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prosecutor’s opening statement discussing anticipated defense witnesses. Defendants had given notice of alibi defenses; prosecutor told the jury “that the State was ‘prepared to expose and refute the alibi defense we anticipate from’ [defendants] and was ‘confident that we have the evidence to prove our case and to disprove the proffered defense.’” In fact, all defendants did present alibi defenses. “Accordingly, while it is inappropriate for a prosecutor in a criminal case to discuss in opening statement the evidence the State anticipates the defense will present at trial, Parker v. State, [277 Ga. 439, 441(2) (588 S.E.2d 683) (2003)], [defendants] cannot carry their burden of showing that, had trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's improper comments, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different. See Jackson v. State, 282 Ga. 494(3) (651 S.E.2d 702) (2007). See also Parker, supra at 442(2) (even where counsel objects, uncorrected argument of prosecutor does not require reversal where it is highly probable the improper argument did not contribute to judgment).” Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 663 S.E.2d 206 (June 30, 2008). “ Muller … contends that his lead attorney at trial was ineffective for promising in opening statement to present evidence of exactly what happened inside the house where the shooting occurred, and then failing to present such evidence even after telling the jurors in opening statement that his words were a bond with them and that they could hold it against his client if he failed to prove anything. However, defense counsel specifically applied the latter statements to the prosecutor as well. During closing argument, counsel took the position that the defense had been prepared to respond when and if the State presented its promised evidence, but that the State failed to deliver on its promise and that the prosecution witnesses ‘essentially made the defendant’s case that there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” “‘(D)efense counsel “is given wide latitude in making [opening statements and] closing arguments. (Cit.) This Court will not, with benefit of hindsight, second-guess defense trial strategies [therein]. Absent a strong showing that counsel’s actions were not reasonable, we will presume that these strategies were not deficient. (Cit.)” (Cit.)’ [Cits.] Davenport v. State, [283 Ga. 171, 175(5) (656 S.E.2d 844) (2008)]. Moreover, in light of the fact that the opening statement and closing argument are not to be considered as evidence by the jury, Muller has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been affected if his counsel had opened and closed differently. Hazelrigs v. State, 255 Ga.App. 784, 785-786(1) (567 S.E.2d 79) (2002).” Brown v. State, 288 Ga.App. 671, 655 S.E.2d 287 (November 30, 2007). “Brown asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective because she promised during opening statement certain evidence, which he claims was not presented. Brown cites McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159 (3d Cir., 1993), for the proposition that when counsel primes the jury to hear a different version of the events from what he ultimately presents, one may infer that reasonable jurors would think the witnesses to which counsel referred in his opening statement were unable to deliver the promised testimony. Id. at 166- 167. We can assess neither the degree nor the effect of an unfulfilled promise to produce evidence because opening statements were not transcribed. ‘It is the duty of [defendant] to show error by the record....’ Thompson v. State, 248 Ga.App. 74, 75 (544 S.E.2d 510) (2001) (citation omitted). And it is ‘the state of an appellate record and transcript duly before us at the time of our original disposition of the appeal’ that controls our appellate review. Williams v. Food Lion, 213 Ga.App. 865, 868 (446 S.E.2d 221) (1994). Although Brown might have perfected the record in regard to this claim of error, see Bates v. State, 228 Ga.App. 140(2) (491 S.E.2d 200) (1997) (trial court is authorized by OCGA § 5-6-41(f) to accept amendments to the transcript to make the transcript conform to the truth), he did not. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury during its preliminary charge that each side would present an opening statement, which the court defined as ‘merely the opportunity for the attorney to state to you what they anticipate the evidence will be.’ No reversible error has been shown.” King v. State, 241 Ga.App. 894, 528 S.E.2d 535 (January 20, 2000). Convictions for armed robbery and firearms offense affirmed. “ Trial counsel's decision to waive opening statement is considered a matter of trial strategy and does not amount to ineffective assistance. Tenant v. State, 218 Ga.App. 620, 622(4)(a), 462 S.E.2d 783 (1995).” Avila-Nunez v. State, 237 Ga.App. 649, 516 S.E.2d 335 (April 13, 1999). At defendant’s trial for child abuse, “[t]rial counsel’s decision to inform the jury that Avila-Nunez was an illegal alien being investigated for welfare fraud was clearly strategic. See Powell v. State, 210 Ga.App. 409, 413(6)(b), 437 S.E.2d 598 (1993). In his opening statement, counsel used that information to explain his client’s apparent evasiveness with the authorities.” 76. PLEA DEAL, FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE/ADVISE Seminal case: Missouri v. Frye (March 21, 2012), below ( “ as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”) ; Lafler (March 21, 2012), below (setting forth proper remedy where ineffective assistance leads defendant to reject plea offer and proceed to trial); Lloyd v. State , 258 Ga. 645, 373 S.E.2d 1 (1988) (“Objective