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Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434, 689 S.E.2d 286 (February 1, 2010). At defendant’s murder trial, trial court properly prohibited defendant from impeaching co-defendant (testifying for State) about his parole eligibility, “see Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327(2) (588 S.E.2d 722) (2003) (because authority to grant parole rests with Board of Pardons and Paroles and not the district attorney's office, cross-examination regarding parole is irrelevant on question of witness's potential bias in testifying favorably for the State), no further analysis of this issue is necessary to the determination of the case at hand.” Nahmias (joined by Melton) concurs specially to argue that parole eligibility may sometimes be relevant for impeachment: “The most obvious example would be if the witness had originally faced a life sentence without possibility of parole but, after pleading guilty, faces life with the possibility of parole. While there still can be no certainty that the Parole Board will ever actually parole the witness, the witness's opportunity to leave prison alive, rather than in a casket, is unquestionably a real benefit that could influence the witness's testimony and that the defendant is therefore entitled to make known to the jury. Where the witness's parole eligibility is reduced through the interaction of the district attorney's charging decisions and the laws governing parole, there may be a provable disparity that, if it is significant and was understood by the witness, is a legitimate subject for cross-examination. Likewise, in cases where the district attorney agrees to make a recommendation to the Parole Board in exchange for the witness's cooperation, that benefit is fair game for cross-examination.” No evidence here, however, that witness’s parole eligibility was affected by deal with State. Nahmias’s concurrence followed in Manley (March 1, 2010), above. Perkins v. State, 288 Ga.App. 802, 655 S.E.2d 677 (December 7, 2007). Trial court properly ruled that defendant couldn’t advise jury of potential sentence for trafficking in cocaine. Defendant’s sole defense was that she was a “blind mule,” unwittingly carrying drugs for someone else; she sought to present evidence of mandatory minimum sentence to explain to jury why a dealer might use someone else to carry their drugs. Distinguishing Vogleson (October 28, 2002), below (trial court erred by refusing defendant’s attempt to cross-examine co-defendant about the amount of prison time he saved himself by agreeing to testify against defendant): “[a]llowing evidence of the specific punishment in a case in which there is a hypothetical wrongdoer, who is not identified, not charged with a crime, not testifying, not subject to cross- examination, and who has not made a deal with the State in exchange for testimony against the defendant, would create a situation in which the exception swallows the general rule.” Glidewell v. State, 279 Ga.App. 114, 630 S.E.2d 621 (April 27, 2006). Full court opinion. Overruled on other grounds, Reynolds v. State , 285 Ga. 70, 673 S.E.2d 854 (February 23, 2009). “ ‘The state is under a duty to reveal any agreement, even an informal one, with a witness concerning criminal charges pending against that witness, and a failure to disclose such an agreement constitutes a violation of the due process requirements of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215) (1963).’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jolley v. State, 254 Ga. 624, 629(5) (331 S.E.2d 516) (1985).” Here, however, despite dismissal of charges against witness after he testified against defendant, both prosecutor and defense attorney testified that there was no “pre-existing agreement made to benefit [witness] for testimony against Glidewell.” Trial court did not abuse its discretion in crediting this testimony. Accord, Wimes v. State , 293 Ga. 361, 744 S.E.2d 787 (June 17, 2013); Devaughn v. State , 296 Ga. 475, 769 S.E.2d 70 (February 2, 2015). Guillen v. State, 275 Ga.App. 316, 620 S.E.2d 518 (August 31, 2005). Trial court properly refused to charge jury on witness immunity, and leniency granted to witnesses. “Though some plea discussions may have occurred between [witness] and the state, there is no evidence that the state granted [witness] immunity or leniency in exchange for his testimony. See Monsalve v. State, 271 Ga. 523, 525-526(3) (519 S.E.2d 915) (1999) (no error in trial court's refusal to give proposed charge on immunity and leniency where the defendant testified that he had been promised nothing in exchange for his testimony, and that he had not been granted any immunity or leniency, or threatened with any harm, in relation to his testimony). See also Harris v. State, 274 Ga. 422, 426(6)(a) (554 S.E.2d 458) (2001); Epps v. State, 262 Ga.App. 113, 117(5) (584 S.E.2d 701) (2003).” Wright v. State, 279 Ga. 498, 614 S.E.2d 56 (June 6, 2005). Defendant’s conviction reversed; trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to impeach witness with juvenile adjudications. “[A] defendant is entitled to cross-examine the State’s witnesses regarding whether they are currently on probation for a juvenile offense or have open or pending cases in juvenile court. [Cit.] … However, the substantive facts underlying an open juvenile case would not generally be admissible.” “[A] witness who is under commitment to the Department [of Juvenile Justice pursuant to OCGA § 15-11- 70] is equally subject to the allegation that he is shading his testimony in favor of the State in order to obtain more favorable treatment,” and thus likewise subject to cross-examination on that basis. Based on Davis v. Alaska , 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) and Mangum v. State , 274 Ga. 573, 555 S.E.2d 451 (2001). Accord, Pate v.