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witness for the State to have a custodial relationship with the members of the jury during trial.” Prejudice found based on significance of testimony and significance of contact with jury. “Although [Sheriff] Wilson's contact with the jury did not involve eating with them or conversing with them in private, neither did his association with the jury consist of a ‘mere “brief encounter”’ or ‘chance contacts ... while passing in the hall or crowded together in an elevator.’ Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052, 1054, 1055 (92 S.Ct. 1053, 31 L.Ed.2d 787) (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).” Court thus finds reasonable probability of different outcome but for counsel’s deficient performance, especially in light of hung jury in defendant’s prior trial, based on essentially same evidence. “While we acknowledge our precedents in which we have declined, absent objection, to presume prejudice in such cases, see, e.g., Hudson v. State, 250 Ga. 479(5) (299 S.E.2d 531) (1983); Bishop v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 293(10), continuation of this practice of allowing key prosecution witnesses to serve as bailiffs in violation of the well-established precedents in the United States Supreme Court and this Court may well force us to reconsider the efficacy of those decisions.” Carley dissents from finding of prejudice. 54. INDICTMENT, WAIVER Steillman v. State, 295 Ga.App. 778, 673 S.E.2d 286 (January 29, 2009). No ineffective assistance where counsel “failed to advise [defendant] of his right to have his case presented to the Grand Jury. Steillman claims that he could have received a ‘No Bill’ on the felony obstruction charge and would not have been tried on that charge. Steillman makes no argument as to why the Grand Jury would have returned a ‘no bill’ on the charge and we discern none.” 55. INEXPERIENCED COUNSEL Dulcio v. State, 292 Ga. 645, 740 S.E.2d 574 (March 25, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown by counsel’ inexperience. “The mere fact that the attorney may have been relatively inexperienced falls far short of demonstrating a complete failure of the adversarial process. [fn] Indeed, ‘[e]very experienced criminal attorney once tried his first criminal case.’ United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657) (1984). The fact that this was the attorney's first felony or criminal jury trial may shed light in an evaluation of the attorney's actual performance, but it does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness of counsel. Id. And, as for the complaint about the lack of a second chair, the record reveals that trial counsel consulted extensively with two other attorneys in preparation for defending Dulcio.” Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (October 29, 2012). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where one of defendant’s three trial attorneys “was not qualified under the Unified Appeal Procedure or the American Bar Association Guidelines, which both present standards for first and second chair lawyers serving in death penalty cases. See U.A.P. II(A); ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913 (2003). … Rice was represented by two attorneys who were fully qualified, and the record shows that the third attorney entered the case just as the trial was beginning, had a minor role, and was fully supervised by the two lead attorneys. Thus, we find no deficiency in the performance of the two lead attorneys in allowing him to assist, which was both reasonable and compliant with the standards set forth in the U.A.P. and the ABA Guidelines. Furthermore, Rice has failed to show that any actions taken by the third attorney prejudiced his defense.” Fitzpatrick v. State, 317 Ga.App. 873, 733 S.E.2d 46 (October 11, 2012). Burglary and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown by counsel’s relative inexperience. “Counsel had practiced law for five years as a public defender and had tried two or three felony cases before a jury. A successful ineffectiveness claim ‘rests upon specific errors made by counsel and does not rest upon trial counsel's inexperience.’ (Citation omitted.) Kelly v. State, 267 Ga. 252, 254(2) (477 S.E.2d 110) (1996). Fitzpatrick has not met either prong of the ineffectiveness test in this contention.” Sevostiyanova v. State, 313 Ga.App. 729, 722 S.E.2d 333 (January 12, 2012). Hit and run and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown from defendant’s (erroneous) claim that defense counsel “was inexperienced and unqualified to defend her in a criminal trial.” “[T]rial counsel's experience or lack thereof does not, by itself, support either prong of an ineffective assistance claim; on the contrary, a successful ineffectiveness claim must be based upon specific errors made by counsel, rather than upon trial counsel's experience or lack thereof. Kelly v. State, 267 Ga. 252, 254(2) (1996) (477 S.E.2d 110) (1996).” Johnson v. State, 287 Ga. 767, 700 S.E.2d 346 (September 20, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for malice murder affirmed; no ineffective assistance merely because of counsel’s inexperience. “At the time of trial, defense counsel had been a member of the bar for a year and a half and had not tried a murder case.” “‘[A]n attorney's lack of experience alone does not constitute grounds for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’ Potter v. State, 273 Ga. 325, 326 (540