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counsel testified at motion for new trial hearing “that there was, in fact, some discrepancy as to exactly when the dreadlocks were removed, and Miller's lawyers did not want the State to be able to argue that Miller cut off his dreadlocks right after the crime in an attempt to ‘change his identity.’” State v. Walker, 327 Ga.App. 304, 758 S.E.2d 836 (May 13, 2014). Following conviction for aggravated assault and related offenses, trial court properly granted motion for new trial. Trial court could find that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and present two witnesses whom defendant presented at hearing on motion for new trial hearing; despite State’s argument that both witnesses are convicted felons with little credibility, “the construction of evidence and the credibility of witnesses are questions for the trial court, and, ultimately, for a jury.” Both witnesses testified that they were present at the incident and that the victim fabricated the incident, including putting her own hand around her neck to make choke marks. Counsel was aware of both witnesses, made some late effort to locate one, but admittedly never attempted to contact the other. Trial court could reasonably conclude that counsel was deficient, and that there was “a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different” if the witnesses had been presented. “‘In close cases, where the evidence presented by the state is thin, mistakes made by trial counsel take on greater significance. A verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by counsel's errors. Since the evidence against [Walker] was not overwhelming, resting largely upon the ... testimony of one witness, a reasonable probability exists that the presence of the [exculpatory] evidence would have affected the result. The trial court did not err in concluding that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Crapp, 317 Ga.App. 744, 748(2), 732 S.E.2d 806 (2012) (failure to introduce available evidence corroborating defendant's account ‘supports a finding that counsel's performance was deficient.’)” McNeal v. State, 326 Ga.App. 429, 756 S.E.2d 660 (March 21, 2014). Cocaine trafficking and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance “because [counsel] did not personally or through an investigator examine the physical evidence prior to trial.” At trial, officer testified that there was a set of keys in the leather bag containing the cocaine, but “that there was nothing in the bag containing identification. Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that, during her closing argument,[fn] she reached into the leather bag which contained the cocaine and pulled out a second key chain containing an inscription of ‘boy's name’ loves ‘girl's name’ which she had never seen before and which had not been contained in the photographs of the evidence which she had seen. After she finished her closing, she realized that the boy's name was [co-defendant]Walters's first name and she had made a huge mistake in failing to argue that point. She did not seek to reopen the evidence to pursue the issue nor did she bring this issue to anyone's attention until her testimony at the motion for new trial hearing.” Defendant failed to produce the key chain at the hearing on his motion for new trial. “When a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to introduce certain evidence claimed to be exculpatory, the defendant must produce that evidence at the motion for new trial hearing. [Cit.] Because McNeal failed to produce the key chain or chains at his motion for new trial hearing, his claim of ineffectiveness is wholly speculative and he cannot show that the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Williams v. State, 326 Ga.App. 16, 755 S.E.2d 831 (March 5, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in “counsel's decision not to present an image from a surveillance camera.” Defendant contends the image showed a possible perpetrator other than himself who matched a description (“wearing a light-colored hoodie”) given by the victim. But victim denied giving that description. “We conclude that counsel's decision not to present the image was not unreasonable. Even assuming that the image showed a man wearing a light-colored hoodie in the nearby store minutes before the armed robbery, as Williams argues, Williams still could have committed the crime. See Tyner v. State, 313 Ga.App. 557, 564–565(6)(a), 722 S.E.2d 177 (2012) (testimony that defendant argued trial counsel should have introduced was not truly exculpatory because it did not contradict state's theory of the case). If the image were identifiable as Williams rather than merely as a person who superficially resembled him and who was wearing a garment superficially similar to the garment Norman described his assailant as having worn, the argument might have merit. As it is Williams' argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present this image is based on the ‘suggestion that another person may have committed the crime [which] was no more than supposition, ... inferred from [evidence] which did not demand such an inference.’ Guess v. State, 264 Ga. 335, 337(5), 443 S.E.2d 477 (1994). ‘The [image at issue] does not raise a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, evaluated in the context of the entire record,’ Maddox v. Seay, 243 Ga. 793, 794(1), 256 S.E.2d 904 (1979), particularly given defense counsel's cross examination of Norman regarding his description of the perpetrator.” Smith v. State, 325 Ga.App. 745, 754 S.E.2d 788 (February 18, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed. Counsel wasn’t ineffective in deciding not to call witness who “said counsel would not want him to testify. … Smith's