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based upon a discrepancy relating to a wholly immaterial matter, [cit.]’ Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153, 156(4) (391 S.E.2d 113) (1990), we find no error in the trial court’s admission of impeachment evidence introduced by the State that reflected on the credentials and competency of a defense expert witness, a collateral issue that was indirectly material to the issue in the case. Carswell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 833, 834(2) (589 S.E.2d 605) (2003). The State’s evidence reflected that at the time a defense expert in the field of psychology prepared an affidavit indicating his opinion that Rogers manifested substantially subaverage intellectual functioning before age 18, the expert was on probation following a suspension by the Georgia State Board of Examiners of Psychologists; the State’s evidence rebutted the expert’s trial testimony regarding the grounds for that suspension and included the Board’s decision that the expert’s admitted conduct fell below minimum standards of care. This evidence reflected on the expert’s credentials and competency, thus challenging his credibility and opinion as to Rogers’s intelligence, the issue in this case. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the impeachment evidence. See Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 403(3) (480 S.E.2d 1) (1996) (scope of cross-examination lies in sound discretion of trial court). Compare King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 273(30) (539 S.E.2d 783) (2000) (questioning defense expert about pending complaint against him was improper impeachment).” Felder v. State, 286 Ga.App. 271, 648 S.E.2d 753 (July 3, 2007). Trial court properly prohibited impeachment by bad character evidence regarding a witness who hadn’t yet testified. Jones v. State, 265 Ga.App. 97, 592 S.E.2d 888 (January 8, 2004). At trial, defense counsel sought to impeach state’s witnesses with testimony that they were “laughing and joking in the hallway and generally making light of the entire proceeding.” Held, trial court had discretion to exclude this evidence as irrelevant. Gilbert v. State, 265 Ga.App. 76, 593 S.E.2d 25 (December 16, 2003). “[E]vidence that three law enforcement officers who testified at trial were suspended from work because they had received illegal satellite television services” was not grounds for new trial because it was merely impeaching of witness credibility, and would not have been admissible for that purpose anyway, as “ specific instances of misconduct can not be used to impeach a witness’ credibility unless the misconduct has resulted in a criminal conviction .” Baird v. State, 260 Ga.App. 661, 580 S.E.2d 650 (March 28, 2003). Defendant’s girlfriend testified that she didn’t think defendant was under the influence when he was charged with DUI. State sought to impeach her with her own guilty plea to DUI the prior year. Held, evidence of girlfriend’s DUI was properly allowed: “ The right to a ‘thorough and sifting cross examination’ of a witness includes the right to impeach the witness by revealing possible biases or prejudices concerning issues in the case. Because [girlfriend] had offered her opinion that Baird was not under the influence of alcohol..., the State was entitled to explore her competence to assess whether a person is under the influence of alcohol.” Bledsoe v. State, 236 Ga.App. 796, 513 S.E.2d 768 (March 8, 1999). State’s attempt to impeach defendant with a false statement, not relevant to the charges on trial, was improper. “Several months after the offenses for which he was charged in this case, Bledsoe applied for a probationary driver’s license under the habitual violator statute. The notarized application form, which was signed by Bledsoe, affirmed that ‘in the two years preceding date of this application, I have received no traffic citations of any type.’” In fact, defendant had been charged with DUI and driving after being declared habitual violator – the charges on trial. “ In Georgia, the State may impeach a witness in the following ways: ‘(1) disproving facts testified to by the witness, (2) previous contradictory statements, (3) bias, interest or corruption on the part of the witness, (4) bad character evidence by reputation or conviction of crime, (5) incapacity or lack of knowledge or opportunity to observe, and (6) absence of religious belief.’ Haynes v. State, 180 Ga.App. 202, 203- 204(3), 349 S.E.2d 208 (1986). The State may not make ‘a collateral attack upon the [witness’] credibility, impeaching in nature.’ Id. at 203, 349 S.E.2d 208.” The impeachment attempt here fit none of the enumerated categories, but was collateral. Accord, Smith v. State , 283 Ga. 237, 657 S.E.2d 523 (January 28, 2008) (defendant couldn’t impeach mother of murdered infant with evidence that she had “misrepresented her income on a public assistance application.”). 8. ILLEGALLY-SEIZED EVIDENCE Hogsed v. State, 287 Ga. 255, 695 S.E.2d 269 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s murder conviction affirmed; no error in allowing State to impeach defendant with illegally seized documents. State consented to grant of defendant’s motion to suppress, agreeing not to use, in State’s case in chief, documents which exceeded the scope of the search warrant. “After appellant took the stand in her own defense at trial, however, the trial court admitted appellant's journals to allow the State to cross-examine her on matters she raised during her direct testimony. … Illegally obtained evidence, or evidence not admissible in the State's case-in-chief, may be used for the limited purpose of impeaching a defendant. Walder v. U.S.,