☢ test - Í

as mitigation in penalty phase of death penalty trial constituted ineffective assistance). To the extent that Abernathy contends trial counsel should have pursued a special plea of incompetency or an insanity defense, the record reflects that trial counsel, recognizing Abernathy's mental health problems from the beginning, sought an expert mental health evaluation within days of first appearing in the case. The court-appointed mental health expert concluded that Abernathy, though having significant mental health problems, was competent to stand trial, and Abernathy presented no expert testimony to the contrary. With regard to an insanity plea, the record reflects that trial counsel considered this possibility, having discussed it with Abernathy's mother, and rejected it. Given that such a defense would have significantly undercut Abernathy's assertion that he acted in self-defense, this decision constituted reasonable trial strategy. See Whitus v. State , 287 Ga. 801(2) (700 S.E.2d 377) (2010) (no deficient performance where counsel made reasonable strategic decision, after seeking psychiatric evaluation of defendant, not to pursue insanity defense which would have run counter to other defenses). Compare Martin v. Barrett , 279 Ga. 593 (619 S.E.2d 656) (2005) (conviction properly vacated where, despite knowledge of defendant's history of mental illness, counsel failed altogether to seek expert mental health evaluation or otherwise investigate the issue).” Whitus v. State, 287 Ga. 801, 700 S.E.2d 377 (September 20, 2010). Defendant’s malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown from counsel’s failure to seek a second psychiatric evaluation after state evaluation. “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, a psychologist testified that there has still not been a full forensic evaluation, as Dr. Norman failed to perform any type of psychological testing. However, the psychologist did not evaluate Appellant either and was unable to offer any opinion contrary to Dr. Norman's or to determine that different testing would lead to such a contrary opinion. Appellant ‘has not shown what the result of any [additional] examination would be, and thus fails to establish prejudice by showing that the result of her trial would have been different if [such] a psychological examination was pursued. [Cit.]’ Taylor v. State, 282 Ga. 693, 696(2)(b) (653 S.E.2d 477) (2007).” Accord, Hambrick (September 12, 2011), above; Arnold (January 7, 2013), above. Hall v. Lance, 286 Ga. 365, 687 S.E.2d 809 (January 25, 2010). 1. Grant of habeas relief as to defendant’s death sentence reversed; evidence of defendant’s mental health record presented at habeas hearing was not enough to require reasonable trial counsel to seek a psychological evaluation of defendant. “If trial counsel had properly interviewed lay witnesses, he would have discovered the following allegations about Lance's past: Lance had been in a number of automobile crashes, including some that might have resulted in brief unconsciousness and one that was caused by his fleeing from the police while drunk; Lance had once been exposed to toxic fumes while cleaning the inside of an oil tank; Lance had once ingested some gasoline as a child and had temporarily stopped breathing; Lance had a long history of abusing alcohol; and Lance had once suffered a shot to the head, which did not penetrate his skull, which led to his being hospitalized followed by his leaving the hospital against medical advice, and which resulted in recurring headaches. Trial counsel also could have obtained records from Georgia Regional Hospital, but those records would have informed trial counsel merely that Lance was having difficulty adjusting to his divorce, that he was depressed, that his depression was associated with his facing kidnapping and aggravated assault charges for an alleged attack on his ex-wife, and that he abused alcohol. We find it doubtful that this information would have led reasonable counsel to seek a psychological evaluation of Lance.” Nor would trial court have erred in denying the evaluation. 2. “[E]vidence of Lance's moderate slowness would not have had a significant effect on the jury's sentencing phase deliberations, particularly in light of the evidence showing that Lance functioned normally in society apart from his criminal behavior. We also conclude that this evidence of moderate slowness would have had essentially no effect on the jury's guilt/innocence phase deliberations.” Hampton v. State, 294 Ga.App. 857, 670 S.E.2d 502 (November 25, 2008). Defense of guilty but mentally retarded is declared by filing notice of insanity defense; trial counsel here was not ineffective for failure to file such notice. “Hampton charges his trial attorney with ineffective assistance in failing to file a ‘notice to proceed under OCGA § 17-7- 131.’ There is, however, no such notice. For purposes of OCGA § 17-7-131, there is only a defense of insanity, which may take the form of a plea of guilty but mentally ill, guilty but mentally retarded, or not guilty by reason of insanity. See OCGA § 17-7-131(b). OCGA § 17-7-130.1 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 provide for the filing of a notice of an insanity defense or of the intention to raise the issue of insanity or mental illness. Testimony given by Hampton's trial attorney at the hearing on his motion for new trial showed that he did not file a plea of guilty but mentally retarded because he believed that would have virtually assured Hampton's conviction and would have resulted in imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Instead, because he thought the victim was a highly impeachable witness, counsel testified that he thought it best to defend the case by challenging her credibility.” “Here, counsel's decision as to which theory of defense to pursue was a matter of trial strategy and tactics that was not unreasonable and thus did not constitute ineffective assistance.”