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as a ‘low-life liar’ would be adverse to Smarr's cause and potentially ‘irritate’ the jury. His strategy was driven by his belief that ‘the less time she spent [on the witness stand], the better.’” 2. No ineffective assistance where counsel decided not to dwell on witness/co-conspirator Mayes’s “extensive prior criminal history … after concluding that Smarr would not benefit from the jury knowing that Smarr was friends and associated with such a person.” In any event, the impeaching information effectively came out during Mayes’s testimony. Slan v. State, 316 Ga.App. 843, 730 S.E.2d 565 (July 13, 2012). Convictions for robbery and simple battery affirmed; no ineffective assistance. Defendant contends that counsel should have investigated State’s witness’s background. “Because Slan has failed to show that his trial counsel inadequately investigated Willis's background or that further investigation would have yielded beneficial evidence, he has failed to carry his burden of showing prejudice from his counsel's allegedly deficient performance. See Banks v. State, 250 Ga.App. 728, 729–730(2) (555 S.E.2d 903) (2001).” Ellis v. State, 316 Ga.App. 352, 729 S.E.2d 492 (June 25, 2012). Rape and related convictions affirmed; at motion for new trial hearing, trial court properly excluded evidence that would have been merely impeaching of victim’s testimony, to wit: evidence of alleged prior false accusations of sexual abuse of her daughter. To the extent the evidence went to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “the trial court was entitled to believe counsel's testimony that Ellis never shared with him any information about the victim's prior false allegations of sexual misconduct. [Cit.] Thus, Ellis could not show that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to investigate a matter of which he was unaware at the time. Consequently, any error in excluding testimony about the matter at the motion for new trial hearing was harmless.” Johnson v. State, 290 Ga. 382, 721 S.E.2d 851 (January 23, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to impeach State’s witness on prior offenses . ‘[D]efense counsel did not want to elicit any further testimony from [witness] Todd about the 2007 convictions because of the potential to reveal that Johnson was involved with Todd in the previous drug case.” Strong v. State, 308 Ga.App. 558, 707 S.E.2d 914 (March 18, 2011). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to obtain certified copies of victim’s felony convictions and First Offender plea. “Strong is right that trial counsel did not obtain the information, but counsel made a strategic decision not to expend the limited resources of his office to obtain the certified copies, choosing instead to focus on other avenues of defense. ‘It is generally a tactical decision of trial counsel to determine how to allot the resources available in the defense of [his] client.’ Herndon v. State, 235 Ga.App. 258, 259 (509 S.E.2d 142) (1998). The trial court's conclusion that this decision did not constitute ineffective assistance is not clearly erroneous.” Lanier v. State, 288 Ga. 109, 702 S.E.2d 141 (November 1, 2010). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to give notice of intent to impeach witness with felony older than ten years. “Lanier argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to provide the required notice because challenging Mikell's credibility was crucial, given her unexpected testimony that Lanier confessed to her during their Sunday night drive that he beat the victim with a hammer. However, the trial court did not err by finding that even if the 1995 conviction had been admitted and the jury had disregarded Mikell's testimony, there remained evidence sufficient to convict Lanier. See Allen v. State, 286 Ga. 392(5)(a) (687 S.E.2d 799) (2010). Moreover, Mikell's trial testimony conflicted with her prior statements and she admitted on the stand that she was a crack dealer, that she was ‘pretty high’ on drugs on the night in question, and that her memory of that weekend was “really mixed up.” Under these circumstances, the additional impeachment value of a 13-year-old aggravated assault conviction would have been minimal at best. Thus, Lanier has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had counsel given notice of intent to use the 1995 conviction for impeachment purposes.” Brown v. Baskin, 286 Ga. 681, 690 S.E.2d 822 (March 15, 2010). Habeas court did not err in finding that Baskin received ineffective assistance from appellate counsel, who failed to raise on appeal trial counsel’s ineffectiveness – specifically, failure to impeach victim with pending criminal charges. 1. Standard of appellate counsel’s effectiveness. “‘To overcome the presumption that his appellate counsel was effective, [the petitioner] must prove that the failure to raise the issue of his trial lawyer's effectiveness was a decision which “only an incompetent attorney would have adopted.” Shorter v. Waters, [275 Ga. 581, 585 (571 S.E.2d 373) (2002)]. See also Battles v. Chapman, [269 Ga. 702, 705(1)(a) (506 S.E.2d 838) (1998)]. [Cit.]’ Walker v. Williams, 282 Ga. 409, 409 (651 S.E.2d 59) (2007).” 2. Habeas court properly found ineffectiveness. “Baskin's appellate counsel never amended his motion to include trial counsel's failure to present to the trial court authority for cross-examining Blalock about his pending charges, or otherwise preserve appellate review of the issue. And, the habeas court certainly did not err in finding that this was deficient performance. ‘This Court [has]