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find her. Trial counsel's efforts, however, were unsuccessful. In light of the limited amount of information about Garnigan that was available to trial counsel prior to trial, the fact that counsel failed to locate Garnigan despite her good faith efforts to do so did not amount to deficient performance. See Freeman v. State, 278 Ga. 349(2)(a) (603 S.E.2d 214) (2004).” Accord, Moreno-Rivera v. State , 291 Ga. 336, 729 S.E.2d 366 (July 2, 2012) (no ineffective assistance in failing to track down witness in Mexico whose name and location were unknown); Black v. State , 296 Ga. 658, 769 S.E.2d 898 (March 2, 2015) (no evidence that attorney was aware of witness defendant claims should have been presented); Hettrick v. State , 334 Ga.App. 115, 778 S.E.2d 369 (October 8, 2015) (no ineffective assistance where defendant “knew of the [witness’s] existence but intentionally kept this information from his trial counsel,” citing Hudson ). Hall v. Brannan, 284 Ga. 716, 670 S.E.2d 87 (November 3, 2008). 1. Habeas court erred in finding ineffective assistance from counsel’s decision not to call defendant’s psychiatrist as a witness at murder trial, after announcing in opening statement that he “believed” the witness would be called. At habeas hearing, counsel testified that he “‘was uncomfortable as to what he might testify to on the issues directly relating to insanity, I don't know that he would have supported us on that. I also had the sense that perhaps Dr. Boyer was being a little protective of the VA and himself, and I thought I wouldn't use him. It was sort of evolving thought about whether to use him or not.’ In light of counsel's reasonable strategic concerns, we conclude as a matter of law that counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to call Dr. Boyer as a witness.” 2. Habeas court erred by finding ineffective assistance in counsel’s strategic decisions regarding presentation of evidence regarding defendant’s mental health. “[C]ounsel reasonably chose to focus their efforts largely on showing post-traumatic stress disorder, which, unlike a showing of bipolar disorder, could potentially support both a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict and a guilty but mentally ill verdict and which was more- consistently supported by Brannan's medical records.” 3. Habeas court erred by finding ineffective assistance in counsel’s strategic decisions emphasizing a strategy of not guilty by reason of insanity over a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. “[T]he fact that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would have barred a death sentence whereas a verdict of guilty but mentally ill would not, confirms that counsel acted reasonably in placing a special focus on insanity while still not entirely abandoning the possibility of a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764(12) (620 S.E.2d 778) (2005) (holding that ‘the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict’).” Milan v. State, 293 Ga.App. 398, 667 S.E.2d 267 (August 22, 2008). No ineffective assistance in child molestation conviction. “‘[D]eciding what evidence to present or to forego in defending a client charged with a crime is a matter of strategy and tactics, and matters of reasonable trial strategy and tactics do not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel.’” (Punctuation omitted.) Dukes v. State, 285 Ga.App. 172, 174-175(2) (645 S.E.2d 664) (2007). Here, trial counsel testified that, given that the mother was not present when the alleged molestation took place, she did not think that the mother's testimony was helpful. She further stated that the mother's demeanor was confrontational and negative and that she did not believe the mother would have made a helpful witness. Under these circumstances, the decision not to call the mother was strategic, which does not constitute ineffective assistance. See Abernathy v. State, 278 Ga.App. 574, 589- 590(3)(xi) (630 S.E.2d 421) (2006).” Accord, Purvis v. State , 301 Ga.App. 648, 689 S.E.2d 53 (November 20, 2009) (not ineffective not to call defendant’s mother, who didn’t want to testify and whose testimony counsel thought was “useless.”) ( Reversed on other grounds, 288 Ga. 865, 708 S.E.2d 283 (March 18, 2011) ) ; Burkes v. State , 302 Ga.App. 895, 691 S.E.2d 910 (March 17, 2010) (not ineffective where counsel chose not to present relatives whose testimony would have been cumulative and “add nothing to his client’s defense.”); Gibson v. State , 290 Ga. 6, 717 S.E.2d 447 (October 3, 2011) (strategic decision not to call defendant’s mother as witness not ineffective); Hudson v. State , 325 Ga.App. 657, 754 S.E.2d 626 (February 5, 2014); Young v. State , 329 Ga.App. 70, 763 S.E.2d 735 (September 16, 2014) (decision not to call a witness, whose testimony wasn’t presented at hearing on motion for new trial, “is a matter of trial strategy and tactics, which we presume were reasonable.”). Schofield v. Cook, 284 Ga. 240, 663 S.E.2d 221 (June 30, 2008). 1. Grant of Cook’s habeas petition (following murder conviction and death sentence) reversed; defense counsel provided effective assistance in investigating and presenting evidence of defendant’s mental health status, and presenting evidence of other mitigation evidence. “Counsel testified that, ‘in the end, it was decided not to put up these mental health experts because I thought that it would end up doing more damage than good.’ In light of the negative evidence contained within the mental health records concerning Cook’s criminal history and the experts’ conclusions regarding malingering and manipulation by Cook, we conclude, as a matter of law, that counsel’s strategic choice to forgo the presentation of mental health evidence was not unreasonable based on the information they actually obtained.” Fact that counsel did not have certain materials doesn’t alter result: “We have held that the critical issue in cases such as this is what the expert