☢ test - Í

Geiger v. State, 258 Ga.App. 57, 573 S.E.2d 85 (September 19, 2002). Trial court properly allowed victim’s signed statement to be read to the jury where “the veracity of the witness’ trial testimony has been placed in issue, the witness is present at trial, and the witness is available for cross-examination. The victim’s veracity was placed in issue because, as she admitted on cross-examination, she had previously denied the abuse allegations” she made in a note to a friend. Peek v. State, 259 Ga.App. 13, 576 S.E.2d 31 (December 18, 2002). Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking was based almost exclusively on prior inconsistent statement girlfriend gave investigating officer at time of incident. Held, “ corroborative evidence is not necessary to sustain a conviction based on a prior inconsistent statement.” See also Andrews (September 8, 2005), above. Young v. State, 258 Ga.App. 238, 573 S.E.2d 487 (October 31, 2002). “[E]ven though a witness may recant a prior statement on the stand, the prior inconsistent statement constitutes substantive evidence on which the jury may rely.” Accord, White v. State , 278 Ga. 499, 604 S.E.2d 159 (October 12, 2004); Sherrer v. State , 289 Ga.App. 156, 656 S.E.2d 258 (January 9, 2008). Holiday v. State, 272 Ga. 779, 534 S.E.2d 411 (September 11, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in admitting witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements as both impeachment and as substantive evidence. “In this case, three prior inconsistent statements were admitted for impeachment and as substantive evidence after Williams, Johnson, and Mitchell, all friends of the defendant, recanted their statements at trial . They testified that police had pressured them into making the statements; they also denied or could not remember giving specific details to police about what they saw and heard on the night that Freeman was killed. Johnson had written her statement in longhand, she and Mitchell signed their statements, and Williams testified that she remembered giving the statement to police and it refreshed her memory. Since these facts support that the statements were voluntary and given under reliable circumstances, the witnesses testified at trial and were subjected to cross-examination, and the jury was able to hear their explanations and assess their credibility, the trial court properly admitted the statements as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the matters asserted in them.” “Although Holiday asks this Court to adopt the federal rule and allow prior inconsistent statements to be admitted as substantive evidence only if given under oath, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d), we decline to follow that rule and instead adhere to the modern state rule. [Cit.] As we noted in Gibbons [ v. State , 248 Ga. 858, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982)] , the ‘oath is not as strong a guaranty of truth as once it may have been’ and the prior inconsistent statement is admissible only if the out-of-court declarant testifies at trial and thus is subject to cross- examination. See Gibbons, 248 Ga. at 863, 286 S.E.2d 717. The availability of cross-examination ‘assures a meaningful opportunity for the trier of fact ... to bear his or her sensory observations, experience, common sense and logic upon the witness to assess credibility and to determine the truth and accuracy of both the out-of-court declarations and the in-court testimony.’ Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 123, 507 A.2d 66, 69 (1986). Moreover, prior statements are made closer in time to the event when memories are fresher and when there is ‘less likelihood that the statement is the product of corruption, false suggestion, intimidation or appeals to sympathy.’ State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 513 A.2d 86, 91 (1986). Although the better practice would be to introduce a video or audio recording of any prior statement, See Griffin v. State, 251 Ga. 431, 306 S.E.2d 283 (1983), a recording is not required if the statement is shown to be given under reliable circumstances.” Randolph v. State, 246 Ga.App. 141, 538 S.E.2d 139 (August 8, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly charged jury on impeachment, but erroneously ruled that prior inconsistent statements, to be used for impeachment, “had to be an ‘official statement made and not just something you mouth off at the scene.’” Citing Shropshire v. State, 226 Ga.App. 669, 671, 487 S.E.2d 384 (1997). Usher v. State, 236 Ga.App. 663, 512 S.E.2d 380 (February 17, 1999). “‘[A] prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence.’ Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 862-864, 286 S.E.2d 717 (1982). ‘ If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accordance with the truth of words uttered under oath in court.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 864, 286 S.E.2d 717. The jury was authorized to believe the informant’s earlier inculpatory statements rather than his present exculpatory testimony.” Accord, Caldwell v. State , 237 Ga.App. 568, 515 S.E.2d 868 (April 8, 1999); Rattansay v. State , 240 Ga.App. 165, 523 S.E.2d 36 (September 28, 1999); Broner v. State , 284 Ga. 402, 667 S.E.2d 613 (October 6, 2008); Rivers v. State , 296 Ga. 396, 768 S.E.2d 486 (January 20, 2015) (decided under pre-2013 Evidence Code); Welch v. State , 298 Ga. 320, 781