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court clerk not sufficient; “statute explicitly requires the filing with the clerk of a ‘true bill of indictment or an accusation.’ OCGA § 17-7-170(a).”). Vedder v. State, 241 Ga.App. 578, 527 S.E.2d 249 (December 16, 1999). In defendant’s speeding prosecution, speedy trial demand, filed in municipal court which didn’t impanel juries, was ineffective when case transferred to state court. “Because Vedder did not file a demand for speedy trial in the state court, he did not file an effective demand for speedy trial.” Thus, no harm to defendant and no abuse of discretion where trial court granted State’s motion to nolle pros. Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 519, 520 S.E.2d 694 (September 13, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for discharge based on speedy trial demand. Traffic citations were filed in State Court during May term; accusation for same offenses was filed in July term; speedy trial demand was filed in September term. Based on State v. Gerbert , 267 Ga. 169, 475 S.E.2d 621 (1996): “‘ the statutory right to demand a speedy trial of a traffic offense in state court attaches when the uniform traffic citation is filed with the court. If a court can adjudicate the charges in the citation without the filing of a formal accusation, then a defendant should be able to enter a speedy trial demand based solely on the citation. This holding presents a bright-line rule that fulfills the purpose of the speedy trial guarantee.... It is also consistent with the cases holding that the prosecution of a traffic offense, for statute of limitation purposes, begins when the state issues the uniform traffic citation.’ Id. at 170-171, 475 S.E.2d 621. … Keeping the rationale of Gerbert in mind, we are compelled to conclude that the filing of a uniform traffic citation triggers the time for the filing of a speedy trial demand – and that the clock does not start again simply because the state subsequently files a formal accusation setting forth the same charges. ” Parks v. State, 239 Ga.App. 333, 521 S.E.2d 370 (July 27, 1999). Defendant’s speedy trial demand was untimely when filed more than two terms after filing of UTC in state court. “[A] uniform traffic citation functions as an accusation, without the necessity of filing an additional, formal accusation. OCGA § 40-13-1; Hayek v. State, 269 Ga. 728, 729(2), 506 S.E.2d 372 (1998); Smith v. State, 207 Ga.App. 762, 429 S.E.2d 149 (1993). The Supreme Court has established a bright-line rule that the right to a speedy trial in such a case attaches when the state files a uniform traffic citation with the court. [ State v. Gerbert, 267 Ga. 169, 475 S.E.2d 621 (1996)].” This general rule is not changed by the local legislation creating the State Court of Cobb County, which provides in part that “[a]ll prosecutions in criminal cases … shall be by written accusation made by the solicitor general.” OCGA § 15-7-1 et seq. provides for uniform rules of practice and procedure in the State Courts. “Accordingly, unless otherwise provided by OCGA § 15-7-1 et seq., when there is a conflict between the statute and local law creating a particular state court, the statute takes priority and is controlling. OCGA § 15-7-3; see also OCGA § 15-7-60.” “Thus, the local legislation cited by Parks does not abrogate OCGA § 40- 13-3's clear pronouncement that, in prosecutions based on uniform traffic citations which are filed in court, the State need not file a formal accusation.” 5. WAIVER/WITHDRAWAL BY DEFENSE Twiggs v. State, 315 Ga.App. 191, 726 S.E.2d 680 (March 27, 2012). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; waiver of speedy trial demand by counsel was valid where made after consultation with defendant, regardless of whether he was present in court when made. “Although the record is unclear as to whether Twiggs was present when his attorney made this announcement, we know of no requirement that the client be present for the voluntary act by his counsel that results in such a waiver.” Accord, Armstrong v. State , 325 Ga.App. 33, 752 S.E.2d 120 (November 20, 2013). Tolbert v. State, 313 Ga.App. 46, 720 S.E.2d 244 (November 16, 2011). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly considered statutory speedy trial demand waived based on defense counsel’s illness. Though the order was never entered on the record, subsequent colloquy showed that both sides were aware that the demand had been struck by the court. “As we see it, Tolbert had at least two options with regard to his speedy-trial demand: (1) challenge the trial court's decision to strike his original speedy-trial demand and/or (2) request permission to file an out-of-time demand. … By acquiescing in the trial court's action of striking his October 2007 statutory speedy-trial demand …, Tolbert abandoned any arguments with regard to it, and his failure to file an out-of-time demand after having been granted permission to do so constituted a waiver. See Mize v. State, 262 Ga. 489, 490–91(2) (422 S.E.2d 180) (1992) (holding that defendant waived statutory right to speedy trial when, following dismissal of first demand, defendant ‘did not seek the trial court's permission to file a new demand for trial’); see also Oni v. State, 268 Ga.App. 840, 841 (602 S.E.2d 859) (2004) (‘A defendant ... may waive his statutory right to automatic discharge and acquittal by some action on his part or on the part of his counsel.’).” Defendant was subsequently granted the right to file an out-of-time demand, but never did so, and hence waived the issue.