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that the Child Hearsay Statute, as construed by this Court in Sosebee [ v. State, 257 Ga. 298, 357 S.E.2d 562 (1987)], and in other appellate cases, cannot pass constitutional muster because it fails to put the onus on the prosecution to put the child victim on the witness stand to confront the defendant. Any cases suggesting the contrary are hereby overruled.” Announces new interpretation of OCGA § 24–3–16, intended to “assure that a defendant's right to confront his accuser will be protected until a more detailed procedure is provided by a USCR or statutory amendment.” New rule requires “the prosecution to notify the defendant within a reasonable period of time prior to trial of its intent to use a child victim's hearsay statements and to give the defendant an opportunity to raise a Confrontation Clause objection. If the defendant objects, and the State wishes to introduce hearsay statements under OCGA § 24–3–16, the State must present the child witness at trial; if the defendant does not object, the State can introduce the child victim's hearsay statements subject to the trial court's determination that the circumstances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability. The trial court should take reasonable steps to ascertain, and put on the record, whether the defendant waives his right to confront the child witness.” Accord, Walker v. State , 322 Ga.App. 158, 744 S.E.2d 349 (June 11, 2013) (no Confrontation violation where trial court offered defendant opportunity to confront child victim and defendant, through counsel, declined); Arbegast v. State , 332 Ga.App. 414, 773 S.E.2d 283 (June 3, 2015) (no violation where counsel declined to question child victims before jury). 2. Error in admitting child’s testimonial statement made to police was harmless, as it was cumulative of the child’s non-testimonial statement to her mother (as to all offenses for which defendant was convicted). Accord, Welch v. State , 318 Ga.App. 202, 733 S.E.2d 482 (October 25, 2012) (any error in admitting child hearsay without offering to call the child as a court’s witness was harmless in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt, cumulative of child’s statement); Walker v. State , 322 Ga.App. 158, 744 S.E.2d 349 (June 11, 2013) (no Confrontation violation where trial court offered defendant opportunity to confront child victim and defendant, through counsel, declined); State v. Dague , 325 Ga.App. 202, 750 S.E.2d 476 (November 18, 2013). But see Ohio v. Clark (June 18, 2015), above (“Statements by very young children will rarely, if ever, implicate the Confrontation Clause.”). 3. CO-CONSPIRATORS Franklin v. State, S15A1308, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1085235 (March 21, 2016). Murder and related convictions affirmed. 1. Under pre-2013 Evidence Code, co-conspirator’s jailhouse statements to a fellow inmate, “made … at a time when the investigation was ongoing and the other conspirators remained at large, … was made during the pendency of the conspiracy,” citing Grimes (November 17, 2014), below. 2. Statement made to fellow inmate “ was clearly not intended for use in a future prosecution, and it thus cannot be classified as testimonial.” 3. Prior authority requiring certain “indicia of reliability” for co-conspirator statements to overcome confrontation concerns, Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74(II), 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), “is no longer applicable in light of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68–69, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).” Young v. State, 291 Ga. 627, 732 S.E.2d 269 (October 1, 2012). Murder and related convictions affirmed; out-of-court statements of co-conspirator during concealment phase of the conspiracy were non-testimonial. “The admission of the co- defendant's statement to the neighbor did not violate the Confrontation Clause because, as the Supreme Court stated in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177) (2004), statements admissible pursuant to the hearsay exception permitting the use of statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are not ‘testimonial.’ The admission of the neighbor's testimony repeating what co-defendant Satterfield told him during the concealment phase of the conspiracy about appellant's participation in the crimes did not violate appellant's right to confront the witnesses against him.” Accord, Billings v. State , 293 Ga. 99, 745 S.E.2d 583 (June 3, 2013) (co-conspirator’s statements to girlfriend, two weeks before his arrest, were non-testimonial); Hassel v. State , 294 Ga. 834, 755 S.E.2d 134 (February 24, 2014) (statements of co-conspirator to a friend, made during concealment phase of conspiracy after the shooting, weren’t testimonial in nature. Co-conspirator didn’t know the friend was cooperating with police.). Bowden v. State, 279 Ga.App. 173, 630 S.E.2d 792 (May 3, 2006). Statements made to police informant by co- conspirator were admissible against defendant without violating either Bruton or Crawford , where they met the requirements set out in Neason (April 27, 2004), see Evidence – Statements of Co-Defendants/Co-Conspirators – Non- Cusotdial Statements. No violation of Crawford because co-conspirator’s “statements to the informant during a criminal enterprise were undisputedly non-testimonial in nature (i.e., not designed to establish evidentiary facts), and therefore Crawford does not apply.” Accord, Toney v. State , 304 Ga.App. 25, 695 S.E.2d 355 (May 11, 2010) (co- conspirator’s statements made in setting up drug deal were not testimonial, were properly admitted as res gestae); Rainey v. State , 319 Ga.App. 858, 738 S.E.2d 685 (February 22, 2013) (same as Toney ). 4. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS