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within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Accord, Davis v. State , 290 Ga. 584, 723 S.E.2d 431 (February 27, 2012) (at murder trial, no ineffective assistance shown where expert at new trial hearing was equivocal about the cause of victim’s wound); Leonard v. State , 292 Ga. 214, 735 S.E.2d 767 (November 27, 2012) (“Leonard has not shown what, if any, effect such an expert might have had on the outcome of his trial.”). Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (January 19, 2011). Ninth Circuit erred in reversing California Supreme Court’s denial of habeas relief to defendant’s murder conviction; 1. no ineffective assistance based on failure to consult expert witnesses. “There are … ‘countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.’ Strickland at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Rare are the situations in which the ‘wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions’ will be limited to any one technique or approach. Ibid. … From the perspective of Richter's defense counsel when he was preparing Richter's defense, there were any number of hypothetical experts – specialists in psychiatry, psychology, ballistics, fingerprints, tire treads, physiology, or numerous other disciplines and subdisciplines – whose insight might possibly have been useful. An attorney can avoid activities that appear ‘distractive from more important duties.’ Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 19, 130 S.Ct. 13, 19, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (per curiam) . Counsel was entitled to formulate a strategy that was reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies. [Cits.]” Prior to trial, neither the defense nor the prosecution here expected blood evidence to be a critical issue in the case; thus, the prosecution also lacked evidence concerning whose blood was found in critical places. If the defense had focused on this issue, Supreme Court says, the prosecution may have gathered more evidence, with the possible result that “Richter’s story would be exposed as an invention. An attorney need not pursue an investigation that would be fruitless, much less one that might be harmful to the defense. Strickland, supra, at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Here Richter's attorney had reason to question the truth of his client's account, given, for instance, Richter's initial denial of involvement and the subsequent production of Johnson's missing pistol. … To support a defense argument that the prosecution has not proved its case it sometimes is better to try to cast pervasive suspicion of doubt than to strive to prove a certainty that exonerates .” “Although courts may not indulge ‘ post hoc rationalization’ for counsel's decisionmaking that contradicts the available evidence of counsel's actions, Wiggins, 539 U.S., at 526-527, 123 S.Ct. 2527, neither may they insist counsel confirm every aspect of the strategic basis for his or her actions. There is a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel's attention to certain issues to the exclusion of others reflects trial tactics rather than ‘sheer neglect.’ Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (per curiam) .” Accord, Deleon-Alvarez v. State , 324 Ga.App. 694, 751 S.E.2d 497 (November 14, 2013). 2. No ineffective assistance where trial counsel failed to anticipate that the prosecution would “ offer expert testimony and therefore was unable to offer expert testimony of his own in response. The Court of Appeals erred in suggesting counsel had to be prepared for ‘any contingency.’ … Here, Richter's attorney was mistaken in thinking the prosecution would not present forensic testimony. But the prosecution itself did not expect to make that presentation and had made no preparations for doing so on the eve of trial.” Having a rebuttal expert is not necessarily required to provide effective assistance: “[i]n many instances cross- examination will be sufficient to expose defects in an expert's presentation. When defense counsel does not have a solid case, the best strategy can be to say that there is too much doubt about the State's theory for a jury to convict. And while in some instances ‘even an isolated error’ can support an ineffective-assistance claim if it is ‘sufficiently egregious and prejudicial,’ Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), it is difficult to establish ineffective assistance when counsel's overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy. Here Richter's attorney represented him with vigor and conducted a skillful cross-examination. As noted, defense counsel elicited concessions from the State's experts and was able to draw attention to weaknesses in their conclusions stemming from the fact that their analyses were conducted long after investigators had left the crime scene. For all of these reasons, it would have been reasonable to find that Richter had not shown his attorney was deficient under Strickland .” Lanier v. State, 288 Ga. 109, 702 S.E.2d 141 (November 1, 2010). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to obtain independent DNA analysis of crime lab evidence, inasmuch as defendant failed to “produce a DNA expert who would testify that the State's DNA evidence was defective, and his unfounded speculation as to the potential for a test result different from that introduced at trial does not constitute a showing of professionally deficient performance by counsel. Williams v. State, 284 Ga. 849(3) (672 S.E.2d 619) (2009).” Accord, Leslie v. State , 292 Ga. 368, 738 S.E.2d 42 (February 4, 2013). Pierce v. State, 301 Ga.App. 167, 687 S.E.2d 185 (November 19, 2009). At defendant’s trial for aggravated battery and related charges, no ineffective assistance for failure “to call an expert witness to testify about the severity of the victim's thigh injury.” “Trial counsel explained at the motion for new trial hearing that after receiving the victim's medical records she did not ask for a continuance to obtain an expert to review them because she was concerned it would give the State