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witness, neither of them considered it either feasible or proper to file a notice of alibi on behalf of another lawyer's client. They also testified that they had no way of knowing and no reason to believe that Allen-Brown would fail in putting up his alibi defense. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that trial counsel acted unreasonably or rendered ineffective assistance to Manley or Allen.” Hernandez v. State, 303 Ga.App. 103, 692 S.E.2d 712 (March 24, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance where defendant couldn’t tell counsel how to locate witnesses he wanted to present. “‘The reasonableness of counsel's conduct is examined from counsel's perspective at the time of representation and under the particular circumstances of the case.’ Buttram v. State, 280 Ga. 595, 599(15), 631 S.E.2d 642 (2006).” Johnson v. State, 286 Ga. 787, 692 S.E.2d 575 (March 22, 2010). No ineffective assistance at defendant’s felony murder trial “by failing to present evidence of an alleged prior violent act of the victim in order to support Johnson's claim of self- defense. See Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 407 (405 S.E.2d 669) (1991).” “At the motion for new trial hearing, however, trial counsel specifically explained that he did not present the Chandler evidence, which he had investigated, because he understood that if he did so, the State would present a ‘plethora of witnesses’ to testify that ‘Mr. Brooks's reputation in the community was non-violent.’ (Emphasis added). Trial counsel also testified that he thought the evidence of Brooks's prior violent act would be nullified by the State's rebuttal evidence about the victim's peaceful reputation.” Decision not to present the evidence was thus strategic. Hall v. Lewis, 286 Ga. 767, 692 S.E.2d 580 (March 22, 2010). 1. Grant of habeas petition as to defendant’s death penalty for malice murder conviction affirmed; defendant was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present evidence of defendant’s mental retardation, which would have required imposition of a life sentence instead of a death sentence. 2. Defendant’s mental retardation has no effect on the determination of whether a homicide was a crime of passion and thus voluntary manslaughter instead of murder. “‘[W]hen the evidence raises the offense of voluntary manslaughter, the question is whether the defendant acted out of passion resulting from provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. It is of no moment whether the provocation was sufficient to excite the deadly passion in the particular defendant. [Cits.]’ (Emphasis in original.) Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 832(2) (483 S.E.2d 582) (1997). See also Nelson v. State, 254 Ga. 611, 615(3) (331 S.E.2d 554) (1985) (‘“Mental abnormality or mere weakness of mind is no excuse unless it ... deprives the offender of the ability to distinguish right from wrong.”’).” Smith v. State, 302 Ga.App. 128, 690 S.E.2d 449 (January 26, 2010). At defendant’s trial for trafficking in cocaine and related charges, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel elected not to call co-defendant, who had pled guilty. Although co-defendant testified at new trial hearing, alleging that the drugs were his alone and defendant never handled them, trial counsel testified that he chose not to call co-defendant because his testimony contradicted the videotape evidence which showed defendant handling the drugs. “See Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 48(3) (597 S.E.2d 373) (2004) (once convicted, a defendant who ‘seeks to exculpate his co-defendant lacks credibility, since he has nothing to lose by testifying untruthfully regarding the alleged innocence’ of his co-defendant) (punctuation omitted).” Gravitt v. State, 301 Ga.App. 131, 687 S.E.2d 150 (November 18, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for DUI and serious injury by vehicle reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel. On motion for new trial, defendant presented testimony of other passengers in his vehicle, who stated “that Gravitt did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, that he did not ingest drugs or alcohol in his presence, that Gravitt's driving did not worry him, and that Gravitt pulled on the shoulder because the vehicle in front of them ‘slammed on brakes’ and that was the only way to avoid an accident.” The witnesses backed up defendant’s assertion that they left the scene because they were not aware an accident had taken place. Trial court found that failure to present the witnesses was deficient, but not harmful as a jury would not have found the witnesses credible; Court of Appeals reverses: “[a]lthough a trial court properly judges the credibility of witnesses who testify at a motion for new trial hearing regarding disputed issues, for example relating to how the trial was conducted or between a defendant and his trial counsel, see Mobley v. State, 264 Ga. 854, 856(2) (452 S.E.2d 500) (1995), here the trial court judged the credibility of the witnesses had they testified at trial, and that is ‘solely a matter to be resolved by the jury.’ Hawkins v. State, 254 Ga.App. 868, 869 (563 S.E.2d 926) (2002). ‘It is the jury's prerogative to choose what evidence to believe and what to reject.’ Trammell v. State, 253 Ga.App. 725, 726(1) (560 S.E.2d 312) (2002).” Mackey v. State, 299 Ga.App. 851, 683 S.E.2d 899 (August 25, 2009). At defendant’s trial for various drug offenses, no ineffective assistance where counsel consented to admission of unavailable defense witness’s testimony by reading