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related offenses, no abuse of discretion where trial court ordered defendant to have no contact with victim. “FN16: See Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 220(1) (419 S.E.2d 450) (1997) (‘When a defendant is charged with a violent crime against a specific victim, it is within the trial court's inherent powers to require that the defendant avoid any contact with the victim as a condition of remaining free pending trial. Such condition is not arbitrary or capricious; it is a reasonable response to the trial court's function of balancing the defendant's rights with the public's safety interests, while avoiding the intimidation of prosecuting witnesses.’).” Strickland v. State, 300 Ga.App. 898, 686 S.E.2d 486 (November 13, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s plea in bar based on double jeopardy; modification of DUI defendant’s pretrial bond didn’t constitute “punishment” for double jeopardy purposes. Court granted State’s motion to modify defendant’s bond noting that it was her third DUI arrest and she had a blood alcohol level of .326. “The State's motion sought to restrict her driving privileges to going to work, going to the hospital for substance abuse treatment, going to school, or going to court proceedings. The State further requested that Strickland only operate a motor vehicle with an ignition interlock device and that she submit to a DUI Court evaluation. After the trial court granted these modification, Strickland filed a ‘Plea in Bar Based Upon Procedural Double Jeopardy,’ which was denied by the trial court.” “[T]rial courts have the inherent authority to impose conditions upon bail and the court may impose reasonable restrictions on a defendant's behavior. Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 220(1) (491 S.E.2d 450) (1997).” Bond conditions aren’t “punishment” if remedial in nature and “reasonably related to public safety,” citing Bozzuto v. State, 276 Ga.App. 614 (624 S.E.2d 166) (2005). “Further, whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's point of view; in fact, the Georgia Supreme Court has held, ‘the fact that a statute designed primarily to serve remedial purposes incidentally serves the purpose of punishment as well does not mean that the statute results in punishment for double jeopardy purposes.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted). Moser v. Richmond County Bd. of Commrs., 263 Ga. 63, 64(1) (428 S.E.2d 71) (1993). Accordingly, we find that the restrictions placed on Strickland's driving privileges and the requirements that she install an ignition interlock device in her vehicle and submit to a DUI Court evaluation are not punishment. Considering Strickland's three prior convictions for driving while under the influence, these measures are rationally related to an alternative purpose as they are designed to prevent Strickland from being a danger to the community by committing future acts of driving under the influence while she was awaiting trial. Additionally, suspending a driver's license or placing restrictions on it is, in fact, the revocation of a voluntarily granted privilege, which is a traditional attribute of a remedial action. Nolen v. State, [218 Ga.App. 819, 822 (463 S.E.2d 504) (1995)].” “Accordingly, conducting a hearing to modify her bond conditions and placing limitations upon Strickland's driving privileges, predicated upon the necessity to protect the welfare and safety of the citizens of Georgia from a recidivist offender of driving under the influence, is not punishment, nor was the hearing prosecution, for the purposes of double jeopardy, and we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion.” Accord, Alden (February 29, 2012), above. Patel v. State, 283 Ga.App. 181, 641 S.E.2d 184 (December 15, 2006). In his prosecution for family violence battery, “Patel … claims that the trial court lacked the authority to impose the special bond condition that Patel have no contact with his wife. For offenses involving an act of family violence, OCGA § 17-6-1(f)(2) expressly authorizes special bond conditions that the accused ‘hav[e] no contact of any kind or character with the victim.’ Even without this express statutory authorization, Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 220(1) (491 S.E.2d 450) (1997) held that the trial court has inherent authority to impose such conditions when the defendant is charged with a violent crime against a specific victim. This enumeration must fail.” Rocco v. State, 267 Ga.App. 900, 601 S.E.2d 189 (June 17, 2004). In case of first impression, 5-2 majority adopts same standards for search of defendant free on bond, with bond condition that defendant waives rights against warrantless searches, as applies to probationers: “‘as a general rule, the police can search a probationer, who is subject to such a special condition of probation, at any time, day or night, and with or without a warrant, provided there exists a reasonable or good-faith suspicion for search, that is, the police must not merely be acting in bad faith or in an arbitrary and capricious manner (such as searching to harass probationer),’” Reece v. State , 257 Ga.App. 137, 140(2) (570 S.E.2d 424) (2002). Condition of bond was reasonable, with defendant already charged with drug distribution. Dissenters agree with the standard, but contend that the search in this case, based on a “tip from an informant of unknown reliability,” was unreasonable. Accord, Cantrell v. State , 295 Ga.App. 634, 673 S.E.2d 32 (January 23, 2009) (bond condition could not be used to justify search where officers were completely unaware of the bond condition). Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 491 S.E.2d 450 (August 22, 1997). Interlocutory appeal in prosecution for misdemeanor battery and related offenses; trial court had power to set bond conditions for misdemeanor offenses, and to revoke bond based on violation of those conditions. 1. Defendant argues that OCGA § 17-6-1(b)(1) “forbids