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notice of supplemental discovery included a statement that there existed tapes of ‘recent’ interviews, and noted that counsel should call the District Attorney’s office to arrange to review the same.” Counsel did not review the material because he thought the defendant should accept the plea recommendation, and because he expected to be granted a continuance for a psychological evaluation. When the unopposed motion for continuance was denied, counsel proceeded to trial, but did not call any of the witnesses defendant wanted to call. Counsel later testified that he thought they were only character witnesses, and didn’t want to put character in issue; but defendant said at least one was an alibi witness. On the motion for new trial, defense counsel “executed an affidavit in which he stated that he was unprepared for trial based on, inter alia, his inability: (1) to review the supplemental discovery, (2) to review the State’s taped interviews with witnesses; and (3) to contact witnesses. … We note … that trial counsel’s initial court testimony and his affidavit are supported by the reservations he expressed at the pretrial conference, the calendar call, and the morning of the trial, about his lack of preparation.” Trial counsel’s cross-examination of the teen-age child molestation victims omitted important subjects such as the victim’s pending civil claim regarding the incident and impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. Counsel also made “no effort … to identify or interview … potential witnesses” to one of the acts of child molestation whose possible presence was raised by the second victim. Held, the record shows that counsel’s deficiencies “were not the result of strategic decisions or trial tactics. Rather, they resulted from trial counsel’s failure to investigate what facts and evidence might be available to assist him in mounting a defense for his client and from his failure to prepare adequately for the trial. Trial counsel admitted as much, testifying that ‘I felt that we were ready on [January] 7 as best as possible without doing any evidentiary or any type of investigation of the additional materials [served by the State on December 30.] ’” Prejudice was shown: “the State’s case rested entirely on the testimony of the two victims. As the foregoing reflects, however, there were facts available that could have been used to impeach the credibility of these witnesses and to demonstrate that they had a financial motive for bringing charges against Johnson. Moreover, in his affidavit submitted in support of Johnson’s new-trial motion, trial counsel stated that since trial he had reviewed the taped interviews noticed in the State’s supplemental discovery responses – tapes which he had declined to review even after he learned that no continuance would be granted. Counsel testified that ‘[ u]pon review, the new evidence [on those tapes] would have proved to be exculpatory and beneficial to [Johnson] if additional time had been allowed to develop such. ’” (Emphasis in opinion.) “While we generally presume that trial counsel’s decisions were ‘made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,’ ( Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783(1) (325 S.E.2d 362) (1985)), we note that ‘ reasonable professional judgment requires proper investigation . [Cit.]’ Turpin v. Helmeci, 271 Ga. 224, 226 (518 S.E.2d 887) (1999). Thus, ‘[t]he right to reasonably effective counsel is violated when the omissions charged to trial counsel resulted from inadequate preparation rather than from unwise choices of trial tactics and strategy.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted .) Id.” State v. McMillon, 283 Ga.App. 671, 642 S.E.2d 343 (February 21, 2007). “[T]he record contains evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that trial counsel did not adequately investigate the case or present a viable defense. See Stapp v. State, 273 Ga.App. 899, 901 (616 S.E.2d 215) (2005). Specifically, trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he did not interview any of the state’s witnesses, … or obtain their taped interviews prior to trial. Moreover, though trial counsel stipulated to the admission of the toxicology reports showing that the defendant and the decedent tested positive for alcohol and cocaine metabolites, he never investigated how those drugs may have affected their ability to function. Additionally, though evidence adduced at trial raised the possibility …, trial counsel failed to investigate or pursue the defense that [victim’s] death was an accident. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting McMillon’s motion for a new trial. [Cits.]” Overruled as to use of “abuse of discretion” standard for special (not general) grounds for new trial, O’Neal v. State , 285 Ga. 361, 677 S.E.2d 90 (May 4, 2009). Wafford v. State, 283 Ga.App. 154, 640 S.E.2d 727 (January 3, 2007). In his trial on competence to stand trial, “Wafford argues that he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel failed to interview Dr. Flores, Dr. Sapp, or Dr. McKee. Trial counsel reviewed these doctors’ written evaluations before trial. We cannot say that trial counsel’s failure to also personally interview them before trial fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See, e. g., Lovelace v. State, 262 Ga.App. 690, 695(6)(b) (586 S.E.2d 386) (2003). Further, even if we assume that trial counsel’s failure to interview the doctors constituted deficient performance, Wafford fails to establish how his case was prejudiced as a result. See Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110, 112(3) (549 S.E.2d 370) (2001) (although trial counsel did not interview a witness, defendant failed to show how the outcome of the trial would have differed had trial counsel interviewed the witness before trial).” Accord, Lewis v. State , 297 Ga.App. 517, 677 S.E.2d 723 (April 16, 2009) (No ineffective assistance where experienced trial counsel reviewed victim and arresting officer statements and otherwise prepared for trial, although he didn’t directly interview the victim and arresting officer).