☢ test - Í

2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562) (1975)]. The trial court did not try to make Lamar aware of the dangers and disadvantages he faced proceeding pro se at trial due to his ignorance of basic criminal law concepts; instead, the trial court queried Lamar in order to assess the scope of Lamar’s pre-existing knowledge of criminal law. Lamar’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ was irrelevant to ‘an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.’ Faretta, supra at 836(V). ‘The test is not whether the accused is capable of good lawyering – but whether he [or she] knowingly and intelligently waives his [or her] right to counsel.’ Wayne v. State, 269 Ga. 36, 38(2) (495 S.E.2d 34) (1998).” Accord, Caldwell v. State , 273 Ga.App. 135, 614 S.E.2d 246 (May 2, 2005); Seymour v. State , 312 Ga.App. 462, 718 S.E.2d 354 (November 9, 2011); Duckett v. State , 331 Ga.App. 24, 769 S.E.2d 743 (March 5, 2015). But note Indiana v. Edwards (June 19, 2008), above (“States [may] insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”). Stewart v. State, 267 Ga.App. 100, 598 S.E.2d 837 (April 14, 2004). Battery and related convictions affirmed. “‘A request for self-representation must be made before trial. The denial of such a request made after the beginning of trial is not reversible error. A defendant “cannot frivolously change his mind in midstream by asserting his right to self- representation in the middle of his trial.”’ Mallory v. State, 225 Ga.App. 418, 422(4), 483 S.E.2d 907 (1997). Stewart’s request was neither unequivocal nor timely. The trial court did not err in refusing to allow Stewart to fire his counsel in the middle of the trial.” Accord, Coley v. State , 272 Ga.App. 446, 612 S.E.2d 608 (March 24, 2005); Powers v. State , 314 Ga.App. 733, 725 S.E.2d 848 (March 12, 2012); Mason v. State , 325 Ga.App. 609, 754 S.E.2d 397 (January 24, 2014). Beattie v. State, 240 Ga.App. 327, 523 S.E.2d 389 (October 8, 1999). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. No error in denying represented defendant’s pro se motion for continuance to subpoena witnesses. “A criminal defendant does not have the right to represent himself and also be represented by an attorney. Maddox v. State, 218 Ga.App. 320(1), 321, 461 S.E.2d 286 (1995). Moreover, since defendant had been represented by an attorney for more than five months before trial, we find no error because, where witnesses have not been subpoenaed and other statutory requirements have not been met, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse a postponement of trial to subpoena witnesses. Halthon-Howard v. State, 234 Ga.App. 229(1), 230, 506 S.E.2d 415 (1998).” Accord, State v. Porter , 288 Ga. 524, 705 S.E.2d 636 (February 7, 2011); Earley v. State , 310 Ga.App. 110, 712 S.E.2d 565 (June 16, 2011) (trial court properly denied represented defendant’s pro se motion for continuance); Jones v. State , 329 Ga.App. 439, 765 S.E.2d 639 (October 30, 2014); Tolbert v. Toole , 296 Ga. 357, 767 S.E.2d 24 (December 11, 2014) (pro se notice of appeal was ineffective where filed while defendant was represented by counsel of record); Thomas v. State , 331 Ga.App. 641, 771 S.E.2d 255 (March 27, 2015) (pro se speedy trial demands filed by represented defendant were “of no effect.”). Schaefer v. State, 238 Ga.App. 594, 519 S.E.2d 248 (June 7, 1999). In prosecution for cocaine trafficking, defendant filed a pro se “motion to dismiss” his appointed lawyer “and replace him with a more experienced attorney.” Five days later, defendant filed a pro se “demand,” which he asserts was a demand for speedy trial. Held, “[a]s recognized in Goodwin v. State, 202 Ga.App. 655, 656, 415 S.E.2d 472 (1992), a demand for speedy trial has no legal effect whatsoever if filed by a defendant acting pro se at a time when he is represented by counsel. … [E]ven if Schaefer informed [attorney] Greenwald and the court that he no longer desired counsel's services, Greenwald continued to represent him as counsel of record until released by the judge. See Parham v. State, 218 Ga.App. 42, 44(4), 460 S.E.2d 78 (1995); see also Uniform Superior Court Rule 30.2. It necessarily follows that a pro se demand for speedy trial filed by Schaefer before the release was without legal force.” Vick v. State, 237 Ga.App. 762, 516 S.E.2d 815 (April 27, 1999). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. Trial court properly prohibited defendant from making his own closing argument where he was represented by counsel. “Vick relies on Jackson v. State, 149 Ga.App. 496, 499(1), 254 S.E.2d 739 (1979) which reversed a conviction where the court refused to allow the defendant to speak during closing argument when he already had an attorney. The defendant had invoked his constitutional right to defend himself ‘in person, by attorney, or both.’ See Art. I, Sec. I, Par. IX, Constitution of Georgia 1976. However, that constitutional provision has been superseded by Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII, Constitution of Georgia, 1983, and a layperson no longer has the right to represent himself and also be represented by an attorney . Seagraves v. State, 259 Ga. 36, 39, 376 S.E.2d 670 (1989).” Boxer X v. State, 237 Ga.App. 526, 515 S.E.2d 668 (April 7, 1999). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed. “‘The denial of [defendant’s] request to represent himself, a request made after the testimony of the State’s [fifth] witness, cannot serve as the basis for reversal since a defendant “cannot frivolously change his mind in midstream” by asserting his right to self-representation in the middle of his trial. [Cit.]’ Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 142(2), 390