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informant in this manner; instead, they wished to show that he had a potential to be biased in favor of the State at the time that he gave his statement. The co-defendants should have been allowed to question the informant about the basis of his first offender plea for these purposes. See Hibbs v. State, 299 Ga.App. 723(2) (683 S.E.2d 329) (2009), citing Vogleson, supra. See also Smith v. State, 276 Ga. 263, 265(2) (577 S.E.2d 548) (2003). Any error, however, is harmless, as the informant's testimony was, at best, cumulative of [another witness’s] testimony that [co-defendant] informed her that he had shot [victim]. See, e.g., Treadwell v. State, 285 Ga. 736(1), 684 S.E.2d 244 (2009).” Butler v. State, 285 Ga. 518, 678 S.E.2d 92 (June 8, 2009). Trial court properly prohibited defense counsel from impeaching State’s witness with prior offense discharged under First Offender Act. “Butler acknowledges this Court's holding in Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 801-803 (493 S.E.2d 136) (1997), that under the plain language of the Act, a witness's first offender record cannot be used to impeach his or her testimony by showing commission of a crime of moral turpitude.” Inability to impeach on this basis does not violate defendant’s rights under Confrontation Clause: “In Matthews, we held that ‘ impeachment.. to show a general lack of trustworthiness based on a prior criminal conviction’ is ‘not guaranteed by the confrontation clause, ’ and that ‘unless there is an adjudication of guilt, a witness may not be impeached on general credibility grounds by evidence of a first offender record.’ Matthews, 268 Ga. at 802.” Accord, Davis v. State , 312 Ga.App. 328, 718 S.E.2d 559 (November 1, 2011); Jackson v. State , 316 Ga.App. 588, 730 S.E.2d 69 (July 3, 2012). 17. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – PARDONED OFFENSES Whatley v. State, 296 Ga.App. 72, 673 S.E.2d 510 (January 28, 2009). “[T]he trial court erred by expressly refusing to consider the balancing test it was required to apply under OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1). No harm, however, because “in order to exclude the evidence of each witness' other convictions pursuant to OCGA § 24-9-84.1(a)(1), Whatley would have to show that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the testifying witness. Here, however, no evidence indicated that such admission would result in any prejudice,” especially given that the jury was already aware that the witnesses were state prison inmates. “Similarly, no prejudice resulted when the trial court inadvertently failed to redact evidence of two of the crimes, as listed on an exhibit, despite its erroneous conclusion that such evidence was inadmissible because they were not crimes of moral turpitude.” Haupt v. State, 290 Ga.App. 616, 660 S.E.2d 383 (March 5, 2008). Dicta : no error in admitting defendant’s prior convictions for felony theft, although he had been pardoned, as part of State’s evidence regarding material omissions in sale of securities. OCGA § 24-9-84.1, relied upon by defendant, only governs use of prior offenses for impeachment, and in any event only prohibits admission of pardoned offenses where pardon “was ‘based on a finding of innocence.’ OCGA § 24-9-84.1(c)(2).” Haupt’s wasn’t. 18. PRIOR MISCONDUCT – PRIOR FELONIES Seminal case: Clay (March 19, 2012), below. See new OCGA § 24-6-609 Robinson v. State, A16A0125, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1314685 (April 5, 2016). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Under 2013 Evidence Code, no abuse of discretion in admitting defendant’s prior felony convictions for general impeachment purposes. Six years before the offenses here, defendant was paroled on convictions for armed robbery and voluntary manslaughter. Trial court admitted the evidence under OCGA § 24-6-609(a)(1), finding that “the probative value … outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.” “This approach differs from the prior OCGA § 24–9–84.1(a), under which, except for convictions involving dishonesty or false statements, even recent felony convictions could be used to impeach a defendant only if the probative value ‘substantially outweigh[ed]’ the prejudicial effect.” Continues, however, to look to factors considered under prior code: “(1) the kind of felony involved and its impeachment value, (2) the time of the conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history, (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged crime (lest evidence of a similar crime create an unacceptable risk of prejudice); (4) the importance of the defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue. See Waye v. State, 326 Ga.App. 202, 205–06(3), 756 S.E.2d 287 (2014); see also Quiroz v. State, 291 Ga.App. 423, 428(4), 662 S.E.2d 235 (2008). This court has raised questions about the continued applicability of these factors to the new Evidence Code’s provision for instances when not more than ten years have passed since the conviction or the release of the witness from confinement. See Smith [ v. State, 331 Ga.App. 296, 300(2), 771 S.E.2d 8 (2015)]. However, the federal courts have employed these factors under a prior version of the federal evidence rule that is substantively similar to our new evidentiary rule. See United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 n. 17 (5 th Cir., 1979). They remain a useful guide.” Here, the trial court properly concluded that the relative credibility of defendant and his victim/girlfriend was central to the case, and that the prior crimes were not so similar as to create an unacceptable risk of prejudice (as the