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murder trial, admission of State’s witness’s prior consistent statement was erroneous where no intervening fabrication alleged; but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt.). Nguyen v. State, 294 Ga.App. 67, 668 S.E.2d 514 (October 16, 2008). Victim’s veracity was placed in issue by cross- examination, sufficiently to allow introduction of her prior consistent statements, regardless of fact that the statements were admitted before veracity was raised in recross-examintion. “[D]uring during recross-examination, Nguyen's counsel questioned H.T. about a key difference between her testimony at trial and her statements to Dr. Levy. Thus, we find that defense counsel's questioning placed H. T.'s veracity at issue, by implying that she had changed her story for trial. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 287 Ga.App. 857, 859-860(3) (652 S.E.2d 807) (2007) (victim's veracity placed in issue during cross-examination when defense counsel questioned her uncertainty as to her age, and when molestation began); Joines v. State, 264 Ga.App. 558, 561-562(3)(a) (591 S.E.2d 454) (2003) (point of cross-examination was that victim fabricated dates). See also Johnson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 448, 451(3) (526 S.E.2d 903) (1999) (a witness's veracity may be placed in issue expressly or impliedly). It is insignificant that the tapes were introduced before Nguyen's counsel conducted recross-examination,” citing Sterling v. State , 267 Ga. 209, 477 S.E.2d 807 (1996). Accord, Davis v. State , 303 Ga.App. 799, 694 S.E.2d 381 (April 21, 2010); Pate v. State , 315 Ga.App. 205, 726 S.E.2d 691 (March 27, 2012) (Physical precedent only). Atwell v. State, 293 Ga.App. 586, 667 S.E.2d 442 (September 18, 2008). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault and burglary, tape of victim’s 911 call was properly admitted during victim’s testimony. Tape did not constitute improper bolstering as a prior consistent statement. “‘“Improper bolstering refers to character evidence intended to show a witness's veracity, that is, his tendency to tell the truth.”’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hill [ v. State, 290 Ga.App. 140, 146(5)(g), 658 S.E.2d 863 (2008)]. See also Goldey v. State, 289 Ga.App. 198, 199(2)(a), 656 S.E.2d 549 (2008).” Corn v. State, 290 Ga.App. 792, 660 S.E.2d 782 (March 21, 2008). Physical precedent only. Co-conspirator testified for State; defense challenged his motivations for testifying, including his potential reduced sentence. State then examined him about full terms of his deal with State, including fact that he passed a polygraph. Held, trial court properly admitted evidence of co-conspirator’s polygraph. “Our Supreme Court has held ‘that upon an express stipulation of the parties that they shall be admissible, the results of a lie detector test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have.’ (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Chambers, 240 Ga. 76, 76-77 (239 S.E.2d 324) (1977). Further, the results may be admissible to explain an actor’s conduct or motive when such is relevant to the issues on trial. Morris v. State, 264 Ga. 823, 824(1) (452 S.E.2d 100) (1995).” “Further, it is clear from Corn’s cross-examination that he was making the argument that Messer was falsely accusing him in order to benefit himself and that this false testimony was the basis of the deal which he made with the State. Therefore, Messer’s motive for testifying was directly called into issue by Corn, and the State was properly allowed to rebut Corn’s allegations with the true terms of the deal, even though that involved the results of a polygraph. See Morris v. State, supra; Newberry v. State, 260 Ga. 416, 418-419(3) (395 S.E.2d 813) (1990); Bantz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 263 Ga.App. 855(1) (589 S.E.2d 621) (2003).” Note, only stipulation to admission of polygraph results here appears to come from witness, not defendant. While prior consistent statements of witness should be admissible due to defendant’s attack on witness’s veracity, polygrapher’s opinion of witness’s veracity would appear to be inadmissible, contrary to Court of Appeals’ conclusion here. Forde v. State, 289 Ga.App. 805, 658 S.E.2d 410 (February 28, 2008). Statement of child molestation victim, given when she was 16 years old, was improperly admitted under Child Hearsay Statute, which applies only to children aged 14 years and less. Contrary to State’s position, the statement was not admissible as a prior consistent statement, either. Although victim testified and defense impugned her motives for testifying, “‘only if affirmative charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive are raised during cross-examination is a witness’s veracity placed in issue so as to permit the introduction of a prior consistent statement. Even then, the prior consistent statement may be admitted as nonhearsay only if it was made before the motive or influence came into existence or before the time of the alleged recent fabrication. Otherwise it is pure hearsay, which cannot be admitted merely to bolster the witness’s credibility.’ (Emphasis added.) Phillips v. State, 241 Ga.App. 764, 766 (527 S.E.2d 604) (2000). See Joines v. State, 264 Ga.App. 558, 561- 562(3)(a) (591 S.E.2d 454) (2003).” Victim’s “statements contained in the videotaped interview were made well after the alleged improper motive came into existence,” and weren’t admissible as prior consistent statements. Accord, Cash v. State , 294 Ga.App. 741, 669 S.E.2d 731 (November 20, 2008). Waters v. State, 288 Ga.App. 260, 653 S.E.2d 849 (November 6, 2007). “[I]t is well established that ‘[a] party may introduce a prior consistent statement of a forgetful witness where the witness testifies at trial and is subject to cross- examination.’ (Citations and footnote omitted.) Manning v. State, 273 Ga. 744, 745(3) (545 S.E.2d 914) (2001).”