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599(3) (255 S.E.2d 710) (1979). ‘[T]he probative value to be accorded such evidence is a matter for the jury's determination.’ Shepherd, supra at 501. … Under the circumstances, the evidence established a sufficient basis to admit [victim’s] opinion testimony that the second female voice she heard during the attack was that of Brown. See Constantino, supra at (3) (voice identification may be admissible where based on prior telephone conversations; it is not necessary that the speakers had met or spoken face to face). Compare Price v. State, 208 Ga. 695(1) (69 S.E.2d 253) (1952) (where the testifying witness did not know the other person on the telephone, had not ever heard the voice, and the identity of the other person is not otherwise established, the conversation is inadmissible hearsay).” Accord, Scott v. State , 279 Ga. 596, 619 S.E.2d 653 (September 19, 2005). Carter v. State, 266 Ga.App. 691, 598 S.E.2d 76 (March 31, 2004). Unanimous full court opinion. Trial court properly granted “the State’s motion in limine preventing Carter from introducing opinion testimony from his mother and aunt to the effect that he was not one of the perpetrators depicted in the videotape of the crime scene.” “We find that it is not beyond the ken of the average juror to decide as a matter of fact whether the identity of a person in a video is the defendant. … Such practice would open floodgates of witnesses for both sides who would give their opinion as to the identity of the person in the video.” Overrules Jackson v. State , 262 Ga.App. 451, 585 S.E.2d 745 (2003). Followed, Mitchell (February 6, 2007), above; Grimes v. State , 291 Ga.App. 585, 662 S.E.2d 346 (May 20, 2008) (bank robbery convictions reversed; detective was improperly allowed to testify to an opinion that the person shown in bank surveillance camera photos was defendant) . Compare Roberts v. State , 257 Ga.App. 251, 570 S.E.2d 595 (August 16, 2002) (proper to admit opinion of identity of person in photograph where person’s appearance had changed at time of trial). 3. INTOXICATION See also DUI – OPINION TESTIMONY, above Lewis v. State, 326 Ga.App. 158, 756 S.E.2d 242 (March 12, 2014). Aggravated assault conviction reversed; trial court improperly allowed officer who didn’t see defendant on the night in question “to testify ‘about his opinion on the behavior of “geeked up,” intoxicated individuals and individuals suffering from mental illness.’” “An officer may testify regarding his training to recognize the manifestations of drug or alcohol intoxication, but such testimony is generally allowed only when the officer has had ample opportunity to observe the demeanor of a party. See, e.g., Sweetenburg v. State, 197 Ga.App. 36, 37(3), 397 S.E.2d 451 (1990). As explained in Bly v. State, 283 Ga. 453, 457(1), 660 S.E.2d 713 (2008), in those cases, the officer's opinion is based upon matters personally observed by the officer. Also distinguishable are cases involving the expert testimony of officers regarding their analysis of physical evidence. See id. But the officer's testimony here, even if the proper foundation had been laid for the testimony, see Bradley v. State, 292 Ga.App. 737, 738(1) n. 3, 665 S.E.2d 428 (2008), was not relevant to the particular circumstances before the jury. While the victim testified that Lewis ‘looked high,’ the officer did not observe Lewis at any time and had no contact with him in the course of his investigation. The officer's testimony regarding his experience with ‘geeked up’ individuals, that those individuals were combative (or not combative if they were bipolar and had taken medication), had to be subdued, and were apologetic in the future, was improper and did not have a tendency to establish any fact in issue.” “Given that the case turned solely on the credibility of Lewis and that of the victim, we cannot say that it is highly probable that admission of the officer's testimony did not contribute to the verdict.” Hassard v. State, 319 Ga.App. 708, 738 S.E.2d 293 (February 7, 2013). DUI conviction affirmed; lay witness was properly allowed to state her opinion that defendant appeared intoxicated. “Contrary to Hassard's argument here, we have held that ‘[a] lay witness may testify as to the intoxication of the defendant and the extent thereof where the witness states the reasons for his opinion and shows that he did observe the defendant.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) McKay v. State, 264 Ga.App. 726, 729(2), 592 S.E.2d 135 (2003); see also Lawrence v. State, 157 Ga.App. 264, 264(2), 277 S.E.2d 60 (1981) (‘A witness who satisfactorily shows that he had opportunity to observe, and did observe, the condition of another, may testify whether that person was under the influence of intoxicants and the extent thereof, stating the facts upon which the opinion is based.[Cits.]’). Here, the woman testified that Hassard had trouble getting out of his vehicle, was ‘fidgeting and stumbling,’ had to balance himself by holding on to the hood of the both vehicles, was ‘kind of slurring,’ and smelled of alcohol. This witness stated further that she believed Hassard was intoxicated, and that she had ‘come across people under the influence of alcohol’ many times in her life and that based on her experience, Hassard's demeanor matched that of others she had observed intoxicated. This evidence, along with the evidence that Hassard ‘bump[ed]’ the woman's vehicle while she waited at a red light and soon after fled the scene, was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Hassard was under the influence of alcohol to the extent he was a less safe driver. See McKay, supra; Lawrence, supra.” Wilson v. State, 308 Ga.App. 383, 708 S.E.2d 14 (February 22, 2011). Convictions for DUI and related offenses affirmed; evidence supported trial court’s finding that arrest for DUI was supported by probable cause. “‘A witness who