☢ test - Í

then, the failure to object to the appointment was a matter of trial strategy or tactics, which cannot be the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Gillison v. State, 254 Ga.App. 232, 234(4)(a) (561 S.E.2d 879) (2002).” Pirkle v. State, 289 Ga.App. 450, 657 S.E.2d 560 (January 31, 2008). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for recusal of trial judge, whose brother testified for State. Counsel made a strategic decision based on the other judges available and the “neutral” testimony of the brother. “Under the facts of this case, including the strategic considerations of trial counsel and the limited nature of the witness’s testimony, the trial court was authorized to find trial counsel’s choice here not to be so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have so chosen.” Trimble v. State, 274 Ga.App. 536, 618 S.E.2d 163 (July 21, 2005) (disapproved on other grounds, Miller v. State , 285 Ga. 285, 676 S.E.2d 173 (April 28, 2009)). “[C]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for bringing meritless motion to recuse,” citing Johnson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 413, 419(3)(b) (579 S.E.2d 809) (2003); likewise, here, counsel can’t be found ineffective for failing to move for recusal, “as there is no evidence that recusal would have been justified here.” 88. RELATIONSHIP WITH DEFENDANT Taylor v. State, 298 Ga.App. 145, 679 S.E.2d 371 (June 1, 2009). No ineffective assistance despite defendant’s complaints “that his trial counsel was hostile, disrespectful, and demeaning toward him. As examples of such conduct, Taylor testified at the motion hearing, ‘He told me I was stupid for going to trial and not taking the plea of twenty, do ten, up under recidivist. And he told me, one time he told me he'd be a damn fool to believe I ain't go in the house.’ In addition, Taylor recounted that during the trial proceedings, he wrote a note to his lawyer asking whether his sister and mother would be called as alibi witnesses and that, in writing back to him on the note, his trial counsel called him a ‘mother fucker.’ Taylor testified that the lawyer then scratched-over his profanity, apologized, and told him that he would not be calling his sister and mother to testify. The note was admitted in evidence. Taylor asserts on appeal that his trial lawyer's actions directed toward him were ‘indicative of his lack of dedication to representing him.’ But Taylor's burden is to establish that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the case. See Strickland [ v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) (1984)]. ‘[A] meaningful relationship between a defendant and his counsel is not a Sixth Amendment guarantee.’ Hammonds v. State, 218 Ga.App. 423, 424(1) (461 S.E.2d 589) (1995); see Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356, 358(3) (541 S.E.2d 362) (2001) (essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, not to guarantee a defendant preferred counsel or counsel with whom a ‘meaningful relationship’ can be established). The cited behavior of Taylor's trial lawyer and Taylor's apparent distrust of his counsel fall short of establishing a claim of ineffectiveness. See Hammonds, supra; see also Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 419(2) (641 S.E.2d 635) (2007) (defendant's assertions that his trial attorney was hostile and refused to follow his instructions did not amount to a showing that the attorney had been unable or unwilling to effectively represent defendant).” Accord, Wood v. State , 304 Ga.App. 52, 695 S.E.2d 391 (May 12, 2010). Harden v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 464, 629 S.E.2d 259 (April 25, 2006). Defendant’s “statements of satisfaction with trial counsel, whether sworn or unsworn, … are not relevant to a determination of an ineffective assistance claim. … In reviewing counsel’s performance, the focus ‘is not the accused’s evaluation of his counsel’s performance; instead, the focus is whether there has been a true adversarial process with the accused’s counsel acting as a reasonably effective advocate for the accused. Accordingly, in evaluating an ineffective assistance claim, no weight is attached to the accused’s expression of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with counsel. [Cit.]’ Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 485, 486, 422 S.E.2d 176 (1992). See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657, n. 21, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984).” Williams v. State, 273 Ga.App. 213, 614 S.E.2d 834 (May 9, 2005). “‘A defendant is entitled to counsel capable of rendering competent, meaningful assistance in the preparation and trial of the pending charges, including appropriate evaluation and advice with reference to a plea of guilty. A defendant is not entitled to an attorney who agrees with the defendant’s personal view of the prevailing law or the equities of the prosecutor’s case. A defendant is entitled to an attorney who will consider the defendant’s views and seek to accommodate all reasonable requests with respect to trial preparation and trial tactics. A defendant is entitled to appointment of an attorney with whom he can communicate reasonably, but has no right to an attorney who will docilely do as he is told. Every defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel dedicated to the proposition, and capable of assuring that, the prosecution’s case shall be presented in conformity with the Constitution, rules of evidence and all other controlling rules and practices. No defendant has a right to more.’ Phipps v. State, 200 Ga.App. 18, 19, 406 S.E.2d 493 (1991).” 89. RESEARCH