☢ test - Í

and its tendency “to bar reliable testimony offered by the prosecution.” Ritter v. State, 306 Ga.App. 689, 703 S.E.2d 8 (September 16, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; intoxilyzer inspection certificates were properly admitted. “Ritter cites Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), for the proposition that the documents were not admissible because they were prepared solely for the purpose of prosecution, but that case does not warrant a different result here. In Melendez-Diaz, the issue was whether certificates of analysis that showed the results of forensic analysis performed on controlled substances were testimonial in nature and thus inadmissible unless the analysts themselves testified at trial. Id. at 2530-2531(I). The Court held that the admission of the certificates without the analysts' testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 2532(II). Melendez-Diaz explained that ‘[d]ocuments kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. But that is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.’ (Citation omitted.) Id. at 2538(III)(D). In the instant case, the certificates at issue do not fall within the class of documents prohibited by Melendez-Diaz because they are not generated for the prosecution of a particular defendant. Accordingly, the documents at issue were properly admitted.” Accord, Jacobson v. State , 306 Ga.App. 815, 703 S.E.2d 376 (November 16, 2010). Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (June 25, 2009). Reversing Massachusetts Court of Appeals, a 5-4 majority finds that crime lab analyst’s certificates of drug test results was improperly admitted into evidence in violation of defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford . “The certificates reported the weight of the seized bags and stated that the bags ‘[h]a[ve] been examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’” “[T]he certificates were admitted [over objection] pursuant to state law as ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight of the narcotic ... analyzed.’” “The documents at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law ‘certificates,’ are quite plainly affidavits: ‘declaration[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.’ Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8 th ed., 2004). They are incontrovertibly a ‘“solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”’ Crawford, supra, at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The fact in question is that the substance found in the possession of Melendez-Diaz and his codefendants was, as the prosecution claimed, cocaine – the precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial. The ‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (emphasis deleted).” Note, “we do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case.” Majority rejects a number of arguments from defendant and from dissent (Kennedy, writing for Roberts, Breyer and Alito): that the lab analysts here are not “accusatory” witnesses; that they are not “conventional” or “typical” witnesses; that scientific evidence does not implicate the Confrontation Clause; that the certificates here are admissible at common law as business records; that the defendant could have subpoenaed the witness if he wanted; and finally, that the “necessities of trial” warrant relaxing the requirements of the Confrontation Clause in this instance. Cites a Georgia case, Miller v. State , 266 Ga. 850, 854-855, 472 S.E.2d 74, 78-79 (1996), and a Georgia statute, OCGA § 35-3-154.1, among other state authority, as examples of a constitutionally-permissible approach to the practical logistical challenge of presenting lab witnesses live at trial, one “requiring the defendant to give early notice of his intent to confront the analyst.” Majority rejects dissent contention that this is “burden-shifting”: “It is common to require a defendant to exercise his rights under the Compulsory Process Clause in advance of trial, announcing his intent to present certain witnesses. [Cits.] There is no conceivable reason why he cannot similarly be compelled to exercise his Confrontation Clause rights before trial.” Hamilton v. State, 297 Ga.App. 47, 676 S.E.2d 773 (March 26, 2009). Admission of business records (here, motel’s records of electronic door key use) didn’t violate defendant’s right to confrontation, as “business records properly admitted under the ‘firmly rooted’ hearsay exception do not violate ‘a defendant's right of confrontation under the Federal and State constitutions.’ (Footnotes and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76, 81 (485 S.E.2d 486) (1997).” Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E.2d 706 (November 20, 2006). “[A]n inspection certificate prepared under OCGA § 40-6-392(f) was not testimonial and was admissible,” citing Crawford, affirming Rackoff (October 5, 2005), below. Accord, Neal v. State , 281 Ga.App. 261, 635 S.E.2d 864 (August 24, 2006); Stadnisky v. State , 285 Ga.App. 33, 645 S.E.2d 545 (March 8, 2007); Phillips v. State , 289 Ga.App. 281, 656 S.E.2d 905 (January 24, 2008). 2. CHILD HEARSAY