☢ test - Í

Frady v. State, 245 Ga.App. 832, 538 S.E.2d 893 (September 8, 2000). Child molestation conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted victim’s prior consistent statement. “The victim’s veracity was placed in issue as she signed an affidavit recanting her original statement. She was present at trial and was thoroughly cross-examined about the truthfulness of her original statement.” Victim’s testimony at trial was consistent with her original statement. Phillips v. State, 241 Ga.App. 764, 527 S.E.2d 604 (January 10, 2000). Defendant’s rape, child molestation, and related convictions reversed; trial court erred in admitting witness’s prior consistent statement absent “affirmative charges of recent fabrication, improper influence, or improper motive,” as provided in Woodard v. State , 269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998). Not harmless error, given lack of physical evidence in the case. “The State's case turned on the credibility of testimony given by prosecution witnesses, primarily [victim and this witness]. The testimony of a number of defense witnesses raised serious questions as to the credibility of these children. The improper bolstering of their credibility with the hearsay testimony added critical weight to the State's case and did contribute to the verdict.” Accord, Astudillo v. State , 244 Ga.App. 612, 536 S.E.2d 271 (June 23, 2000) (admission of victim’s prior consistent statement error, but harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt). James v. State, 270 Ga. 675, 513 S.E.2d 207 (March 1, 1999). “During cross-examination of an eyewitness, defense counsel asked the witness to refresh his recollection with a statement the witness had given to the police. Defense counsel then contested several parts of the witness’s trial testimony, asking at one point whether, since he was now testifying differently, the witness had been mistaken when he gave the statement. After cross-examination, the trial court permitted the State, over defense objection, to have the witness read the whole statement. Contrary to James's argument on appeal, that ruling was not error because where, as here, the veracity of a witness is at issue, and that witness is present at trial, under oath, and subject to cross-examination, the prior consistent out-of-court statement of the witness is admissible . Edwards v. State, 255 Ga. 149(2), 335 S.E.2d 869 (1985).” Accord, Rattansay v. State , 240 Ga.App. 165, 523 S.E.2d 36 (September 28, 1999); Mashburn v. State , 244 Ga.App. 524, 536 S.E.2d 208 (June 21, 2000). 3. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE See also subheading IMPEACHMENT – PRIOR STATEMENTS, above New case! Hood v. State, S16A00064, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2946398 (May 23, 2016). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed. Under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly excluded witness’s prior inconsistent statement that was “irrelevant or collateral to the subject matter of the case. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 717 F.2d 518, 520 (11 th Cir., 1983) (‘The Federal Rules of Evidence discourage the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove or disprove issues which are collateral to the subject matter of the case.’); United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418, 423 (8 th Cir., 1996) (‘[U]nder [Rule] 613(b) a witness may not be impeached on a collateral matter by use of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements.’). See also Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 862, 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000) (affirming the exclusion of a prior inconsistent statement under the old Evidence Code because it ‘was irrelevant to the issues to be considered by the trier of fact’ (citing Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 567, 492 S.E.2d 201 (1999))). Thus, although aspects of Georgia’s Evidence Code dealing with prior inconsistent statements used to impeach have changed, the principle that such statements may not be introduced to impeach a witness on collateral matters remains intact. See Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 14:3, at 437 (2015–2016 ed.).” Harper v. State, 330 Ga.App. 561, 768 S.E.2d 755 (January 28, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Under pre-2013 Evidence Code, witness’s prior identification of defendant in photographic lineup was admissible as substantive evidence at trial despite his recantation at trial, citing In re: M.D.L., 271 Ga.App. 738, 741(3), 610 S.E.2d 687 (2005). McNair v. State, 330 Ga.App. 478, 767 S.E.2d 290 (December 16, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Under 2013 Evidence Code, trial court properly admitted co-conspirator’s custodial statement to police when he “claimed to have no recollection of speaking with the police. … On cross-examination by McNair's defense counsel, the cousin claimed that his memory had been impaired by his abuse of illegal drugs.” Trial court therefore admitted the cousin’s statement, and testimony by the investigator and ADA who interviewed him. 1. “The evidentiary rules pertaining to examining witnesses on their prior inconsistent statements and using those statements for impeachment purposes or as substantive evidence are currently codified at OCGA § 24–6–613 [fn] and § 24–8–801(d)(1)(A).[fn] These new evidentiary rules ‘retain Georgia's [former] approach to a testifying witness's out-of-court statements. Such statements are not hearsay.’ (Footnote omitted.) See Milich, Georgia's New Evidence Code, 28 Ga. State U. Law Rev. 379, 390 (Winter 2012). Thus, they may be admitted both for impeachment purposes and as substantive evidence.” 2.