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representation by oneself and counsel.”); Voils v. State , 266 Ga.App. 738, 598 S.E.2d 33 (March 16, 2004) (Defendant was represented by appointed counsel on pending motion to withdraw guilty plea when he filed pro se motion for evidentiary hearing on (prior) post-trial counsel’s ineffective assistance); Smith v. State , 332 Ga.App. 849, 775 S.E.2d 211 (July 8, 2015). State v. Watson, 244 Ga.App. 484, 536 S.E.2d 170 (June 13, 2000). Defendant’s pro se testimony from his preliminary hearing was inadmissible absent evidence that he knowingly waived his right to counsel. Stone v. State, 272 Ga. 351, 529 S.E.2d 136 (May 1, 2000). Defendant did not have the constitutional right to demand that an out of state attorney be allowed to represent him during portions of his trial. Such a decision shall be left to the discretion of the trial court. Held, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because defendant did not move to have out of state attorney admitted pro hac vice until the day of trial; defendant was already represented by a qualified member of the Georgia bar; and the trial court allowed out of state attorney to advise defendant’s appointed counsel during the trial. 12. MUNICIPAL COURTS Nguyen v. State, 282 Ga. 483, 651 S.E.2d 681 (October 9, 2007). By statute, any defendant in a municipal court proceeding must be afforded the right to counsel and, if indigent, the opportunity to apply for appointed counsel, before being subject to loss of liberty or any fine, fee or cost. “We … disagree with the habeas court’s resolution of the merits of Nguyen’s habeas petition that, because Nguyen was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment or a suspended or probated sentence, she was not entitled to counsel as a matter of constitutional right. See Jackson v. State, [257 Ga.App. 715 (572 S.E.2d 60) (2002)]. OCGA § 36-32-1(f) [effective January 1, 2005] provides that ‘[a]ny municipal court having jurisdiction over the violation of municipal ordinances ... shall not impose any punishment of confinement, probation, or other loss of liberty, or impose any fine, fee, or cost enforceable by confinement, probation, or other loss of liberty, as authorized by general law or municipal or county ordinance, unless the court provides to the accused the right to representation by a lawyer, and provides to those accused who are indigent the right to counsel at no cost to the accused.’” 13. WAIVER OF AT TRIAL See also subheadings under SENTENCING – AGGRAVATED SENTENCE, below Williams v. State, A15A1973, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1177089 (March 28, 2016). Conviction for driving without license reversed; no effective waiver of right to counsel. “Here, Williams initialed and signed a form entitled ‘Record of Defendant Entering a Plea of Not Guilty and Faretta Warning.’[fn] It informed him that he could receive a maximum fine of $5,000 and up to12 months in jail, but it did not describe the nature of the charges against him. Instead, it merely recited that an attorney could explain some but not all of the factors listed in Banks [April 21, 2015, below; see factors listed in Middleton (March 29, 2002), below ] , quoting them but never explaining what they were.[fn] It further recited that Williams had been informed that he was entitled to an attorney, that ‘[a]ll litigation can be complex,’ that ‘an attorney can assist me in making strategic decisions’ such as those listed in Banks, and that an attorney could “preserve [his] case for appeal.” In other words, it ‘contained only conclusory statements concerning [his] rights rather than an explanation of the dangers of proceeding to trial pro se. [Cit.]’ [ Banks ] at 260(1), 772 S.E.2d 57. The waiver form, standing alone, thus did not show that Williams’ waiver was ‘made with an understanding’ of those factors, as required by Georgia law. 332 Ga.App. at 259(1).” Tyner v. State, 334 Ga.App. 890, 780 S.E.2d 494 (November 20, 2015). Physical precedent only. Convictions for rape and related offenses reversed; trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s request to re-appoint counsel at trial. Counsel conducted trial for defendant, but just before closing argument, defendant requested to dismiss counsel and defend himself. Trial court allowed defendant to do so, and had counsel remain as standby counsel. Defendant immediately made a series of improper arguments, to which the court granted State’s objections. Defendant then requested that his counsel be allowed to “just go on and argue, because I don’t quite understand where you are coming from. It would be all right with me if the lawyer ... would just take over from here, because ... I keep making these mistakes.” Trial court denied this request, and defendant’s argument continued with more sustained objections. “Pretermitting whether the trial court properly acceded to Tyner’s desire to waive his right to counsel just after the State’s closing argument, the record shows that he very quickly discovered that he was overwhelmed by the demands of self- representation, and he asserted a post-waiver request for counsel within minutes of being allowed to represent himself. The record does not show that the request had any impact on the trial court’s ability to manage its docket or on its general responsibilities for the prudent administration of justice. Nor does the record show any significant disruption of the trial, given that only a few minutes had passed and that counsel had an argument prepared and was standing by and ready to proceed. The record does not show that the trial court weighed the negligible cost of