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of counsel during the plea process. State’s offer was presented to defendant in open court, following which defendant conferred with counsel in private and “told Counsel he wanted to accept the offer, but Counsel talked him out of it because he believed that Lexie was innocent. Counsel told Lexie that they had a very good chance to win and to get the matter expunged from his record. Lexie rejected the plea offer based solely on Counsel's advice, and Counsel said that Lexie made that decision only after Counsel ‘twisted his arm.’” Defendant later again advised counsel that he wanted to accept the State’s offer, and again counsel talked him out of it. Counsel “told Lexie that he had the best case he had ever seen and that no reasonable jury would convict him. When Lexie asked Counsel how certain he was, Counsel said that if he lost the case, he would turn in his bar card.” Trial court properly found counsel’s guarantees and assurances about the outcome to be unreasonable and “meretricious.” “The trial court further found that given Counsel's assessment of the State's case, Counsel could not have reasonably advised his client concerning the risk of going to trial in order to allow Lexie to make an informed decision about the plea offer. Nor did it ‘appear that Counsel was willing or interested in abiding by his client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.’ The trial court based these findings not only on the evidence that Lexie rejected a first-offender probationary sentence to risk a potential mandatory life sentence, but also on the evidence that ‘Counsel actively lobbied his client to reject the plea knowing his client wanted to accept the offer. He all but guaranteed an outcome for his client that he knew, or should have known, he could not promise.’ Based on these findings, the trial court accordingly concluded that ‘Counsel's actions were not in the best interest of his client, but rather based primarily on his individual desire to win.’” “Although the trial court informed Lexie at the plea hearing that the maximum sentence that could be imposed by the court was life plus 120 years, we find no indication in the record that Lexie was ever informed of the mandatory sentencing provisions of OCGA § 16–6–2(b)(2).” Defendant’s two expressions of desire to accept the offer “demonstrate that Lexie would have accepted the offer had he been afforded effective assistance of counsel,” as required by Frye (March 21, 2012), below. Maines v. State, 330 Ga.App. 247, 765 S.E.2d 382 (October 29, 2014). Following non-negotiated plea, trial court found plea counsel to be ineffective, but properly concluded that the ineffectiveness didn’t require State to re-offer prior plea deal. Defendant originally rejected State’s offer, entered blind plea, and received significantly harsher sentence on his aggravated stalking charge. Trial court granted defendant’s motion to set aside the plea, “finding that plea counsel had been ineffective because he did not know the elements of the aggravated stalking offense charged and thus did not adequately explain those elements to Maines.” But trial court denied defendant’s motion to require the State to re – offer its original plea offer, distinguishing Lafler v. Cooper (March 21, 2012), below. “As explained in Lafler: ‘If, for example, an offer was for a guilty plea to a count or counts less serious than the ones for which a defendant was convicted after trial, or if a mandatory sentence confines a judge's sentencing discretion after trial, a resentencing based on the conviction at trial may not suffice. In these circumstances, the proper exercise of discretion to remedy the constitutional injury may be to require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal. Once this has occurred, the judge can then exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed.’ Lafler, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 1389(II)(C) (citations omitted; emphasis supplied). In this case, there was no offer for a plea to a lesser count than the aggravated stalking count for which Maines was convicted after his first guilty plea, nor was there a mandatory sentence confining the judge's sentencing discretion. Thus, the circumstances contemplated by Lafler which might have necessitated a re-offering of the plea proposal simply are not present in this case. Moreover, even if such circumstances were present, Lafler still clearly states that such a remedy would be up to the trial court's discretion.” Instead, in a situation like this where “the sole advantage a defendant would have received under the plea is a lesser sentence,” the trial court properly “held an evidentiary hearing after which it allowed withdrawal of the first plea because there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, Maines would have accepted the plea offer. Thereafter, when Maines chose to enter a second non-negotiated plea, the trial court properly determined the voluntariness of the plea and then exercised its discretion in determining the appropriate sentence. Before imposing sentence, the court noted that it had considered the arguments from both sides and the stipulated testimony from the prior hearing, which showed that Maines had engaged in a systematic pattern of harassment and intimidation of the victim. Based on the arguments and evidence, the trial court decided to impose the same length of sentence as originally imposed, but this time granted Maines first offender status.” Lafler v. Cooper, 10-209, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398, 2012 WL 932019 (March 21, 2012). Following Michigan prosecution for assault with intent to murder and related offenses, grant of federal habeas relief vacated and remanded for application of proper remedy. “[W]here ineffective assistance results in a rejection of the plea offer and the defendant is convicted at the ensuing trial,” proper remedy was to require “the State to reoffer the plea agreement. Presuming respondent accepts the offer, the state trial court can then exercise its discretion in determining whether to vacate the convictions and resentence respondent pursuant to the plea agreement, to vacate only some of the convictions and resentence respondent accordingly, or to leave the convictions and sentence