☢ test - Í

because Crapp had reported Simpson and Simpson’s accomplice Brooks to the police. Brooks was arrested for robbing Crapp, but Crapp was threatened and so retracted his statement implicating Brooks. In closing argument at Crapp’s trial, prosecutor argued that if Crapp’s story were true, the defense would have presented the warrant and the statement he gave police. Those items were in counsel’s possession, but he chose not to present them since Crapp had retracted the allegations. “The case was a pure credibility contest between Simpson and Crapp. And in such cases, defense counsel's failure to introduce available evidence that corroborates a defendant's testimony supports a finding that counsel's performance was deficient. See Gibson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 435, (634 S.E.2d 204) (2006) (trial counsel rendered deficient performance when entire defense to vehicular homicide charges hinged on defendant's testimony that his light was green at the time of the collision yet counsel failed to introduce records of prior occasions where light showed green in all four directions).” Note, Gibson wasn’t about strategic decision not to present evidence, but about failure to investigate, which would have revealed the prior malfunctions. Gibbs v. State, 316 Ga.App. 431, 729 S.E.2d 563 (June 26, 2012). Aggravated assault convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in strategic decision to concentrate on showing that defendants didn’t shoot at victims as alleged, rather than contesting the circumstances of the car collision that precipitated the encounter. Armour v. State, 290 Ga. 553, 722 S.E.2d 751 (February 27, 2012). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in failing to subpoena “the real shooter.” “[N]o evidence in the record shows that [alternate perpetrator] Knight would have agreed to testify or that his testimony actually would have been favorable to Appellant. Neal v. State, 290 Ga. 563, 722 S.E.2d 765 (February 27, 2012). Murder conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance in declining to present good character evidence – former girlfriend who would testify to defendant’s “peaceful” character, rebutting similar transaction evidence suggesting tendency toward violence against women. Defendant was charged with murder of fiancé; State also presented similar transaction evidence of assaults against defendant’s ex-wife. “Trial counsel testified that testimony regarding Neal's peaceful character would have opened the door to additional adverse character evidence which had been excluded by the trial court, including the testimony of another ex-girlfriend who was present and ready to testify about Neal's bad character. The prior admission of a similar transaction from which the jury may draw certain limited inferences does not make unreasonable defense counsel's strategy to avoid offering testimony of the defendant's nonviolent character which would open the door to additional adverse character evidence. See Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 584–585(17)(g) (340 S.E.2d 891) (1986).” Damerow v. State, 310 Ga.App. 530, 714 S.E.2d 82 (July 6, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel chose not to present witness who, during event in question, “had ‘a good buzz’ from drinking a 12–pack of beer and fell asleep for a couple of hours at the residence.” Robinson v. State, 308 Ga.App. 45, 706 S.E.2d 577 (February 22, 2011). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance for failure to call victim as a witness when her prior statement was admitted as child hearsay. “[T]he mere existence of a defendant's right to confront a witness at trial cannot be taken to mean that it is always in his interest to do so. A defendant's confrontation rights are not violated by his own counsel's failure to call a child molestation victim to the stand if that victim is available to testify at trial. Williams v. State, 290 Ga.App. 841, 842(1) (660 S.E.2d 740) (2008). It is also clear that a decision as to whether a witness should testify is within ‘the realm of specific decisions regarding trial strategy’ to which we afford ‘wide discretion.’ Muller v. State, 284 Ga. 70, 72 (663 S.E.2d 206) (2008). Here, trial counsel testified that he did not call the victim to the stand because he thought that her testimony would ‘have done more damage than help.’ The trial court did not clearly err when it accepted counsel's strategic judgment in the matter.” Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. 545, 705 S.E.2d 159 (February 7, 2011). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defense counsel chose not to seek continuance to obtain presence of reluctant alibi witness. “Defense counsel's investigation revealed that the supposed alibi witness was reluctant, unfavorable, and possibly prepared to perjure herself. The decision not to call such a witness is a reasonable exercise of professional judgment. Nelson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 63, 66(8), 528 S.E.2d 844 (2000).” Smith v. State, 288 Ga. 348, 703 S.E.2d 629 (November 8, 2010). Defendants’ felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel elected not to present good character evidence. “‘Whether to introduce character evidence and potentially open the door for impeachment is clearly one of tactics and strategy.’ (Citation omitted.) Washington v. State, 276 Ga. 655, 659(3)(c) (581 S.E.2d 518) (2003). After discussing the issue with Sonya,