☢ test - Í

failed to prove venue. Defendant gave a false statement to a DeKalb DA’s Investigator as they drove in a vehicle, beginning at the Dekalb County jail. “The State may indeed be able to show circumstantially that the DeKalb County Jail is in DeKalb County. … However, even if the interview began in DeKalb County, we do not know what county Stockard was in when he made the false statements. The audio recording of the interview indicates that Stockard made his initial false statement between 8 and 10 minutes after the recording began, and told the investigators the truth as to his whereabouts between 16 and 37 minutes after the recording began. There is no way to tell from the audio recording where the vehicle was when Stockard made the false statements.” State can’t rely on OCGA § 17-2-2(e) here, the exception for when ““it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed,” because “the State made no attempt to elicit evidence as to where the crime occurred. … In this case, the investigators may well have known which county or counties [defendant] was in when he made the false statements, but they were never asked to identify any locale. The evidence did not establish that it would have been difficult to determine where the crime was committed, or, necessarily, that the crime could have been committed in more than one county. The State simply failed to present any evidence about counties except that the interview began at the sally port of the DeKalb County Jail. … If we were to affirm the trial court in this instance, given the lack of effort on the part of the State to elicit any information as to venue, then we would be removing from the State its mandated burden. Any time a crime occurred in a vehicle traveling through Georgia, the State would be absolved of the burden of proving venue; further, it would not even need to attempt to prove venue.” Grant v. State, 326 Ga.App. 121, 756 S.E.2d 255 (March 12, 2014). Fleeing and eluding conviction reversed for failure to prove venue. Contrary to State’s argument, “testimony identifying which streets Grant traveled and that the officers worked with” the Savannah-Chatham police department was insufficient to prove venue. “[O]ur Supreme Court in Jones specifically held in 2000 that ‘slight evidence’ is not sufficient to prove venue, that venue is an element of each crime, and that it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones [ v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 903(2), 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000)]; see also Segel v. State, 293 Ga.App. 506, 507(1)(b), 667 S.E.2d 670 (2008). … Merely identifying the names of streets and the arresting officers' place of employment is insufficient to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore Grant's conviction for fleeing and eluding must be reversed. See [ In re: B.R., 289 Ga.App. 6, 8(2), 656 S.E.2d 172 (2007)]; Jones, 272 Ga. at 904(3), 537 S.E.2d 80.” State’s reliance on OCGA § 17–2–2(h), providing for venue when the location of the offense is in doubt or occurred in more than one county, is misplaced; the officers here testified specifically to the place where the offense occurred, they just didn’t identify the county. Davis v. State, 326 Ga.App. 279, 754 S.E.2d 815 (March 6, 2014). Theft by taking conviction reversed; evidence failed to establish venue. “[I]n cases such as this, where the unlawfully appropriated property is money, the State has two options for proving venue. See Naylor [ v. State, 257 Ga.App. 899, 900, 572 S.E.2d 410 (2002)]; Stowe v. State, 163 Ga.App. 535, 537(4), 295 S.E.2d 209 (1982). The State can proceed ‘in the county where the accused received the money,’ Naylor, 257 Ga.App. at 900, 572 S.E.2d 410 (punctuation omitted); see also Stowe, 163 Ga.App. at 537(4), 295 S.E.2d 209, or it can produce evidence ‘tracing funds disbursed ( i.e., spent) in one county (where the case is being prosecuted) back to the account or other source in the origin county, showing further that the funds were not disbursed in accordance with the contract provisions governing the use of the funds.’ Naylor, 257 Ga.App. at 900, 572 S.E.2d 410 (punctuation omitted); see also Stowe, 163 Ga.App. at 537(4), 295 S.E.2d 209. In the case sub judice, the trial court found—in its order denying Davis's motion to dismiss—that because the negotiation and execution of the contracts occurred at Pruett's offices in Dodge County, there were ‘significant contacts’ establishing venue there. But as we have previously explained, it is not the residence of ‘the beneficiary or rightful owner of the stolen funds which controls venue[.]’ DeVine v. State, 229 Ga.App. 346, 348(1), 494 S.E.2d 87 (1997). Nor can a nexus or general factual connection with a county, as argued by the State, ‘establish venue in contravention of the clear requirements of the relevant statute.’ Id. at 348–49(1), 494 S.E.2d 87. Indeed, the argument posited by the State and adopted by the trial court below ‘essentially disregards the applicable law: in a theft by deception case, ‘the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the accused exercised control over the property which was the subject of the theft.’ Davis v. State, [322 Ga.App. 826, 828(1), 747 S.E.2d 19 (2013)]; see OCGA § 16–8–11. And here, although the contracts were executed in Dodge County, there is no evidence that Davis exercised any control over the $350,000 until Pruett wired the funds into Davis's bank account located in metro Atlanta. Nor is there any evidence that Davis spent or disbursed any of the funds in Dodge County. Rather, the evidence shows that Davis used the money for his other business ventures, including the failed venture in Jeff Davis County.” O’Donnell v. Smith, 294 Ga. 307, 751 S.E.2d 324 (November 18, 2013). Following defendant’s malice murder conviction, habeas court erred in granting relief; no ineffective assistance based on failing to challenge State’s proof of venue. Contrary to habeas court’s findings, jury could have found from the evidence that the stabbing took place in Fulton