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the prior convictions. He did not make any argument or showing that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, and, as a result, he has failed to provide any basis for showing that the convictions would have been admissible and that he was harmed by his attorney’s failure to introduce them. Mere speculation regarding the admissibility of these convictions does not satisfy Clark’s burden of showing prejudice under Strickland .” New case! Edwards v. State, S16A0255, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 2619593 (May 9, 2016). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to cross-examine and impeachment State’s witness with his plea deal to defendant’s satisfaction. “‘Although an attorney is permitted to thoroughly question a testifying co- defendant regarding the details of any plea agreement, it does not necessarily follow that counsel is ineffective for failing to elicit all details of the agreement.’ Curtis v. State, 330 Ga.App. 839, 845(1)(d), 769 S.E.2d 580 (2015) (citation omitted). ‘As trial counsel obtained testimony from [Russell] that he had substantial motivation to testify against [Edwards], we cannot say that [her] failure to ask about specific effects of the plea deal was patently unreasonable.’ Holder v. State, 319 Ga.App. 239, 249(3)(b), 736 S.E.2d 449 (2012) (citations omitted).” Barney v. State, 333 Ga.App. 807, 777 S.E.2d 490 (September 15, 2015). Burglary convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to cross-examine State’s witnesses “about their sentences because both had testified that they pled guilty without a recommendation from the State regarding their sentences. She further explained that she chose to focus her cross-examination on the fact that both men admitted that they had lied in the past. ‘Even though counsel is permitted to cross-examine thoroughly a testifying co-defendant about the terms of his plea agreement, it does not necessarily follow that counsel is ineffective for failing to do so.’ (Footnote omitted.) Bonner v. State, 308 Ga.App. 827, 828(1)(a), 709 S.E.2d 358 (2011). In the instant case, defense counsel’s decision not to question Harris and Jonathan Smith about their plea deals was tactical and strategic.” Curtis v. State, 330 Ga.App. 839, 769 S.E.2d 580 (March 2, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failure to impeach witnesses by introducing their felony convictions where a) their testimony was helpful to or consistent with the defense; or their testimony was duplicative or cumulative of other evidence. “Even if [witness] Jackson's prior convictions had been admitted and the jury had disregarded all or some part of his testimony, the remaining evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury's verdict. Curtis has therefore failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if Jackson had been impeached with his prior convictions.” Heard v. State, 296 Ga. 681, 769 S.E.2d 917 (March 2, 2015). Murder and related convictions affirmed; counsel wasn’t ineffective for failing “to properly impeach [State’s witness] Flint with his prior convictions. Given Flint's acknowledgment during his trial testimony that he was at that time incarcerated on unrelated charges, Appellant cannot show prejudice from counsel's failure to probe more deeply into Flint's criminal history.” Harper v. State, 330 Ga.App. 561, 768 S.E.2d 755 (January 28, 2015). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in choosing not to impeach State’s witness whose testimony was helpful to the defense. “The middleman [in drug transaction] was the State's key witness, and trial counsel wanted the jury to believe the middleman's trial testimony that Harper did not do it rather than his pre-trial identification of Harper as the gunman.” Crapps v. State, 329 Ga.App. 820, 766 S.E.2d 178 (November 20, 2014). Conviction for aggravated stalking affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to impeach victim with her first offender record. “A witness's first offender status may be used to impeach the witness's bias and motive only when the record shows that the witness may have received special, first offender treatment in exchange for testimony favorable to the State. See Jackson v. State, 316 Ga.App. 588, 593(4), 730 S.E.2d 69 (2012) (‘evidence of a witness's first offender status is admissible to “reveal a possible bias, prejudice or ulterior motive on the part of the witness to give untruthful or shaded testimony in an effort to please the State.”’), quoting Melson v. State, 263 Ga.App. 647, 648(2), 588 S.E.2d 822 (2003). No such circumstances exist in this case. Rather, Crapps's argument is that Pass's probationary status would demonstrate that she had motive to lie to police in 2012 regarding Crapps's conduct in the DeKalb County incident. In other words, Crapps contends that trial counsel should have used Pass's probationary status to impeach her credibility. Given that the evidence was inadmissible for this purpose, counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to impeach Pass.” Douglas v. State, 327 Ga.App. 792, 761 S.E.2d 180 (June 27, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions reversed; trial counsel was ineffective in “failing to investigate the criminal records of the three victims and impeaching them