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pediatrician’s improper bolstering of victim’s credibility was adequately cured by immediate curative instruction. “[T]he pediatrician's testimony that he believed that J.G. had told him the truth was improper. [fn] But given the trial court's immediate curative action-reminding the jury that credibility was exclusively its province and instructing the jury that the pediatrician's testimony relating to J.G.'s credibility was improper, devoid of any relevance, and stricken, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial.” Rayner v. State, 307 Ga.App. 861, 706 S.E.2d 205 (February 15, 2011). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly sustained State’s objection to defense expert’s testimony going to witness credibility. “In one instance, while discussing the efficacy of multiple interviews, the expert testified that research shows that interviewing children multiple times risks the possibility of contaminating the information received in subsequent interviews. He then stated: ‘And Dr. Stephen Ceci out of Chicago has shown clearly that after a thirty-day period of time, in an experiment he conducted, experts cannot tell anything about what really did or did not happen based upon the interviews.’ The state objected on the grounds that the expert was testifying about the witness's believability, and the trial court sustained the objection. Experts are allowed to discuss the propriety and effect of interviewing techniques in child sexual abuse cases , see Barlow v. State, 270 Ga. 54 (507 S.E.2d 416) (1998), and the record here shows that Rayner's expert was permitted to testify at length on this topic. It is also true, however, that an expert witness cannot testify as to his opinion of a victim's truthfulness. See Roberson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 208, 210(4) (447 S.E.2d 640) (1994).” Bunn v. State, 307 Ga.App. 381, 705 S.E.2d 180 (October 27, 2010), affirmed on other grounds, 291 Ga. 183, 728 S.E.2d 569 (June 18, 2012). Convictions for child molestation, aggravated child molestation and child cruelty first degree affirmed; therapist didn’t improperly comment on victim’s credibility. “The therapist stated that it ‘was good’ that K.B. ‘was comfortable enough and felt like telling what had actually happened was important enough to go back’ to correct her mistake in an earlier statement about the room in which the molestation occurred. The therapist explained that this was good because it demonstrated ‘resistance to suggestibility.’” “The statement that Bunn complains of here is not a statement concerning whether, in the therapist's opinion, the victims had been molested. See Hafez v. State, 290 Ga.App. 800, 801(2) (660 S.E.2d 787) (2008) (statement that social worker was treating victim for ‘“exhibiting intrusive thoughts and memories of abuse that are triggered by current events in life”’ was not an opinion that the victim had in fact been abused); Brownlow v. State, 248 Ga.App. 366, 368(2)(a) (544 S.E.2d 472) (2001); compare Pointer v. State, 299 Ga.App. 249, 250-252(1) (682 S.E.2d 362) (2009) (statement that evaluation ‘strongly suggests that [victim] had been “sexually abused as alleged”’ was improper).” Pointer v. State, 299 Ga.App. 249, 682 S.E.2d 362 (July 17, 2009). Defendant’s child molestation conviction reversed; defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel based on improper bolstering of victim’s testimony by expert who testified “that his evaluation ‘strongly suggests that [A.P.] had been sexually abused as alleged.’” “The witness’ testimony that his evaluation ‘strongly suggests that [A.P.] had been sexually abused as alleged’ was inadmissible. [ Allison v. State, 256 Ga. 851 (6) (353 S.E.2d 805) (1987)]. Our courts have recognized a difference between expert testimony that ‘the victim's psychological exam was consistent with sexual abuse,’ and expert testimony that ‘(i)n my opinion, the victim was sexually abused.’ See Odom v. State, 243 Ga.App. 227, 228(1) (531 S.E.2d 207) (2000). In the first situation, the expert leaves the ultimate issue for the jury to decide; in the second, the expert makes a factual conclusion which invades the province of the jury by providing a direct answer to the ultimate issue: was the victim sexually abused? Id. The ‘strongly suggests’ language in this case falls somewhere between the two types of testimony. The expert stops just short of stating his opinion that the victim was sexually abused, but he goes beyond merely stating that the evidence was consistent with sexual abuse. Considered in context, with the ‘as alleged’ language, the testimony amounts to a factual conclusion (regarding whether the child was in fact sexually abused and, if so, whether Pointer was the abuser) which invades the province of the jury. The jurors were fully capable of deciding from the evidence, on their own, whether the child was in fact sexually abused as alleged. See Allison, supra at 853(6). The admission of this testimony over proper objection would have demanded reversal.” Carrie v. State, 298 Ga.App. 55, 679 S.E.2d 30 (May 4, 2009). 1. Not improper bolstering: during interview with child molestation victim, “the psychologist's comment that [victim] I.C. did a good thing by immediately reporting the sexual abuse did not amount to bolstering I.C.'s credibility. See Turner v. State, 253 Ga.App. 760, 762(2) (560 S.E.2d 539) (2002).” 2. Improper bolstering: “Upon direct examination, the State's prosecutor asked the psychologist: ‘In your course of interviewing the victim in this case, [I.C.], did you ever have any reason to believe that she was lying to you?’ The psychologist responded: ‘Not based on her interview with me. There wasn't anything that she said that jumped out at me that I would have a big concern about.’”