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withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a plea bargain. The determination that there is or is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent counsel's errors can be conducted within that framework.” Remanded for consideration of this issue, especially in light of defendant’s subsequent charge of driving while revoked. Scalia, writing for Roberts, Thomas and Alito, dissents: “The plea-bargaining process is a subject worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most criminal convictions are obtained. It happens not to be, however, a subject covered by the Sixth Amendment, which is concerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the fairness of conviction.” Accord, Brown v. State , 291 Ga. 892, 734 S.E.2d 23 (November 5, 2012) (evidence showed defendant wasn’t interested in seeking a plea deal “and was determined to go to trial.”); Temple v. State , 320 Ga.App. 721, 740 S.E.2d 669 (March 22, 2013) (defendant was advised of, and rejected, State’s offer on record before trial). Cammer v. Walker, 290 Ga. 251, 719 S.E.2d 437 (November 21, 2011). Habeas court properly denied petition based on alleged ineffective assistance. “Contrary to Cammer's contentions, the record does not establish that trial counsel, by consulting jointly with Cammer and Cammer's father, failed to ensure that the decision to reject the State's plea agreement offer was Cammer's. The record supports the habeas court's factual findings that trial counsel believed that he was consulting with Cammer personally about the plea offer when he met with Cammer and Cammer's father and that trial counsel took Cammer's silence in the face of his father's insistence on Cammer going to trial to mean that Cammer did not want to accept the offer. Cammer admitted that he never told trial counsel that he wished to plead guilty. Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude that trial counsel acted in an unreasonable or professionally deficient manner in concluding that Cammer had decided to let his father speak for him and wished to reject the State's offer.” Based on Johnson (June 13, 2011), below. State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 715 S.E.2d 48 (July 5, 2011). In murder prosecution, no ineffective assistance where counsel allegedly “failed to inform him that he faced a maximum sentence of life without eligibility for parole for 30 years. However, even assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently in this regard, Abernathy cannot establish prejudice from his alleged misapprehension about parole eligibility insofar as there was no evidence the State would have considered a plea deal even if Abernathy had offered to plead guilty.” Accord, Sutton v. State , 295 Ga. 350, 759 S.E.2d 846 (June 16, 2014) (“It cannot be said that trial counsel failed to secure and communicate a plea deal because a deal was not offered.”). Badger v. State, 310 Ga.App. 157, 712 S.E.2d 582 (June 20, 2011). Aggravated assault and firearms convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance despite defendant’s claim that counsel failed to communicate a plea offer, where counsel testified that “[Badger] had strongly told me he would not, under any circumstances, consider pleading guilty. He was not guilty and would not under any circumstances consider a guilty plea. ” Accord, Enuka v. State , 314 Ga.App. 466, 724 S.E.2d 471 (February 29, 2012). Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. 532, 712 S.E.2d 811 (June 13, 2011). Reversing 301 Ga.App. 423, 687 S.E.2d 663 (December 3, 2009). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for new trial; defendant received ineffective assistance where counsel failed to provide full advice about State’s plea offer. “Due to ongoing health problems, [public defender] Casto was not present at the docket call on August 1, 2003, but another attorney from the public defender's office, Jim Messner, entered a not guilty plea on Johnson's behalf. Casto first met with Johnson on August 4, 2003, during which Johnson gave Casto the names of two alibi witnesses. After the meeting, Casto investigated the alibi witnesses, but could not locate one of them, and the other witness, Johnson's sister, would not support an alibi defense. During a meeting two days before trial, on August 12, Casto reported to Johnson that he would be unable to present favorable testimony from the alibi witnesses. Casto then brought up the State's plea offer and informed Johnson that due to his prior record, he would face a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole if he was convicted on the armed robbery count. There is no evidence in the record that Johnson had been advised of this mandatory sentence prior to this time. Johnson asked Casto to propose a counteroffer of twenty years to serve ten, and Casto immediately telephoned Michele Ivey, the Assistant District Attorney handling the case, who rejected the counteroffer. About five minutes later, Casto again called Ms. Ivey and informed her that Johnson wanted to accept the original offer. However, Ms. Ivey stated that the original offer was withdrawn due to a standing policy of the district attorney's office that plea offers are held open only until the docket call, meaning that once a defendant pleads not guilty, the plea offer is considered rejected. Johnson was subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to life without parole.” 1. Deficient performance. “In Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645, 648(2)(a), 373 S.E.2d 1 (1988), this Court held that trial counsel has rendered ‘less than reasonably professional assistance’ if he has not informed his client ‘that an offer to plead guilty has been made and ... advised [his client] of the consequences of the choices confronting him.’ … In the present case, it is clear that Johnson was not reasonably represented by any attorney during the plea bargaining process. Although there is a dispute as to whether Johnson was