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to be shown to the witness prior to their use for impeachment purposes.” Accord, Cade v. State , 289 Ga. 805, 716 S.E.2d 196 (October 3, 2011) (audio recording of defendant’s prior inconsistent statement properly admitted though defendant “had not been given an opportunity to listen to it,” where foundation for it was properly laid); Hurt v. State , 298 Ga. 51, 779 S.E.2d 313 (November 2, 2015) (under pre-2013 Evidence Code, OCGA § 24-9-83 only applied to written statements, not recordings, and didn’t require that witness be shown transcript of recorded statement, even in one existed; disapproving contrary dicta from McDonald v. State, 249 Ga.App. 1, 3–4(3), 548 S.E.2d 361 (2001)). Warner v. State, 281 Ga. 763, 642 S.E.2d 821 (March 26, 2007). Recordings of prior inconsistent statements by witnesses were admissible; fact that the witnesses admitted the prior inconsistent statements did not make them inadmissible bolstering. “There is no prohibition about the prior inconsistent statement being lengthier than the in-court testimony. Also, the fact that the witness admits that he or she made the inconsistent pre-trial statement does not render it inadmissible. Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 569(1) (492 S.E.2d 201) (1997). Certainly, the State may attempt to impeach its own witness. OCGA § 24-9-81; Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 832(2) (632 S.E.2d 152) (2006). And whether a witness has successfully been impeached is for the jury to decide. Richard v. State, 281 Ga. 401, 405(1)(n.4) (637 S.E.2d 406) (2006); Chapman v. State, 263 Ga. 393, 394-395(3) (435 S.E.2d 202) (1993).” Accord, Jefferson v. State , 309 Ga.App. 861, 711 S.E.2d 412 (June 13, 2011). Davidson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 333, 643 S.E.2d 848 (March 20, 2007). Defendant’s trial for DUI was mistried after arresting deputy testified. On re-trial, solicitor decided not ask the deputy certain questions he had asked in the first trial about the defendant’s level of intoxication and performance of field sobriety tests. When defense counsel sought to cross- examine deputy on these issues, trial court sustained State’s objection that the questions “were not related to the direct examination or the evidence before the jury.” Defendant contends he should have been able to use the prior testimony for impeachment. Held, the trial court did not err in limiting the cross-examination; the matters were not proper impeachment because they did not contradict the deputy’s testimony in the second trial. “ To impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent statement, the cross-examiner must lay the proper foundation, establish that the prior statement contradicts or is inconsistent with the witness’s in-court testimony, and show that the prior statement is relevant. Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 567(1) (492 S.E.2d 201) (1997).” Castillo v. State, 281 Ga. 579, 642 S.E.2d 8 (February 5, 2007). Witness’s prior statement could not be used for impeachment where it “was not inconsistent with the witness’s in-court testimony.” Parker v. State, 283 Ga.App. 714, 642 S.E.2d 111 (January 18, 2007). “‘The proper method for impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent statement is codified in OCGA § 24-9-83.... [T]hat statute does not require that the prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence before it is used for impeachment purposes. Nor does the case law mandate the introduction of the prior written statement into evidence before questioning the witness. The purpose behind laying a foundation for impeachment is met by showing or reading the prior written statement to the witness before asking questions about it.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Whitehead v. State, 232 Ga.App. 140, 141-142(2) (499 S.E.2d 922) (1998). See [ Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 874, 878(3) (536 S.E.2d 514) (2000)]; Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 569(1) (492 S.E.2d 201) (1997). ‘[I]f a defendant reads only the portions of the prior written statement of a witness that are relevant to impeaching the witness, the defendant has not introduced evidence and does not lose the right to open and close.’ Smith, 272 Ga. at 878(3).” Here, defense counsel impeached witnesses by introducing their entire prior statements, but could have instead only read portions, and thus kept the right to opening and concluding arguments. Accord, Jackson v. State , 292 Ga.App. 312, 665 S.E.2d 20 (June 26, 2008) (trial court erred in requiring defense counsel to tender prior inconsistent written statement into evidence; all that is required is to show it or read it to witness, citing Duckworth ). Paige v. State, 281 Ga. 504, 639 S.E.2d 478 (January 8, 2007). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. “During the investigation, Smith told police that Paige admitted to him that he had shot someone during the robbery. At trial, however, Smith specifically denied that Paige had ever told him that he had shot anyone, and testified that if he had made that statement to police, it was only because the detective asking the questions was trying to deceive or intimidate him. The trial court properly admitted Smith’s statement to police as a prior inconsistent statement, as the statement directly contradicted his trial testimony. OCGA § 24-9-83 (‘[a] witness may be impeached by contradictory statements previously made by him as to matters relevant to his testimony and to the case’); Palmer v. State, 274 Ga. 796, 797(4) (560 S.E.2d 11) (2002).” Holsey v. State, 281 Ga. 177, 637 S.E.2d 32 (October 30, 2006). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. “[T]here is no requirement in Georgia law that a witness’s prior inconsistent statement be admitted into evidence prior to