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across spaces in supermarket parking lot. “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Strickland's trial counsel testified that he did not ask for a continuance of the trial in order to have Simoni testify because he believed that the State had failed to prove that Strickland was in control of the motor vehicle such that the jury could find Strickland guilty of DUI- less safe. … Here, Strickland's counsel testified that his decision was a strategic one, and we will not second guess it in hindsight.” McFadden concurs in judgment only, would find counsel deficient, but no prejudice in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. “Strategy entails analysis of the potential risks and benefits of particular tactics. Trial counsel's hope that the jury would acquit, without more, was not strategy. And I do not see how the possibility of its being disbelieved is a strategic reason for not introducing the sole evidence of the sole defense.” McKay v. State, 292 Ga. 886, 742 S.E.2d 714 (May 6, 2013). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in choosing not to present evidence of alleged confessions to the crimes by other persons. “‘Deciding what evidence to present or to forego in defending a client charged with a crime is a matter of strategy and tactics.’ Nichols v. State, 281 Ga. 483, 485(2)(a) (640 S.E.2d 40) (2007). Reasonable trial strategy does not constitute deficient performance. Pruitt [ v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 34 (644 S.E.2d 837) (2007)]. Here, appellant's trial counsel testified he was aware of the alleged confessions by the other individuals because the statements were provided in discovery. Counsel stated he did not proffer any evidence of these alleged confessions at trial because the statements could not be corroborated, the statements consisted of double hearsay, and the statements did not match the physical evidence in the case. Counsel testified his trial strategy was to discredit appellant's siblings who had implicated appellant in the crime rather than focusing on ‘red herrings’ he believed would diminish appellant's defense. Counsel also testified he discussed the evidence in the case and the trial strategy with appellant.” Shaw v. State, 292 Ga. 871, 742 S.E.2d 707 (May 6, 2013). Murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to call murder victim’s children as witnesses. “Although the lawyer conceded at the hearing on the motion for new trial that the children might have been able to offer some helpful testimony, he explained that he decided not to call them as witnesses at trial because much of the helpful testimony they might offer could be elicited from other witnesses, [fn] and in any event, the lawyer was concerned about putting the children through the stress of testifying. The reasons given by the lawyer in this case for not calling the children are, we think, reasonable ones. After all, a reasonable lawyer might reasonably worry about the way in which a jury might perceive the defendant putting the children of his victim through the stress of testifying at trial, especially when the children could only offer evidence that was largely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial.” Proposed testimony of children – about potential weapons in victim’s trunk, unknown to defendant and never brought out in altercation – wasn’t especially compelling. Russu v. State, 321 Ga.App. 695, 742 S.E.2d 511 (May 2, 2013). Conviction for first degree forgery affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to tender police incident report which contradicted officer’s testimony. Counsel instead brought out the contradiction on cross, preferring not to tender the report, which contained other matters harmful to the defense. “Plainly, the alleged deficiencies in Russu's trial counsel's performance were decisions made as matters of trial strategy.” Williams v. State, 292 Ga. 844, 742 S.E.2d 445 (April 29, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in calling “an alibi witness who was impeached by prior convictions and by his friendship with Williams and whose testimony was not consistent with Williams's statement to police. The decision to call a defense witness is a matter of trial strategy and tactics within the province of the lawyer after consultation with the client. Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 486(3)(a) (690 S.E.2d 177) (2010); Watkins v. State, 285 Ga. 355, 358(2) (676 S.E.2d 196) (2009). Williams's lawyers did consult with Williams about calling the witness. See Browne v. State, 261 Ga.App. 648, 649(2) (583 S.E.2d 496) (2003). And one of the lawyers testified that they felt that the credibility issues of the witness were outweighed by his favorable testimony that he was present in the area when the gunshots were fired and that Williams could not possibly have committed the offense. In light of the damaging evidence against Williams, it is not a ground for reversal that his lawyers made a strategic decision that the positive aspects of the evidence would outweigh the negative, ‘and the fact that [Williams], in hindsight, now questions the efficacy of the chosen defense strategy cannot establish ineffective assistance.’ Chapman v. State, 318 Ga.App. 514, 519–520(1)(e) (733 S.E.2d 848) (2012) (footnotes omitted).” State v. Wofford, 321 Ga.App. 249, 739 S.E.2d 110 (March 19, 2013). Following convictions for aggravated child molestation and related offenses, trial court erred by granting motion for new trial. Defendant failed to show ineffective assistance based on failure to call certain defense witnesses. 1. Trial counsel testified that he wasn’t aware of the two potential witnesses, and trial court made no finding to the contrary. 2. Trial counsel’s strategy of discrediting the victims by pointing to inconsistencies in their statements and testimony “amounted to ‘the exercise of reasonable professional