☢ test - Í

defendant’s contention to the contrary, he failed to demonstrate “that, but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the State's plea offer.” Although Court of Appeals correctly found that “counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,” because counsel failed to review the prosecutor’s file when made available, and thus was unaware of important evidence in the case , defendant shows no prejudice because the record demonstrates that he adamantly protested his innocence both before trial and after conviction, refusing to consider any plea offer. Rejects defendant’s misinterpretation of Lloyd v. State , 258 Ga. 645 (373 S.E.2d 1) (1988), which “merely noted that the evidence presented to show ineffective assistance of counsel failed to support even an ‘inference’ that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer, much less amounted to the affirmative demonstration of prejudice required by the second prong of the Strickland test. We did not intend by this statement to lower the evidentiary burden for establishing Strickland prejudice in the plea bargain context.” Note the contention here is not that counsel performed deficiently at trial; rather, that if counsel had informed defendant of the additional evidence in the prosecutor’s file, defendant would have accepted the plea bargain. Celestin v. State, 296 Ga.App. 727, 675 S.E.2d 480 (February 18, 2009). Defendant can’t complain that his appointed counsel was unprepared for trial where trial was forced to proceed five days after counsel’s appointment by defendant’s refusal to withdraw his statutory speedy trial demand. “Having declined to withdraw his speedy trial demand, Celestin cannot now complain that his attorney proceeded to trial without conducting a lengthier investigation of his case.” Accord, Hubert v. State , 297 Ga.App. 71, 676 S.E.2d 436 (March 26, 2009). Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 668 S.E.2d 651 (October 6, 2008). 1. No ineffective assistance upon mere showing of large caseload by defendant’s indigent defender. “Whatley argues that his defense counsel, Johnny Mostiler, had such a heavy caseload as the contract defender for Spalding County that this Court should presume that Whatley's defense suffered prejudice. In general, an ineffective assistance claim can succeed only where the prisoner can show actual prejudice to his or her defense that in reasonable probability changed the outcome of the trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984); Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783-784(1) (325 S.E.2d 362) (1985). However, Whatley correctly notes that an exception to this general rule applies and prejudice will be presumed where, ‘although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-660(III) (104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657) (1984).” No such showing here: defendant’s “assertion regarding Mostiler's general caseload is irrelevant. As was noted by the habeas court, it is the amount of time actually spent by Mostiler on Whatley's case that matters, not the number of other cases he might have had that potentially could have taken his time.” Record showed that attorney and his investigator spent well over 200 hours over more than two years on defendant’s case. “[V]ague statistics that fail to shed light on the amount of work actually done in the particular case at issue are insufficient to show the kind of complete breakdown in representation necessary for prejudice to the defense to be presumed. [Cits.]” 2. “It is entirely reasonable for trial counsel to have delegated an investigation into potential witness testimony to his investigator and to follow up with his own interviews of witnesses when it appeared prudent to do so, which the record shows counsel did.” Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga.App. 115, 656 S.E.2d 238 (January 8, 2008). No ineffective assistance based on attorney’s failure to record interview with police officer for later use as impeachment. “At the motion for new trial hearing, trial counsel testified that he does not record interviews unless he expects the witness to offer exculpatory evidence. Trial counsel did not expect the complained of interview to be exculpatory, and it was not. Instead, it differed from the officer’s police report only insofar as it indicated that the weapon had been pointed at the officer's head, rather than at his midsection, and that the weapon had been held in the left, rather than the right hand. It is where an attorney fails to conduct a reasonable investigation into evidence crucial to the defense that he may render ineffective assistance. See Curry v. Zant, 258 Ga. 527, 530 (371 S.E.2d 647) (1988) (counsel’s failure to obtain an independent psychiatric examination constituted deficient performance). There here is no deficiency for failure to investigate an inconsistency significant to the defense.” See also Savior (October 27, 2008), above. Felder v. State, 286 Ga.App. 271, 648 S.E.2d 753 (July 3, 2007). “Felder suggests that counsel did not have time to adequately prepare for trial, and he contends that counsel was deficient when he failed to request a continuance. Counsel, however, testified that he was hired to represent Felder three or four weeks before trial and that he had adequate time to prepare for trial. According to counsel, the only benefit of having some extra time would have been that it might have allowed him to find a potential defense witness, but there was no competent evidence in the record regarding what the witness would have testified to and that it would have been relevant and favorable to Felder. Counsel also testified that,