 17–1–1(e)(2), Hudson's demand was otherwise its own separate, distinct, and individual document that was not a part of any of the ten additional documents filed on August 6, 2009. See OCGA § 17–7–170(a). Compare Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 445, 449(2 )(b) (696 S.E.2d 346) (2010) (concluding defendant's speedy trial demand was not a separate, distinct, and individual document where it was contained within the defendant's motion to dismiss). Moreover, Hudson's speedy trial demand complied with the additional pleading requirements of OCGA § 17–7–170(a) insofar as the self-contained document clearly bears the title ‘DEMAND FOR SPEEDY JURY TRIAL,’ references OCGA § 17–7–170(a), and identifies the indictment number for which such demand is being made.” Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 445, 696 S.E.2d 346 (May 27, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; purported speedy trial demand was ineffective. “Jones's speedy trial demand contained within his December 10, 2008 motion to dismiss filed in state court was not a ‘separate, distinct, and individual document’ as required by OCGA § 17-7-170(a). Further, Jones has failed to demonstrate that he served the State with a copy of the December 8, 2009 demand, which is also specifically required under the statute. See OCGA § 17-7-170(a) (‘the demand for speedy trial shall be filed with the clerk of court and served upon the prosecutor and upon the judge to whom the case is assigned or, if the case is not assigned, upon the chief judge of the court in which the case is pending’). Finally, even assuming that Jones's December 2009 demand was effective, he waived his right to a speedy trial under OCGA § 17-7-170 by announcing not ready for trial on February 3, 2009, April 14, 2009, and April 20, 2009. See Oni v. State, 268 Ga.App. 840, 841 (602 S.E.2d 859) (2004).” Over v. State, 302 Ga.App. 215, 690 S.E.2d 507 (February 3, 2010). In defendant’s state court DUI prosecution, trial court properly found that defendant’s jury trial demands were not demands for speedy trial though “he cited that portion of the Georgia Constitution providing that ‘the defendant shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury,’ Art. 1, Sec. 1, Par. 6(a). Those jury trial demands themselves, however, included no explicit speedy trial demands, and our Supreme Court has held that a demand for jury trial does not invoke a constitutional right to a speedy trial. State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 513(3) (555 S.E.2d 710) (2001). The accused bears the responsibility for putting the government on notice he does not want a delay, and failure to do so weighs strongly against him” in constitutional speedy trial analysis, citing Frazier v. State, 277 Ga.App. 881, 882(c) (627 S.E.2d 894) (2006). Merrow v. State, 268 Ga.App. 47, 601 S.E.2d 428 (June 21, 2004). Defense counsel’s entry of appearance, stating that counsel “enters a demand for trial in the above styled case,” was insufficient to invoke statutory speedy trial rights. “‘[T]he minimum acceptable standard for such demand requires that the defendant’s demand for trial be coupled with some other language that places the State on reasonable notice that a speedy trial under the sanctions of OCGA § 17-7- 170 is being invoked, i.e., a reference to trial at the next term, reference to a ‘speedy trial,’ use of the language of the Code, or reference to the Code section.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State , 251 Ga.App. 489, 490(1), 554 S.E.2d 612 (2001).” State v. Shields, 265 Ga.App. 473, 594 S.E.2d 692 (February 6, 2004). Jury manager’s affidavit that there were jurors summoned and available for two terms after filing of speedy trial demand was sufficient; affidavit did not have to recite that juries were “properly empaneled.” “This argument is foreclosed by Redstrom v. State, 239 Ga.App. 769, 770 (521 S.E.2d 904) (1999), in which we held that ‘the term “impanel” signifies the act of the clerk of the court in making up a list of the jurors who have been selected for the trial of a particular cause.’” Bonakies v. State, 263 Ga.App. 812, 589 S.E.2d 573 (September 10, 2003). Defendant’s demand for trial at the next two terms of court citing the constitutional speedy trial provisions and not OCGA § 17-7-170 or -171 “on its face, was a request for trial under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provisions of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the statutory right was not properly asserted.” Notice was also defective for failing “to identify either the indictment number or the charges against him.” “Discharge and acquittal based on a statutory speedy trial demand is an extreme sanction that requires strict statutory compliance,” even where filed pro se, as here. Bishop v. State, 261 Ga.App. 445, 582 S.E.2d 571 (June 2, 2003). “Bishop’s equivocal ‘Demand & Waiver,’ wherein the request for a speedy trial was advanced only upon the occurrence of a condition precedent, i.e., transfer to superior court, was insufficient to invoke the extreme sanctions authorized by under OCGA § 17-7-170. ‘A demand for trial will not be