☢ test - Í

required inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.’” “We disagree with Sheppard's contention that, having ordered a mental evaluation of Sheppard which was conducted shortly before trial, the trial court had a duty to conduct a further investigation of Sheppard's mental health status based on his mother's claims on the first day of trial that he was severely mentally ill. If evidence contradicting Dr. D'Alesandro's conclusions existed, neither Sheppard, his mother, or anyone else provided it to the trial court.” “Finally, we reject Sheppard's contention that he was not mentally competent to represent himself in view of the fact that, from time to time, the trial court had to instruct him on matters such as how to properly mark exhibits, the proper form of questions during cross-examination, and how to proceed when he took the stand to testify. Any layperson might require such instructions, and their necessity did not require the trial court to conclude that Sheppard was mentally incompetent to represent himself. ” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 161, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (June 19, 2008). Trial court properly denied defendant’s right to waive assigned counsel when a mentally ill defendant was competent enough to stand trial but not competent enough to defend himself at trial. Held: The constitution does not forbid a state from insisting that a mentally ill defendant be represented by counsel . “We … conclude that the Constitution permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.” The trial judge therefore correctly denied the defendant’s request to waive counsel because the judge concluded that the defendant in his current mental state was competent enough to stand trial under the standard of Dusky v. United States , 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975) but was not competent enough to defend himself at trial. Supreme Court holds that “…the Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” The Sixth Amendment right to defend oneself at trial, which was announced in Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), is not an absolute right; the court must ensure that “proceedings […] not only be fair, they must appear fair to all who observe them.” Allowing a mentally incompetent defendant to defend himself at trial can result in an unfair proceeding and possibly in humiliation of the defendant. “In our view, a right of self-representation at trial will not affirm the dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel [citations omitted]. To the contrary […] the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.” Further, the nature of mental illnesses is such that the competence of a mentally ill defendant may vary over time. Applying a universal standard for both the competence to stand trial and the competence to defend oneself would be inappropriate because “… in certain instances an individual may well be able to work with counsel at trial, yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel.” Announces no standard or test for determining competency to self-represent; rejects standard proposed by Indiana “that would ‘deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.’” Scalia, joined by Thomas, dissents, would hold that “a defendant who is competent to stand trial, and who is capable of knowing and voluntary waiver of assistance of counsel, has a constitutional right to conduct his own defense.” 3. ON APPEAL/POST-CONVICTION Merriweather v. Chatman, 285 Ga. 765, 684 S.E.2d 237 (September 28, 2009). Habeas court erred in denying defendant’s petition to overturn his convictions for burglary, aggravated assault, and related offenses; trial court erred in allowing defendant to represent himself on appeal without engaging in colloquy to assure that his waiver of counsel on appeal was knowing and voluntary. “Following his convictions, appellant filed a motion for new trial and a hearing was held at which appellant represented himself, although the trial court appointed the public defender as stand-by counsel to assist appellant if necessary. At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial and asked appellant whether he wanted the public defender to be appointed counsel for his appeal or whether appellant wanted to proceed pro se. Appellant replied he wanted to proceed pro se. Appellant represented himself before the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction in an unreported decision.” “Although the record reflects that the trial court asked appellant several times whether he was sure he wanted to proceed without a lawyer, the record does not reflect that the trial court gave appellant any instruction or admonition about the dangers of self-representation. Thus, the habeas court erred when it denied appellant's writ based on its conclusion that appellant knew the dangers of proceeding without counsel prior to waiving his right to appellate counsel. Cochran v. State, [253 Ga. 10, 11, 315 S.E.2d 653 (1984)]. Therefore, the judgment of the habeas court is reversed. [Fn: We decline appellant's request to adopt a specific colloquy for trial courts to follow when admonishing defendants on the dangers of self-representation at trial or on appeal. See State v. Evans, [285 Ga. 67, 673 S.E.2d 243 (2009)] (record need only show that a defendant was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel); Lamar v. State, [278 Ga. 150, 152, 598 S.E.2d 488 (2004)] (colloquy regarding dangers of self-representation may vary