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to trial or that it intentionally and with bad faith withheld the fact that he would testify at trial.” Luker v. State, 291 Ga.App. 434, 662 S.E.2d 240 (May 7, 2008). No abuse in allowing unlisted witness to testify where “she certainly was not a ‘surprise’ witness or unknown to Luker. Rather, she was a key element of Luker’s own explanation for his presence at the Buford home. The trial court granted defense counsel an opportunity to interview [witness], and counsel asked for no additional relief following that interview.” Gassett v. State, 289 Ga.App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (January 31, 2008). No abuse of discretion in denying continuance where State called co-defendant as a witness without putting her on witness list. “‘The witness list rule is designed to prevent a defendant from being surprised at trial by a witness that the defendant has not had an opportunity to interview.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Wilbanks v. State, 251 Ga.App. 248, 255(5)(a) (554 S.E.2d 248) (2001). But, ‘[w]hen a witness’ name is contained in the indictment, a defendant cannot validly contend that he had been surprised or unable to interview the witness in question through lack of knowledge of such witness.”(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Byrd v. State, 216 Ga.App. 510, 512(4) (455 S.E.2d 318) (1995). Because Oliver was named in the indictment as a co-defendant, Gassett had noticed that she might be called as a state’s witness. Id.” Ingram v. State, 286 Ga.App. 662, 650 S.E.2d 743 (July 18, 2007). No harm shown where trial court denied continuance despite fact that confidential informant’s identity not disclosed “until five days before trial instead of the ten days required by OCGA § 17-16-8(a).” Trial court’s stated reason for denying the continuance – need to try the case based on pending speedy trial demand – was erroneous, given that more than five months remained in term of court. Nevertheless, “we have held that ‘absent a showing of prejudice and bad faith, an interview of the witness is the remedy for failure to comply with the requirement that a witness must be identified prior to trial.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Carter v. State, 253 Ga.App. 795, 797(1) (560 S.E.2d 697) (2002). Ingram had an opportunity to interview the witness and used the results of that interview to good effect in cross-examination. He has failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance.” Accord, Crawford v. State , 294 Ga.App. 711, 670 S.E.2d 185 (November 19, 2008). Ellis v. State, 282 Ga.App. 17, 637 S.E.2d 729 (October 2, 2006). No ineffective assistance for failing to object to witnesses not on witness list: “the record shows that all of the witnesses’ names were included in investigative reports given to Ellis. One witness was included in the second additional list under her maiden name, and trial counsel actually interviewed two other witnesses.” No prejudice shown. Acey v. State, 281 Ga.App. 197, 635 S.E.2d 814 (August 18, 2006). Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defense witnesses not disclosed to State until day of trial. “‘[I]n enacting OCGA § 17-16-6, the legislature did not impose a rigid formulation or grant an exclusive remedy for a defendant or a fatal consequence to the State for failure to comply with the discovery mandates. Instead, it cloaked the trial court with the discretion to use its own judgment to ensure a fair trial.’ Morris v. State, 268 Ga.App. 325, 325-326(1) (601 S.E.2d 804) (2004). This Court is ‘not required to consider any particular course of action in any particular order, but has discretion to take any listed corrective action it deems appropriate.’ Jones v. State, 251 Ga.App. 285, 286(1) (554 S.E.2d 238) (2001). The trial court had the discretion to choose the course of action it took when Acey failed to file his witness list within the five days before trial, as required by OCGA § 17-16-8(a). Under OCGA § 17-16-6, the trial court may exclude the witnesses upon showings of prejudice to the State and bad faith by the defense. See Sullivan [ v. State, 242 Ga.App. 839, 841, 531 S.E.2d 367 (2000).]. The requirement of bad faith is satisfied because nothing in the record indicates that Acey did not know of these witnesses, or intend to call them, until the day of the trial. There is no good faith explanation for Acey’s failure to disclose his witnesses to the State. The requirement of prejudice to the State is satisfied because the State had no notice of the witnesses until the day of trial, and thus it had no opportunity to investigate these witnesses or their testimony. See Id.” Accord, Hudson v. State , 284 Ga. 595, 669 S.E.2d 94 (November 3, 2008) (no abuse of discretion in excluding defense witness whom counsel knew about before trial but not disclosed to State until third day of trial); Theophile v. State , 295 Ga.App. 517, 672 S.E.2d 479 (January 13, 2009). Rayo-Leon v. State, 281 Ga.App. 74, 635 S.E.2d 368 (August 11, 2006). “‘Because he failed to agree to reciprocal discovery, [Rayo-Leon] was not entitled to a continuing list of trial witnesses....’ Blevins v. State, 270 Ga.App. 388, 391 (606 S.E.2d 624) (2004). Furthermore, the witness was offered to rebut an assertion that Rayo-Leon made while testifying in his own defense, and when the issue was raised, the trial court gave Rayo-Leon time to interview the witness and limited the scope of questioning. [Cit.] We find no abuse of discretion.”