☢ test - Í

Ga. 401(3), 456 S.E.2d 578 (1995).” Jones v. State , 243 Ga.App. 351, 532 S.E.2d 120 (March 21, 2000). Physical precedent only. Conviction for robbery by intimidation affirmed; trial court properly allowed State to present witness not on witness list, upon finding of no bad faith by State and no showing of prejudice to defense. Upon objection, “[t]he State responded that the witness's name was included on a supplemental police report it provided to Jones, which described only the statement [witness/Investigator] Hughes overheard. The trial court found that the State did not act in bad faith in leaving Hughes's name off the witness list and granted Jones an opportunity to interview the witness, which he took. Jones did not seek a continuance. … In this case, Jones made no showing that he was prejudiced as a result of the State's failure to make the custodial statement available to him prior to trial or that the State acted in bad faith in failing to list the witness. Further, Jones did not ask for a continuance to cure any prejudice which may have resulted from the State's failure to comply with OCGA § 17-16- 4(a)(1). Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Hughes to testify, although his name was not on the witness list. Maxwell v. State, 233 Ga.App. 419, 423(4)(a), 503 S.E.2d 668 (1998); Bell v. State, 224 Ga.App. 191, 192, 480 S.E.2d 241 (1997).” Sullivan v. State , 242 Ga.App. 839, 531 S.E.2d 367 (March 16, 2000). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; no abuse of discretion where trial court refused to allow defendant “to call witnesses about whom he failed to furnish the State with the information required by OCGA § 17–16–8(a). We find no error. Under OCGA § 17–16–6, the trial court had discretion to exclude these witnesses upon showings of prejudice to the State and bad faith by the defense. Implicit in the trial court's decision to exclude these witnesses is the determination that prejudice and bad faith were shown. The trial court's rulings on these matters are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous, and this determination is supported by the evidence. Even the partial information provided was given so late as to prevent the State from adequately investigating the witnesses, their testimony, and their criminal history. Further, as the witnesses who were belatedly noticed were the defendant's relatives, friends, neighbors, acquaintances, co-workers, and employers, some evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the required information was not provided in bad faith. Therefore, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding these witnesses. Todd v. State, 230 Ga.App. 849, 854(3)(b), 498 S.E.2d 142 (1998).” Bullard v. State, 242 Ga.App. 843, 530 S.E.2d 265 (March 1, 2000). Medicaid fraud and related convictions affirmed; no error where trial court, on express finding of “objective bad faith,” prohibited defense from calling 22 witnesses on a list first faxed to State on Saturday before Tuesday trial. “Here, there was evidence that the court had put the case on call for trial at least two months earlier. Defense counsel did not have a sufficient explanation as to why he waited to disclose the witnesses until just before the start of trial. Further, the trial court correctly concluded that it would now be very difficult for the State to interview 22 witnesses during trial. Moreover, as the State points out, there was no proffer at trial as to the testimony of the 22 witnesses for Lester Bullard.” Ruffin and Ellington concur specially, suggesting better practice of reducing list and allowing State time to interview those to be presented. “By flatly excluding all 22 witnesses, without exploring the possibility of less drastic alternatives, the trial court may have needlessly hampered Bullard's ability to present a defense.” Brice v. State, 242 Ga.App. 163, 529 S.E.2d 178 (February 1, 2000). Less-safe DUI conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion in allowing witnesses not on witness list to testify. 1. State properly allowed to call witness whom defendant claimed to have argued with just before driving. “In this case, the record shows that the State did not become aware that Snell had knowledge of the defendant's condition and conduct on the night of her arrest until after the trial had begun. It further shows that defense counsel's statements and questions during the trial gave the State its first notice of this witness. Defense counsel referred to Snell during his opening statement and asked three different witnesses about Snell's interaction with the defendant on the night of her arrest.” 2. State properly allowed to call sheriff to impeach Snell. “OCGA § 17-16-21 obligated the State to provide Brice with a list ‘of the witnesses on whose testimony the charge against [the defendant] is founded.’ It does not obligate the State to list unanticipated impeachment witnesses.” Johnson v. State, 241 Ga.App. 448, 526 S.E.2d 903 (December 14, 1999). Defendants’ convictions for attempted armed robbery affirmed; no witness list violation because no surprise to defense where omitted deputy’s “name appeared on multiple documents in the case files. There is no claim that defense counsel were denied access to such files before trial. Further, neither Johnson nor Mosby expressed surprise or sought an opportunity to interview Deputy Godowns when they were made aware that he would appear as a witness at trial. Id. Additionally, Deputy Godowns' testimony was cumulative of that provided by other sheriff's deputies and would have been harmless for this reason in any event. See