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any, resulting from the inconsistency between the evidence and the misstatement was mitigated by the trial court charging the jury that what the lawyers say in opening statement ‘is not evidence’ but ‘is intended to be a preview or an outline of what they expect the evidence to be.’” Garcia v. State, 319 Ga.App. 751, 738 S.E.2d 333 (February 14, 2013). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defense counsel arguably violated motion in limine in opening statement. “[F]ollowing his arrest outside of the Mexican restaurant, Calderon moved to suppress a handgun and a large amount of cash that were found as a result of a search of his vehicle. In a consent order, the trial court suppressed the handgun and cash and further ordered that Calderon could not refer to a “lack of money or guns being present” in Calderon's vehicle at the time of his arrest. However, during his opening statement at trial, Calderon's counsel apparently stated that ‘zero’ had been found in his client's vehicle when he was arrested.” After bench conference, “the trial court found that the remark by Calderon's counsel was improper but that it did not open the door to the admission of the handgun or cash. Instead, the court stated that it would issue a curative instruction, to which both parties agreed.” 1. Decisions about what to say in opening are presumed strategic; defendant didn’t question counsel about this at motion for new trial. 2. No ineffective assistance in failing to move for mistrial following curative instruction. “‘A conviction will not be reversed if the opening statement was made in good faith, and the trial court instructs the jury that opening statements are not to be considered as evidence during deliberations.’ Simmons v. State, 291 Ga. 705, 709(6), 733 S.E.2d 280 (2012) (punctuation omitted). That is precisely what the trial court did here.” Barber v. State, 317 Ga.App. 600, 732 S.E.2d 125 (September 11, 2012). Conviction for cocaine possession with intent to distribute affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to object to prosecutor’s opening statement. “Barber objects to the prosecutor's first statement: ‘[t]his is a simple case, and it's a simple case about a drug dealer, a drug dealer who makes money off of other peoples' addiction.’ According to Barber, this statement was made with the improper purpose of inflaming the minds of the jurors against defendant. … Even if we were to assume that Barber's trial counsel deficiently performed by failing to object to this statement, there was ample evidence supporting Barber's conviction [fn] and the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the opening statement as evidence. Accordingly, Barber cannot meet his burden of proving that prejudice resulted from such performance. [fn]” Tucker v. State, 313 Ga.App. 537, 722 S.E.2d 139 (January 12, 2012). Drug convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel elected not to object to prosecutor’s statement in opening, telling jury that co-defendants had already pled guilty. “[T]rial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that ‘[i]f the drugs were not found particularly on my client and if the codefendants are arrested at the same time and had entered a guilty plea, that does not impact on my client's guilt or innocence to that particular incident.... I would want them to be guilty.’ This was clearly a matter of trial strategy by trial counsel which fell within the bounds of reasonable professional conduct. See Lawrence v. State, 274 Ga. 794, 795(3) (560 S.E.2d 17) (2002); Watts v. State, 304 Ga.App. 632, 635 (697 S.E.2d 272) (2010).” Sheats v. State, 305 Ga.App. 475, 699 S.E.2d 798 (July 30, 2010). Defendant’s conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel, anticipating similar transaction evidence from State, made reference to it in opening statement. “Pretermitting whether the statement ‘things that happened in Mr. Sheats' past’ calls his character into question, counsel's decision to address the problem of similar transaction testimony in his opening statement was clearly strategic.” Boggs v. State, 304 Ga.App. 698, 697 S.E.2d 843 (June 30, 2010). Defendant’s robbery conviction affirmed; counsel wasn’t deficient in failing to object to prosecutor’s opening statement. “In Peterson v. State, 282 Ga. 286, 290-292(4)(a), (b) (647 S.E.2d 592) (2007), our Supreme Court held that the defendant had failed to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's opening statement, given that the defendant failed to show that the prosecutor was not exercising good faith, and given that the trial court instructed the jury that opening statements are not evidence. The present case is controlled by Peterson. Boggs did not cross-examine the prosecutor at the hearing on his motion for a new trial or otherwise present any evidence reflecting on what the prosecutor anticipated the evidence would show prior to trial. As such, he cannot establish that the prosecutor lacked a good faith basis for her assertions made during her opening statement. Additionally, the trial court specifically instructed the jury that opening statements are not to be considered as evidence.” Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 690 S.E.2d 801 (January 25, 2010). No ineffective assistance where counsel strategically waived opening statement: “in order to ‘leave the door open’ for him to pursue whatever strategy would turn out to be the most advantageous for Lawrence after hearing the evidence that the State would present. Such a reasonable strategic