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statement to nurse undisputedly predated her allegedly fabricated trial testimony).” This misstates and misapplies the rule regarding when prior inconsistent statements are admissible. The prior statement must predate the alleged improper influence or motive to lie, not just the trial testimony. The witness’s testimony here didn’t precede her alleged intoxication/lack of opportunity to see her assailant. But as the opinion goes on to point out, it may also have been admissible as part of the res gestae. Accord, Williams v. State , 292 Ga. 844, 742 S.E.2d 445 (April 29, 2013). Brown v. State, 310 Ga.App. 835, 714 S.E.2d 395 (July 13, 2011). Rape and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted victim’s statement to examining nurse naming her assailant, not as information provided for medical diagnosis, but as a prior consistent statement. 1. Statement was not admissible as information provided for medical diagnosis. “Brown is correct that M.B.'s statements to the Examining Nurse identifying Brown as her perpetrator and providing information unrelated to the purpose of medical diagnosis and treatment were outside the scope of the hearsay exception defined in OCGA § 24–3–4. See Miller v. State, 194 Ga.App. 533, 534(2)(a) (390 S.E.2d 901) (1990).” 2. Statement was admissible as prior consistent statement. “Moreover, at the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that his strategy was to attack the victim's credibility and show that her claims were fabricated. It is undisputed that M.B.'s statements to the Examining Nurse predated her allegedly fabricated trial testimony. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the admission of the complained of testimony was not erroneous. See Tuff [ v. State, 278 Ga. 91, 94(4) (597 S.E.2d 328) (2004)]; Dorsey v. State, 252 Ga.App. 33, 34(1) (555 S.E.2d 498) (2001).” Followed, Mims (February 16, 2012), above. Damerow v. State, 310 Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in admitting 15-year old’s prior consistent statements. Although victim’s veracity was attacked, a prior consistent statement is only admissible “‘to refute the allegation of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive [if] the prior statement must predate the alleged fabrication, influence, or motive. ’ … (Punctuation and footnotes omitted; emphasis supplied.) Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366(2), 677 S.E.2d 92 (2009). Here, J.S.'s veracity was challenged on cross-examination, based upon a defense theory that she was motivated to fabricate the molestation allegations because she was vindictive and wanted to have Damerow removed from the residence. Under these circumstances, J.S.'s pretrial statements did not predate the alleged motive. It thus follows that the testimony regarding J.S.'s prior statements was improperly admitted. [Cits.]” No prejudice, however, because “[t]he videotape of J.S.'s forensic interview was played during the trial, which allowed the jury to form their own assessment of J.S.'s credibility. Moreover, Damerow was able to test J.S.'s credibility during cross-examination. And, significantly, the jury acquitted Damerow of two of the three child molestation offenses. Such reflects that the jury was able to objectively consider the evidence of the charges, despite the improper bolstering, and that trial counsel was not ineffective in his defense of the case.” Accord, Pate v. State , 315 Ga.App. 205, 726 S.E.2d 691 (March 27, 2012) (Physical precedent only); Grant (March 12, 2014), above. Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 498, 713 S.E.2d 376 (July 5, 2011). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court erred, but harmless, in allowing officer to testify about out-of-court statements of witness, although that witness was available and did later testify. Statement was not admissible as a prior consistent statement inasmuch as no issue of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive was raised as to witness. Harmless, however, as witness “did testify, and his testimony repeated and expanded on his prior statements the officer had recounted. Moreover, Johnson did not seriously dispute — nor could he, in light of his own statement to the police and the other evidence at trial — that there was a struggle in the victim's room followed by multiple gunshots. And the witness did not mention Johnson or place him at the crime scene.” Colzie v. State, 289 Ga. 120, 710 S.E.2d 115 (April 18, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; witness’s prior consistent statement was properly admitted after defense suggested recent fabrication. “On cross-examination, Johnson was asked whether he had told defense counsel just a week earlier that it had been too long for Johnson to describe the shooter, and Johnson answered negatively. ‘A review of the transcript shows ... that the import of the cross-examination of [Johnson] was that portions of his testimony on direct were inconsistent with what he had told defense counsel in an earlier interview. Thus, the suggestion was that ... [Johnson's] inculpatory trial testimony lacked veracity and had been fabricated since his interview with [Colzie's] attorney.’ Blackmon v. State, 272 Ga. 858, 859(2) (536 S.E.2d 148) (2000). See also Hall v. State, 287 Ga. 755, 758(3) (699 S.E.2d 321) (2010); Dorsey v. State, 252 Ga.App. 33, 34(1) (555 S.E.2d 498) (2001). Therefore, the cross-examination of Johnson constituted the requisite attack on his veracity.” Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (February 7, 2011). Convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; admission of prior consistent statement of State’s witness was erroneous, but harmless error. Although witness’s