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8(4) (608 S.E.2d 621) (2005)), counsel’s decision not to seek severance amounts to reasonable trial strategy and as such cannot be the basis of a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Accord, Hubbard v. State , 274 Ga.App. 184, 617 S.E.2d 167 (July 6, 2005); Jackson v. State , 281 Ga. 705, 642 S.E.2d 656 (March 19, 2007); Hill v. State , 290 Ga.App. 140, 658 S.E.2d 863 (March 7, 2008); Clowers v. State , 299 Ga.App. 576, 683 S.E.2d 46 (July 17, 2009); Nelson v. State , 302 Ga.App. 583, 691 S.E.2d 363 (March 2, 2010); Ansley v. State , 325 Ga.App. 226, 750 S.E.2d 484 (November 18, 2013); McNair v. State , 330 Ga.App. 478, 767 S.E.2d 290 (December 16, 2014); Powell v. State , 297 Ga. 352, 773 S.E.2d 762 (June 15, 2015). 94. SHACKLES/PRISON GARB, FAILURE TO OBJECT Jones v. State, 312 Ga.App. 15, 717 S.E.2d 526 (October 13, 2011). Armed robbery conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance shown “by failing to develop or present evidence regarding the jurors seeing him in shackles and handcuffs” absent some showing of prejudice, not made here. “Even assuming that the two jurors saw him in shackles and handcuffs, ‘[w]e cannot presume the jury was unfairly tainted by [Jones's] appearance.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Stevenson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 335, 342(3)(d), 612 S.E.2d 521 (2005). See also Casey v. State, 237 Ga.App. 461, 462(1), 515 S.E.2d 429 (1999) (no evidence was in the record that any of the jurors actually saw defendant in handcuffs and defendant's burden of establishing prejudice was not met); Whatley [ v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 572(V)(D), 668 S.E.2d 651 (2008)] (holding that based on evidence presented at trial, no reasonable probability existed that shackling during the sentencing phase affected the jury's sentence selection).” Hampton v. State, 294 Ga.App. 857, 670 S.E.2d 502 (November 25, 2008). “Hampton charges his attorney with ineffectiveness in failing to object to him being tried in prison garb. The record, however, reflects that Hampton appeared for trial in a jumpsuit without any distinguishing markings. Therefore, it would appear that his clothing, though issued by the jail, was not so suggestive as to have created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if he had been dressed in less institutional attire. See Gay v. State, 258 Ga.App. 854, 857-858(4)(b) (575 S.E.2d 740) (2002); see also Hayslip v. State, 154 Ga.App. 835(1) (270 S.E.2d 61) (1980).” Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 668 S.E.2d 651 (October 6, 2008). “The Supreme Court of the United States decided in 2005, well after Whatley's trial and direct appeal, that visibly shackling a defendant during the sentencing phase is unconstitutional unless the record shows ‘“an essential state interest” – such as the interest in courtroom security – specific to the defendant on trial.’ Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953) (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-569 (106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525) (1986)).” “ On direct appeal where unconstitutional shackling has occurred, there is a presumption of harm that can be overcome only upon a showing by the State that the shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, where, as here, the issue is the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object to such shackling, the petitioner is entitled to relief only if he or she can show that there is a reasonable probability that the shackling affected the outcome of the trial. See Marquard [ v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1312-1314(IV)(B) (11th Cir., 2005)] (addressing a visible shackling claim and finding no reasonable probability of a different outcome in the sentencing phase). In view of the balance of the evidence presented at his trial, we conclude as a matter of law that Whatley cannot show that his trial counsel's failure to object to his shackling in the sentencing phase in reasonable probability affected the jury's selection of a sentence.” 95. SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS, FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE/GIVE NOTICE Payne v. State, 289 Ga. 691, 715 S.E.2d 104 (September 12, 2011). Malice murder conviction affirmed; USCR 31.1 requirement of notice of intent to introduce evidence of victim’s bad acts against third persons didn’t apply to victim’s threats against defendant. That rule, and Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 405 S.E.2d 669 (1991), “applies to ‘evidence of specific acts of violence by a victim against third persons, ’ 261 Ga. at 407, 405 S.E.2d 669 (emphasis added), not evidence of a victim's threats to a defendant or evidence that the victim might have had a weapon but had not used it against a third person.” Hence, trial court properly ruled that counsel didn’t provide ineffective assistance by failing to provide such notice. King v. State, 242 Ga.App. 642, 530 S.E.2d 744 (March 8, 2000). Conviction for marijuana possession with intent to distribute affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to object to similar transaction evidence at trial, where “the State's introduction of the similar transaction evidence was vigorously contested prior to trial … . [Counsel’s] subsequent failure to object to the evidence at trial was irrelevant, since evidence of King's prior sale of drugs was properly admitted for the purposes offered by the State, i.e., to show intent and course of conduct in engaging in the business of distributing controlled substances. Chappell v. State, 215 Ga.App. 596, 597(1), 451 S.E.2d 491 (1994).”